



Daily Report

East Europe

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Iran Offers Troops for UNPROFOR in Bosnia

AU0712162694 Paris AFP in English 1542 GMT
7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Dec 7 (AFP)—Iran is ready to send 10,000 troops to serve with the UN force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran's foreign minister said Wednesday [7 December], but said some Security Council members were apparently against the idea.

"We are ready to send 10,000 troops, who are well equipped, to Bosnia under the flag of the United Nations," said Ali Akbar Velayati, speaking to journalists here. He said Iran and several other Islamic nations had proposed in October to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali to send at least 20,000 men to Bosnia.

But Butrus-Ghali "said that some of the permanent members of the Security Council are against it." No countries were named, but the five permanent members are the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia.

"If you don't have enough peacekeeping forces we are ready to send at least 20,000 troops from Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Malaysia," he said he told Butrus-Ghali.

On Tuesday, foreign ministers from countries in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), meeting

here, accused the UN of bungling its mission in Bosnia—which has a Moslem-led government—and urged the UN to boost the UN Protection Force there from its current 24,000 troops to 35,000.

The OIC ministers, including Velayati, also pledged to send an Islamic force to replace any western UN troops withdrawn from the war-torn country.

Velayati, who Tuesday charged the UN had "failed miserably" in protecting UN-mandated safe areas in Bosnia, Wednesday said the question of "neutrality" of Islamic peacekeepers in Bosnia was not an issue—any more for Iran than for countries like Britain and France.

"We would be committed to do so (respect neutrality) if we were sending troops under the UN flag," the Iranian foreign minister said.

He said the United Nations had two choices: "either to preserve peace and security in Bosnia in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions."

"If it can't, then it should let the government of Bosnia defend itself," he said, suggesting this could be done by lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia which Islamic countries contest anyway.

Croatian, Bosnian, Turkish Ministers' Statement*LD0712232594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 7 Dec 94*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A joint statement from the meeting of the foreign ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Turkey was issued this evening. [passage omitted]

Assessing the course of events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the ministers decided the following:

1) To coordinate the three countries' activities in preparations for and during the upcoming summit of the ICO [Islamic Conference Organization] in Casablanca and to appeal to the ICO members to give continuing support to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and to confirm the influence of the ICO members, within the international community, by adopting a plan of action based on the principles of the UN Charter, by demanding the (correct) definition and a consistent implementation of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, by exerting pressure on the international community to provide negotiated solutions on the basis of international law, and by reiterating Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia's right to self-defense in line with the UN Charter;

2) To establish a tripartite working group at ambassadorial level, so that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia can examine—in direct contact with the authorities in certain areas—the achievements and difficulties in the process of the implementation of the agreement on the Muslim-Croat Federation, in order to assess the existing progress with a view to suggesting an adequate solution to the ministers. The authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia will grant the working group concessions and support in consulting officials in the area, including the political, governmental, and military leaderships of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as local authorities, political and religious leaders, representatives of (?business) communities, foreign diplomatic representatives, and others.

3) To establish expert groups within the governments tasked with determining the current and long-term needs for reconstruction and development and tasked with giving the ministers suggestions for initiatives and projects for possible tripartite cooperation in the fields of energy, transport, public (?working) communications, trade, industry, banking and finance, including as a separate item, the implementation of initiatives such as the setting up of a federation bank.

In the framework of this, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina will sign an agreement on visas and customs control regulations because that will considerably improve the flow of people and goods through Croatia and increase the possibilities for bilateral and tripartite cooperation.

4) To invite a Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation to take part in the next round of meetings between Turkish and

Croatian experts dedicated to the review of the initial stages of establishing a ferry and railway link between Croatia and Turkey. In this context, the ministers concluded that the agreement on the use of the port of Ploce—which is part of the Federation agreement—could improve the economic viability of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and make possible the recovery and reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would start through multiparty cooperation and aid.

5) To continue cooperation in dealing with the problem of refugees and displaced persons from and in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ministers gave their full support to the initiative that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina sign an agreement on the return of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina accommodated in third countries. In order to create conditions for an organized, dignified, and safe return of refugees, the two countries' officials will try to prepare a map of the areas where a safe return is possible at the moment. Turkey will join Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina by offering assistance in covering the expenses of transport, health care, and the rebuilding of housing in the areas of safe return, as well as the reconstruction of residential infrastructure in the territory of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation for refugees from the areas under temporary Serb occupation, who are unlikely to return in the near future.

In conclusion, the three ministers agreed to nominate their special coordinators for the problem of refugees and displaced persons.

6) The ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey agreed to accept the U.S. initiative and to nominate—as Croatia will do later—special coordinators for the problems linked to the implementation of the agreement on the federation and confederation with Croatia. They also agreed to promote jointly that initiative among the ICO members at the upcoming summit in Casablanca with a view to calling on them to grant them support and sign an agreement for the reconstruction and development of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the auspices of the United States.

7) To launch urgent preparations for the visits by a delegation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation to Turkey. The Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina ministers expressed immense gratitude for Turkey's political stances in connection with the crisis in the region, and especially for the role and activity of the Turkish peacekeeping troops with UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The three ministers expressed readiness to continue with their consultations in the future as well.

Zagreb, Sarajevo Cardinals Appeal to Powers*AU0712204194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Dec 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Archbishop of Zagreb Cardinal Franjo Kuharic, president of the Croatian Bishops' Conference, and Archbishop of Sarajevo Cardinal Vinko

Puljic, viewing the tragic events in the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, have issued an appeal to world churches and international leaders:

In the name of all believers, we urge everybody to stop the horrors of crime in our countries. All negotiations so far have not reduced or alleviated the suffering of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, let alone halted the aggression and restored international law. On all the territories under Serbian control in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, relentless ethnic cleansing is under way. At the same time, the superpowers demand from those who have been attacked to succumb to all dictates of international policy. They are also being denied legitimate defense. Zones that have been publicly placed under international protection, such as Sarajevo and Bihac, are being shelled. Encircled towns are concentration camps, where hundreds of thousands of people are hungry, cold, and in mortal danger.

International protagonists truly have not done what is expected of them. If the endangered zones, especially Sarajevo and Bihac, remain without international protection, the people there will be subjected to the terrible extermination that we have already witnessed in Vukovar and other towns.

We appeal to all those responsible for events in the world effectively to protect the principles and practices of humanity and the rights and dignity of all peoples, regardless of their religion. Experience teaches us that the preservation of the internationally recognized state borders is most important, reads the appeal that Cardinal Franjo Kuharic and Cardinal Vinko Puljic have sent to the world and the international public.

France's Lamassoure on EU's Eastward Expansion

BR0512153194 Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Dec 94
p 8

[Report by Jean Krauze: "The Hesitant Beginnings of Expansion"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw—"There will not be an a la carte Europe, but a choice of meals: a basic meal, a tourist meal, and, for the most ambitious, a gastronomic meal." The very French analogy used in Warsaw by France's Alain Lamassoure, minister delegate for European affairs, at the end of last week, was perhaps not entirely to the taste of his Polish interlocutors: It shows too clearly that in the future European restaurant, the possible "East European" guests could only aspire to the most modest choice, with the French, Germans, and a few other fortunate gourmets tackling the gastronomic menu. But Mr. Lamassoure's remarks, which explain Paris' intentions at a time when France is preparing to take over the European Union [EU] presidency, also lend themselves to a more positive interpretation: The restaurant will one day be open to all those who have the minimum required to enter it.

The French minister went a little further. At the end of a day on which he repeatedly heard it said that France should stop giving the impression that it was opposed to expansion toward Eastern Europe, Mr. Lamassoure hinted that Paris is now prepared or at least would soon be prepared to talk about dates.

Expressing the hope that, "during the French EU presidency, it will be possible to define the criteria and timetable for membership" certainly does not promise very much. But it is nonetheless a departure from the statements made by Edouard Balladur who, on a visit to Poland in July, immediately upset his hosts by explaining that "Paris is not prepared to envisage a timetable at this stage." [passage omitted]

Many West Europeans, particularly the French, think that we should take our time: Officially because the East European countries must be able to make preparations, and adapt, and because the EU must digest its first expansion and adapt its institutions. On a deeper level, some people quite simply want to postpone the date as long as possible, because they are worried about having to carrying such a burden, and are not really convinced that "Eastern Europe" deserves anything but the status of fairly privileged associate. [passage omitted]

Berisha Meets Heads of State at CSCE Summit*AU0712190494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 6 Dec 94*

[Telephone report by Zamira Koleci from Budapest]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] This morning, President Berisha held meetings with the Italian prime minister, the Austrian and Swiss presidents, and the Swedish foreign minister.

Assuring President Berisha of his government's support, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi declared to him that Albania will be at the top of the list of Italian aid to other countries. Berlusconi assured Berisha of his personal support and that of the Italian Government in order to encourage cooperation with private Italian investors so that they invest more in Albania. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Martino was present during the Berisha-Berlusconi meeting.

Austrian President Thomas Klestil, who was accompanied by Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock, told Berisha that as a European Union member, Austria will aid Albanian integration into the structures of our continent. Klestil stated that we have always favored the expanding of the EC through new members.

Swiss President Otto Stich assured President Berisha that economic assistance for Albania has always been present in Switzerland. Stich asserted that this assistance will be more sensitive in the future, particularly in encouraging investments. The Swiss president also spoke of current possibilities for establishing cooperation in banking.

During a meeting with Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev, Berisha and Zhelev stressed the fact that Albania and Bulgaria, as friendly countries that are situated in a turbulent region, have common possibilities for strengthening cooperation in various fields.

At a meeting with Kiro Gligorov, the president of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, President Berisha focused on economic problems and bilateral cooperation. He said that one of these topics is expanding cooperation, particularly in transportation and energy, and creating border facilities. Berisha stressed the fact that Albanians in Macedonia remain a factor of stability in this country, and it is important that they take an active part in Macedonian state structures. President Berisha suggested that this should be achieved through an agreement with them.

Berisha Meets Dignitaries*AU0712190794 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 7 Dec 94*

[Telephone report from Budapest by Zamira Koleci]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] As you have been informed during the past two days, President

Berisha gave his speech on the first day of the CSCE summit. During lunches and dinners hosted by the inviting party, as well as during the breaks between sessions, President Berisha met, exchanged opinions, and conducted talks with many heads of state, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and leaders of international institutions.

Among these we can mention: German Chancellor Kohl, British Prime Minister Major, Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, Turkish Prime Minister Ciller, Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez, Austrian President Klestil, Swiss President Stich, Belgian Prime Minister Dehaene, Hungarian President Goncz and Prime Minister Horn, Luxembourg Prime Minister Santer, Bulgarian President Zhelev, Bosnian President Izetbegovic, Croatian President Tudjman, FYROM President Gligorov, European Commission Chairman Delors, Council of Europe Secretary General Tarchys, U.S. Secretary of State Christopher, German Foreign Minister Kinkel, French Foreign Minister Juppe, Italian Foreign Minister Martino, Israel's chief of diplomacy Peres, Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias, etc.

The course of bilateral relations and that of reforms, as well as developments in the region, were topics of discussions. These meetings displayed an assessment of the great progress of the economic reform, the market economy, and standards of democracy in Albania. They stressed Albania's role as a factor of peace and stability, as well as the need to have all-around support for the consolidation of democracy in Albania, the establishment of the nation's economy, and our country's integration into European structures.

President Berisha is to return to Tirana today.

Commentary Criticizes Recent Cabinet Changes*AU0812073294 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 6 Dec 94 p 3*

[Commentary by Prec Zogaj: "Meksi Government Partially Reshaped"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Dubious Compromise of the Party With the Presidency

The profound changes in the government, announced so noisily in advance by Democratic Party [PD] chairman Eduard Selami in his postmortems following 6 November [constitutional referendum date], remind one of the phrase "a shadow of their former selves." Indeed, we do not know how Mr. Selami measures depth, and he may rest content with the breadth of his alterations. However, if one casts an eye at the presidential decree, one realizes that the promises to take a critical look at and determined action against complex defects of government have failed at the last hurdle. The most surprising thing is that the changes as a whole run in the

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opposite direction to that announced, and are not motivated by the struggle against corruption or incompetence. These problems still remain taboo subjects under the PD's roof, while it seems that clan interests, conflicts, and compromises are setting the scene for fruitless political movements at the helm of the state.

Parliamentary Group's Vote Ignored

About a week ago, the PD parliamentary group was invited to a secret vote on the Democratic ministers of the Meksi government. Seven members of the government did not receive an adequate number of votes—including Defense Minister Safet Zhulali, one of President Berisha's high-fliers, and, it seems, one of the trump cards in his pragmatic political hand. There is a chance that Zhulali may have become a focus for unarticulated conflict between the party and the presidency. Berisha, who could not in any way agree to being so significantly disarmed before the eyes of the world, has decided to ignore the useless vote of the parliamentary group, also ignoring the accusations of corruption at the Defense Ministry. Zhulali remains the minister. Thus, the anticipated reaction becomes muted and forestalled, and there is now room for smaller concessions and compromises. Dashamir Shehi rises to the post of deputy prime minister, but finance is not left in his hands. Agron Musaraj, invited into the party and the parliamentary group, becomes strengthened as interior minister. Dylber Vrioni, an engineer, takes over the Finance Ministry as a guarantee that customs and transit operations in Albania will proceed as before. The "game" has apparently ended in a draw, even though the compromise slightly favors Berisha. This compromise has been sought and achieved at the ironic price of a retreat from the promised struggle against signs of corruption, flagrant violations of the law, and well-documented anti-democratic behavior.

Militants of the Referendum Rewarded

Another striking aspect of the decree on the government changes is the reward of militants who favored a "yes" vote in the 6 November referendum. Mr. Hektor Frasheri has replaced Mr. Kudret Cela as justice minister. The face of the new justice minister will be familiar to the attentive television viewer. It filled the screen twice during that extraordinary campaign to persuade the people to vote "yes." The new but no longer young minister made an impression on me during this campaign because of the conspicuous shallowness of his arguments in defense of the now-rejected draft. His enthusiasm for the draft did not permit the slightest doubt. This is perhaps why, having once been put on television as part of a group of lawyers, he was paraded one more time in a solo performance as a single lawyer for that laughable program, "Discussing the Draft Constitution." Now that the state leadership itself has made known the criticisms of the Council of Europe and other institutions regarding our draft constitution, the enthusiasm of Frasheri the lawyer would, under normal circumstances, now speak against his talents as a lawyer, a

profession in which his shortcomings struck me as incredibly infantile. I hope that I am mistaken in my subjective impressions. We will see how the independence of the judiciary fares under the new minister.

It is superfluous to underline that writer Teodor Laco was also rewarded with a ministerial post precisely because of his attitudes to the referendum. They are his attitudes, and I do not intend to judge them; nor do I have a right to do so. As a colleague, however, I would have liked Laco to make a career in a more becoming fashion. For the past four years, Laco has been sully his name, by his own choice, by adopting the position of a state conformist. It must be made clear in this context that his appointment as minister of culture cannot be an effective signal to conformism in Albanian culture.

Others have been also rewarded for militantism during the referendum, although normally, according to the PD's own predictions, justice would pass into the hands of those who had criticisms and reservations regarding the text or the draft constitution and who were not on the government's side.

Coalition Does Not Expand But Shrinks

Another aspect of the decree is the total lack of "meat" to justify the PD's promise to expand the coalition with right-wing elements. Perhaps the talks with the National Front and Legality failed, and the PD remained alone. Talks do not always yield results, and there things happen. However, the surprise to me is the narrower representation of the spectrum of opinion within the PD. Four or five relatively young ministers, whom the public has seen as moderate, have been removed. Thus, the moderates within the PD have suffered a fresh blow, giving ground once again to party favoritism and militantism.

A Slight Reversion to Political Government

The Meksi government that emerged from the 22 March [1992] elections was a political government. Almost imperceptibly, with the passage of time, technical ministers without any specific political responsibility for their work have been invited to join it. Day before yesterday's decree shows a tendency to strengthen the government's political hue, especially with the appointment of Dylber Vrioni and Njazi Kosovrasti. In an Albanian context, this is a positive development. It is necessary in Albania for the government to carry political responsibility, i.e. to consider in every step it takes the voters that stand behind it. However, this slight turnaround is only a peripheral element in the new governmental changes, which will neither satisfy citizens' demands nor fulfill the PD's promises.

Thus, we will have nothing new in the policies of the state, while the now doubtful idea of a future democratic-liberal government has become further shrouded in mist.

Operation Results in Seizure of Contraband Fuel

AU0812095094 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 6 Dec 94 p 3

[Report by "A.P.": "Twenty-two Tanker Trucks of Contraband Fuel Seized"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Albanian Government's November decision placing even greater emphasis on combating fuel smuggling, police in Shkoder and Malesia e Madhe districts, with the assistance of special deployment forces, recently completed an operation that concluded with the seizure of 22 tanker trucks laden with fuel believed to be involved in cross-border traffic. Smuggling in these two districts has been a problem preoccupying the authorities, and the police have frequently seized quantities of fuel destined to cross the Albanian-Montenegrin water border. The Albanian press has also involved itself in this topic deeply, sometimes with prejudice and speculative data.

Efforts to prevent fuel-smuggling last year and this year have led to the seizure and confiscation of fuel by the police. Five fuel smugglers were brought before a Shkoder court and convicted in September of this year. However, the quantity seized on this occasion is the largest since the beginning of the embargo against the former Yugoslavia. It involves about 888,000 liters of fuel seized (word indistinct) from its appointed destination, and with irregular, inadequate, or falsified documentation. On the basis of this evidence, the police have confiscated this fuel, passing documentation on the case to the Financial Police. The Albanian Government's decision to step up the battle against oil smuggling, which is now being seriously enforced, involves among other things the compilation of proper documentation for the import of fuel by private firms and also by those dealing in wholesale or retail fuels. The decision also authorizes the police to destroy fuel depots established by local smugglers along the Albanian-Montenegrin water border.

People Said Detained on 'Conjecture', Tortured

AU0812103394 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 4 Dec 94 p 11

[Report by Afrim Maliqi: "Hypothetical Accusations, Real Violence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lawyers Kelmendi, Destan Rukiqi, Nakibe Kelmendi, and Fazli Balaj [names as published] held a news conference yesterday following the mass arrests of former Albanian employees of Kosova internal affairs authorities. According to information so far, more than 100 people have been arrested and court proceedings have been held in several Kosova district courts. At the news conference, journalists were also provided a public communique stressing that these people have been arrested on the basis of conjecture and tortured in the most brutal fashion.

The communique states that a large number of those arrested have been interrogated by investigators and taken into custody for 30 [figure as published] days, the maximum length of time an investigator can hold someone. Others detained are being held by the internal affairs authorities and handed over to the investigators for interrogation at intervals. Virtually all of those arrested have been detained by the internal affairs authorities for more than three days, i.e. beyond the legal maximum. Such behavior on the part of the internal affairs authorities constitutes illegal detention, a punishable offense even under Serbia's Penal Code. Neither the public prosecutor nor the investigator has taken any steps to prevent this unlawful treatment. Physical violence has also been used against the detainees during their detention. This fact has also been recorded in the records of the suspects' interrogation by the investigators. The suspects' defense lawyers have proposed that these persons be sent for examination to the Institute of Forensic Medicine in Prishtina, in order to verify the physical injuries they have suffered as a result of torture and the use of force. The defense lawyers' warning that serious physical torture is being used against these people was recently confirmed by the violent death of Ismail Raka from Kacanik, who died in a police station on 30 November.

The Albanian lawyers' communique goes on to state that what is most serious is that, even after the interrogation by the investigator, the internal affairs authorities, in direct contravention of the law, have continued to subject suspects to questioning late into the night, using physical and psychological torture and threatening them with physical elimination. Avi Mehmedoviqi, Blerim Olloni, Isak Aliu, Shermet Ahmeti, Destan Thaci, etc. have been subjected to this treatment. The suspects' defense lawyers have drawn the attention of the investigators and the judge of the court to these cases, pointing out that these people are in prison following a court decision.

The communique concludes by stating that the detainees' families visited the suspects on 1 December and the suspects informed them that they were being subjected to torture. They therefore all sought defense lawyers.

Continuing the news conference, the lawyers dwelt on special aspects of this affair. Bajram Kelmendi said that other methods besides torture are being used against the detainees in order to break them down. Members of their families are being arrested, mistreated, and subjected to nightly summons. There have even been cases in which their homes have been sequestered. Azem Villasi, defender of Enver Ramizi from Gjiilan, said that investigator Nikolic had not allowed him to meet his client. The investigator had obliged this detainee to sign forcibly extracted statements.

Lawyer Fazli Balaj said that relatives who have had the opportunity to meet the detainees were severely shocked

by their condition. The arrestees have sought help from their lawyers and from the public, in order to secure their rescue from the tortures of the Serbian police.

Failure To Lead Nation Toward Europe Noted

AU0812104894 *Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 4 Dec 94 p 2*

[Article by Altin Hazizaj: "Broken-Down Jalopies Not Allowed in the Council of Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The land of the eagles is still far from attaining its dream of entering the Council of Europe. This membership now seems like a mirage taunting people weary of poverty and reform. Since the democratic changes, although many of these people have had the opportunity to visit Western countries, none have gone as they would have liked. The demands for highly qualified workers among the countries of the 12 have obliged Albanians to take menial jobs or to become involved in smuggling and crime. Meanwhile, the Meksi Government has shown that it is incapable of steering the broken-down Albanian jalopy toward Europe.

Although European political circles promptly turned their attention to Albania, giving its 3 million inhabitants the chance to become members of the Council of Europe like many countries of the East, the Albanian president refused. Although he persisted in sporting the European "cockade," he nevertheless behaved differently behind Europe's back. At home, political arrests and imprisonments became commonplace. Outrages to human rights and freedoms became a feature of the system, which was corrupted by smuggling politicians. Meanwhile, Islamic fundamentalism continues to lurk behind the veils of 10-year-old girls.

He responded to Europe's demands to rigorously enforce the European documents he had signed by expelling the specialists of the "Task Force Albania" program from Albania. Meanwhile, by losing the referendum, Berisha proved to the countries of the 12 that his reputation at home has sunk to the same level as it has abroad. Europe's memory, which remembers Albania's mistakes, did not delay in its reply. The doors of Europe will be closed this January session, as far as discussing Albania's membership is concerned.

Mr. Luan Hajdaraga, deputy chairman of the Socialist Party, said: "We as a party consider the matter of the constitution to be the reason for our failure to enter Europe. The imprisonment of our leader Fatos Nano is also an important factor."

The other opposition parties also agree on the point of the referendum. They say that this is the main reason, followed by others. We understood from a conversation with Mr. Arben Imami, member of the presidency of the Democratic Alliance, that Berisha's loss of reputation abroad is also a reason this failure should be admitted. "Europe imagined that the Albanian people had what they deserved in President Berisha. At the moment that

he lost his reputation among the people, the 12 decided to leave outside an Albania represented by a despot of a president...."

"I do not agree with this idea," objected Mr. Petrit Kalakula, chairman of the Democratic Party of the Right. "It is not the constitution that prevented our entry, but the low level of democracy in Albania and continual violations of the rights of the individual."

Mr. Paskal Milo, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party—which played an important part in bringing down the draft constitution—outlined his version of the real reason. "The constitution," he said, "and the imprisonments of Fatos Nano and of the five criminal leaders of Omonia were decisive in ensuring that the question of Albania will not be discussed in January."

While Albania's 3 million inhabitants will not have the chance to realize their four-year-old dream, the Democratic Party and Sali Berisha, head of the Albanian state, continue to obstruct the urgent approval of the constitution and the release of political prisoners. The government, accused by the opposition of corruption, has still not tendered its resignation. Berisha, during a news conference, has yet again put forward the idea of approving the constitution via referendum. The Albanians remind one of a sinner knocking at the gates of paradise. As long as the land of the eagles is ruled by Berisha, there is very little chance of its becoming a member of the Council of Europe. Europe is fed up with the sins of the Albanian Government. Broken-down jalopies are not allowed to enter the Council of Europe.

Currency From Workers Abroad

95BA0033A *Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 4 Nov 94 p 12*

[Article by Gerd Hoehler: "Albania Lives Off Its People's Exodus; Money Sent Home Keeps Economy of Europe's Poorhouse Afloat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Omonia Square in Athens is not the only place where they draft around in the early morning hours. They have long had their own meeting places in every one-horse town in the provinces. In recent months, the Greek police have apprehended and deported, by the tens of thousands, Albanian workers who have entered the country illegally. However, it looks as if they have all returned. Each one of them leads a pitiable existence, taken advantage of by unscrupulous employers paying starvation wages, exploited by greedy apartment owners who demand exorbitant rent for a closet-sized room, chased by the police. But together these shabbily clothed illegal workers represent a considerable economic force. They are primarily responsible for the fact that Albania, Europe's poorest country, is able to remain somewhat afloat economically.

Although the Ministry of Labor in Tirana cannot provide any exact figures, it is estimated that as many as 350,000 Albanians are at present working in neighboring

countries. This would correspond to at least one-tenth of the population. The vast majority of these temporary emigrants, an estimated 300,000, are in Greece. "Let the Albanians do that" has long been a standard catch phrase there when hard or dirty work must be done that a native is no longer willing to undertake. Meanwhile, nearly every Greek village has two or three Albanian odd-jobbers. They help farmers during the harvest, carry goods and bags of cement, or shovel stinking sludge out of drainage pits—at a daily wage that is half of what a Greek would demand but that is still more than even a skilled worker takes home in an entire week in the homeland.

Most Important Source of Foreign Exchange

Emigration not only relieves the Albanian labor market, which is only gradually beginning to recover from the collapse of the antiquated industry; the guest worker drachmas remitted from Greece have become the country's most important source of foreign exchange. In 1992, these remittances amounted to the equivalent of 225 million German marks [DM], while last year they exceeded DM500 million. That corresponded to three times the country's export earnings and even surpassed incoming foreign aid, which most recently amounted to DM450 million.

Besides these remittances, further hundreds of millions come through in the form of consumer goods. Entire truckloads pass the border crossings at Kakavia and Kristallopigi. Owing to the chaotic customs clearance situation, there are no exact figures, but since the beginning of the year alone, an estimated 250,000 refrigerators, 150,000 electric ranges, 120,000 television sets, 100,000 washing machines, and the same number of space heaters have passed under the barriers.

Next to agriculture, which has now begun to flourish, the guest worker money is the strongest engine of economic growth. After the GDP shrank a total of 35 percent between 1989 and 1992, a first-time growth of 11 percent was achieved in 1993. The estimate for this year is 8 percent. This would be the highest rate of any European country.

The upswing is discernible most of all from the large number of newly opened shops, restaurants, and bars in the capital, Tirana. The abundance of goods in store windows, the satellite dishes on many balconies, and the increasingly fashionable clothing of people on the street are in glaring contrast to conditions under the Stalinist dictatorship, which outlawed lipstick, makeup, high heels, and foreign television as "Western-decadent."

But the lavish retail displays, the flourishing hamburger restaurants, and the omnipresent cola ads cannot hide the fact that Albania is still deep in crisis. A number of the new acquisitions have limited practical value: What good is a fax machine if the telephone network is continually breaking down; what good is a personal computer if electricity power is constantly being lost; what good is a washing machine if tap water is available only sporadically, as is the case in many neighborhoods even in Tirana? Moreover, only a small number of citizens can afford the luxury goods, some of which are imported through proper channels—although more frequently they are smuggled from Greece or by way of the Adriatic. Gourmet restaurants can be visited only by foreign businessmen or local millionaires, of which there already appears to be a considerable number, thanks to many shady deals.

The biggest problem is still unemployment. President Sali Berisha recently cited the figure "14 to 18 percent." Foreign observers question the reliability of the Albanian statistics. They estimate that the national average is well over 20 percent. In the former industrial districts of the north, it is probably even 40 percent or higher.

However, the successfully completed privatization of agriculture underscores the fact that the situation is less hopeless than many feared after the total collapse of the Stalinist planned economy. On the other hand, foreign investment has so far lagged well behind expectations. This has had less to do with political reservations on the part of the investors than with the inadequacies of the infrastructure. It will take years, together with massive foreign aid and, not least of all, further guest worker remittances, before the foundations for a permanent economic upswing can be laid.

Judicial Council Appoints Acting Prosecutor

AU0712144694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Judicial Council has appointed Colonel Nikolay Kolev deputy chief prosecutor of Bulgaria and chief prosecutor of the Armed Forces. Colonel Kolev has been proposed for this post by Chief Prosecutor Ivan Tatarchev.

Colonel Kolev will carry out his functions temporarily, said Vladislav Slavov, deputy chief prosecutor and spokesman for the Supreme Judicial Council.

DPS Leader Discusses Philosophy, Rival Parties

AU0812071494 Sofia PRAVA I SVOBODI in Bulgarian No. 23, 2 Dec 94 pp 1, 2

[Interview with DPS Chairman Ahmed Dogan by Halid Daalu, editor in chief of PRAVA I SVOBODI; place and date not given: "DPS Lays Its Bets on Pragmatism in Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Daalu] Is the idea of "a bouquet of ethnic groups" realizable at this stage; and what, in your view, are the real chances of making it part of the country's political life?

[Dogan] The idea of "a bouquet of ethnic groups" is connected with the new policy that we have been implementing from the outset to address the problem of human and minority rights in Bulgaria. We chose the path of the so-called Bulgarian model—the path of dialogue, action through legislation, and placing all the ethnic groups at all levels of power on an equal footing. From this viewpoint, the future DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement] parliamentary group will represent a real incarnation of this idea. In a civil society, the rights and freedoms of the minorities are truly a fundamental factor that determines the face of democracy. They act as a corrective and a criterion for democracy itself.

The bouquet of ethnic groups already presupposes that citizens—who have equal rights and responsibilities in developing a new democratic, civil society—are also treated equally. I am glad that our candidate lists contain representatives of the main ethnic group: 23 Bulgarians, six of whom have good chances of being elected. We also have 28 Gypsy representatives, several of whom have good chances of election, plus the main group of candidates from the Turkish ethnic group. I would be pleased if, after the next elections, a parliamentary group like ours also included Armenians and Jews, who would assume the same responsibility of addressing the problems of the transition that directly affect them. [passage omitted]

[Daalu] For a long time the unity of the DPS disturbed the sleep of certain formations and individuals. Now, it seems, many of them must be pleased, because both Nedim Gendzhev and Mehmet Hodja have registered

their own parties.... What is your view, has the unity of the DPS' followers been destroyed, and will this affect the election campaign?

[Dogan] It is true that for a long time the unity of the DPS disturbed many people. Now, some are smirking with satisfaction because prominent persons like Nedim Gendzhev and Mehmet Hodja are sowing dissension in our ranks and thus arousing doubt over whether or not the DPS voters are unified. I am convinced that those playing these games do not understand the nature of our electorate. This is a matter of the survival of basic principles that concern a substantial proportion of our country's citizens.

Election campaign strategies based primarily on tried and tested ideas already implemented by the DPS are imitative and ridiculous. I consider that the people who want to introduce an element of dissension among our electorate and in our party ranks have simply backed the wrong horse. We do not intend to waste time by opposing such tendencies. Quite the contrary, we smile to ourselves and let these things take their course. In our view, these are people who still do not know what they want. Many of them are attempting to form parties or party groupings because they feel offended or unsatisfied in their personal ambitions. One thing is clear: Many people dream of power who have no idea what to do with it, but are merely seeking a cozy corner and security for themselves. I am surprised that people like Mehmet Hodja—who should, first and foremost, explain to the voters what they were doing in the period from 1985 to 1989, as active participants in the "revival process" [campaign to force ethnic Turks to change their names and rites] - are now presenting themselves to the voters and want to assume responsibilities and express the common will. His Highness The Voter shoulders a big responsibility by casting his vote for one of these parties that claim to be an alternative or antithesis to the DPS because, in the final analysis, the voter casts his ballot for himself—his own image, his own standards, his own views, and his own world outlook. I am very sad that people like Nedim Gendzhev and Mehmet Hodja, who represent nationalistic tendencies—I also mean parties—appear on our television screens and make statements about banning other parties like the DPS, and so on. I am amazed that people who cannot even represent themselves are trying to represent others.

[Daalu] The DPS is accused of not caring enough for its own voters, failing to provide jobs and not showing any interest in the problem of purchasing the tobacco crop....

[Dogan] I can answer these accusations directly: Political parties do not distribute jobs. A party represents the common will and is a performer in the game of government. By manipulating the levers of power it can only provide conditions for creating new jobs. However, a party is not a bank, nor an enterprise that gives out jobs. The DPS is perhaps the only party that entered the present election campaign with its 1991 election promises almost completely fulfilled. I say almost because a

few things do remain outstanding, such as television transmissions in the Turkish language, which have not been implemented.

As regards the tobacco problem, the DPS did something for its electorate that no other party has achieved. I am sure that the problems of the tobacco industry will disappear, because markets now already exist. It should be clear to everyone that a party does not create a market. The market is an objective concept, and not something achieved by imposing desired schemes in the current business situation of an economic system. The DPS will continue to do everything necessary to promote job creation. Here I would like to point out that a party that promises to create new jobs is certainly regarded as a company or a factory organization. [passage omitted]

Shevardnadze on Relations, Abkhazian Conflict

AU0712162894 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 3 Dec 94 p 11

[Interview with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze by Momchil Indzhov; place and date not given: "Eduard Shevardnadze: Terrible War Could Begin From Caucasus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Indzhov] Eduard Amvrosyevich, Willy Betz and SOMAT [International Truck Transportation Economic Trust] just presented their views concerning the Burgas-Poti transportation corridor. Are you optimistic about the idea?

[Shevardnadze] Of course. I believe in the idea of an Asiatic corridor because it is a very promising one. For me it is exceptionally interesting and represents one of the most important elements in the Asiatic economic space. The specific work related to implementing the idea could begin in the next few days or shortly thereafter. The main thing is to assess the idea carefully—this is something the experts should do—and proceed toward specific actions.

[Indzhov] Could certain circumstances in Georgia prevent the implementation of the idea?

[Shevardnadze] Yes, it is possible. Three basic factors are necessary for the implementation of the idea: First, stability in the countries through which the cargoes will be transported. Thank God, in Georgia this factor already exists. We already are a stable country with guaranteed safety along our roads, highways, and railroads. You can rest assured about this. The same already applies to Azerbaijan, where the corridor will pass—precisely through the zone of the local conflict with Armenia.

Second, an appropriate draft must be prepared. Various departments of the interested countries are dealing with this at present. Simultaneously, we will deal with relations of the countries through whose territory the corridor will pass. Nothing real can be achieved without a draft. If we want to accelerate this project, we must work together.

Third, there must be cooperation among the countries. I think that an international organization with the participation of Bulgaria, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia must be established in the future. We will probably thus be able to achieve better coordination in implementing the project. As you can see, only the first factor is evident so far.

[Indzhov] Both Bulgaria and Georgia are members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. How do you see our countries' relations within the framework of that organization?

[Shevardnadze] It is difficult to separate Sofia-Tbilisi relations from the relations of all member-countries. Recently I note increased activity on the part of the business circles of our countries, which contributes to developing economic relations. We have also established good contacts at the government level. Your deputy prime minister visited here recently, and we conducted interesting talks on specific subjects. I hope that such meetings will continue in the future. The geographic location, traditions, and common interests of our countries facilitate our relations.

[Indzhov] Our trade union leader Konstantin Trenchev and various Bulgarian businessmen visited you recently. Why has there been no meeting between the presidents of Bulgaria and Georgia? Might we expect such a meeting in the near future?

[Shevardnadze] I have repeatedly invited President Zhelev to visit Georgia. We reached an agreement with him to solve our specific problems through negotiations. As regards me myself, I have also been repeatedly invited by your president to visit Bulgaria. However, as you see, the situation in Georgia is not easy, and I still cannot go to Bulgaria. I hope to see President Zhelev soon in Budapest. We have met several times and I respect him very much.

[Indzhov] You said recently that a terrible war could begin from the Caucasus. Do you continue to think so, and why?

[Shevardnadze] Yes, if the conflicts there, which have been prompted by the specific character of the region, are not resolved on time.

[Indzhov] You have many friends and enemies. With what balance do you greet the new year?

[Shevardnadze] Every politician, especially a head of state, has both friends and enemies. Nevertheless, I think the majority of Georgians are on my side.

[Indzhov] How do you view the Abkhazian separatists who declared Vladislav Ardzinba their president?

[Shevardnadze] I have already made the appropriate statement on this subject. This is an incredible stupidity on their part and I do not intend to conduct any negotiations with them. Their step harms both Georgia and Abkhazia.

[Indzhov] Eduard Amvrosyevich, has Georgia requested Bulgarian weapons for the war in Abkhazia?

[Shevardnadze] We have not conducted talks on this matter. Well, if Bulgaria wants to send us weapons we would not object. (laughing)

[Indzhov] You first gave an example of civilized behavior when you ordered your guards in parliament to surrender their arms. How do you intend to disarm the numerous armed militia that are active in Georgia and seize the huge arsenal of weapons that people say they have?

[Shevardnadze] Some of them voluntarily surrendered their weapons. The police conduct frequent searches and seize concealed weapons. This really is a problem, but I hope it can be resolved.

[Indzhov] You were among the leading Soviet reformers, but you resigned after warning about the impending coup. Are you not concerned that you might share Gorbachev's fate?

[Shevardnadze] No, I have nothing to fear. When I sense that the time has come to leave, I will immediately go.

Havel Discusses European Integration, CSCE

AU0712142394 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in
Czech 2 Dec 94 pp 1, 23

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Petr Stepanek; place and date not given: "I Want European Europe, a Europe of All Its Nations and States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Stepanek] You were known for your vision of a united Europe long before November 1989. How do you feel now about your ideas of that time? And how does Vaclav Havel view the "old continent" at the turn of the millennium?

[Havel] If we consider the past years from the vantage point of today and our hopes of that time, we can only conclude that, although one must admit that the world is moving in the direction we wanted it to move, it is moving at a snail's pace. The new European order is emerging only with tremendous difficulty. It seems that no sufficiently clear visions exist regarding this order, and there is a danger that, if the democrats do not create this order in time, someone else in the spectrum from Zhirinovskiy to Milosevic will do it for them. It would be a great shame if our generation could not cope with this historic task. The united democratic Europe was a fascinating vision for a number of generations of politically thinking inhabitants of this continent. Although many people endorse the idea of a united Europe, one cannot but notice that the ideas about it are rather diverse. It is not to the detriment of the matter. What is important is that the new order is truly durable, and therefore it must be just. Hence, it must be based on truly free will of the nations.

[Stepanek] There is no doubt that, in this respect, the humane "Mitterrand-type" vision was closer to you than the pragmatic "Kohl-type" vision. Has your opinion changed since then?

[Havel] I certainly would not underestimate pragmatic solutions during the integration process. Europe could never unite without them. I only believe that pragmatic solutions in themselves are not enough. They must be in balance with more general ideas that give deeper meaning to the entire integration and, therefore, also greater durability.

[Stepanek] You will attend the CSCE summit in Budapest at the beginning of next week. What can the participants and Europeans expect from Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, this time?

[Havel] The CSCE played a great positive role in the last stage of the existence of communist regimes in Europe. The conditions in Europe are different now, new problems emerged, and the CSCE must come to terms with this development. It must adjust to it if it is to play the expected role—that is, the main instrument for providing stability, security, mutual trust, and cooperation in the Euroatlantic space.

The Budapest summit is to contribute to achieving this goal. Because of its exacting nature and the decision-making method in the CSCE, which requires everyone's approval, no very rapid development can be expected. The nature of the CSCE militates rather for constant "antlike" work. An important prerequisite for the success of the CSCE is the political will to reach an agreement with the partners while taking their interests into consideration. This aspect will certainly play a large role in bilateral talks, many of which are expected to take place during the summit. I myself will meet with several counterparts here. Although the Czech Republic is not directly involved in any serious European problem, I believe that our delegation, which I will head at the summit, will fulfill its obligations with respect to the international community.

[Stepanek] Your representative obligations to the world have acquired an even more profound dimension in the post of Czech president than during your Czechoslovak "presidency." On the other hand—excuse me for saying this—even Vaclav Havel has "lost his novelty" in the world. To what degree are you now able to implement not only the Czech ethically philosophical views but also the security-related, political, and economic interests of the small Czech Republic abroad?

[Havel] I prefer to do something specific. I like it when work shows some results. I consider myself a creative and orderly person, and to assume the form of a mere symbol would not satisfy me, even if I do not underestimate the representative and symbolic role of head of state. Foreign policy is a wide stream of diverse activities. Some of them, like great speeches at important international forums, are more attractive to an observer than others. I participate, however, in the formation and implementation of the foreign policy of our country in its full extent, which certainly includes the security or economic interests of the Czech Republic. True, this activity remains somewhat concealed, although it takes up a lot of my work schedule.

[Stepanek] How do you understand the "route of the Czech Republic to Europe"? Do you, who "became famous" as early as the turn of 1989 and 1990 by an accommodating gesture toward the (at that time still Western) FRG also share the opinion that it passes "through" Germany or is the route "through" France and other European, albeit smaller, countries more attractive to you?

[Havel] Our conjured "route to Europe" passes through the integration of the Czech Republic into the key European and transatlantic institutions. These are, above all, the European Union and NATO. These institutions have their internal structures, which delimit satisfactory space for the states of all sizes and sufficiently respect their diverse specific characteristics. That is because they are built on democratic principles. Of course, while bilateral relations between states continue to be of great importance—we, too, will always have our

neighbors or a better mutual understanding with some states than with others—the multilateral perception of common goals is becoming ever more pronounced in the integrating Europe. I believe that our relations with other European nations will develop in harmony with this trend. Hence, I want neither a German nor a French Europe. I want a European Europe—that is, a Europe of all its nations and states.
Latvian Presidents

LD0712143694 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Lithuanian and Latvian Presidents Algirdas Brazauskas and Guntis Ulmanis are visiting the Czech Republic today. Our correspondents Eva Hulkova and Miroslav Konvalina report from Prague Castle, where the two representatives had separate talks with Vaclav Havel this morning.

[Hulkova] Following the talks with Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, President Havel said he is pleased that it was possible to hold a meeting with the Baltic representatives as a follow-up to the CSCE summit. [passage omitted]

[Konvalina] In view of the fact that Lithuania and the other two Baltic countries are trying to come closer to the European Union and NATO, we asked President Brazauskas whether he regards the Czech Republic as a competitor in Lithuania's efforts to join the West European economic and security structures. This is what the Lithuanian president told Czech radio:

[Begin Brazauskas recording, in Lithuanian with superimposed Czech translation] No, I do not think we are competing. We know that the Czech Republic is several steps ahead of us. We can make use of your experience and take the well-tried path. I know we are heading in the same direction, but we will try not to lag too far behind. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Defense Minister Holan Comments on U.S. Visit

AU0712214094 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 5 Dec 94 p 1

[Article by "gag": "For Joining NATO, We Have the Support of the United States and Canada"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Regardless of the very intensive efforts of Russia to prevent the Central European countries from becoming members of NATO, the Czech Republic obtained the support of the United States and Canada, both of whom are advocates of the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Defense Minister Vilem Holan made this statement on returning from the United States and Canada. He added that Washington and Ottawa are demonstrating their political will by practical suggestions for a faster telecommunication and computer-system compatibility of the Czech Army with the NATO systems. According to Minister Holan, the discussion with the U.S. partners focused on solving these technical issues. Their experience indicates, among other things, that modern systems of control and command can not only significantly save the operational costs of the armed forces, but also play a decisive role in effective execution of combat operations. Holan's discussion on the technical questions regarding the Army control systems culminated in a visit to the Continental Air Defense Command Center. According to the minister, studies of Czech officers at U.S. military academies also contribute to a significant increase in the Army's intellectual potential. "They are men who are not only very well prepared in their field of expertise, but also newly motivated for service in the transforming Army of the Czech Republic," Holan said.

LSU Elects Milos Petera as Party Chairman

AU0812072094 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 5 Dec 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "New LSU Chairman Was Elected"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague—At the 3 December congress of the Liberal Social Union [LSU] in Zdar nad Sazavou, Milos Petera was elected as the new LSU chairman to replace the resigning Frantisek Trnka. Petera is a technician at the Nymburk sugar refinery and was elected to the Union presidium only recently, Trnka said of his successor. [passage omitted]

Kukan on NACC Meeting, NATO Expansion*AU0712205094 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in
Slovak 5 Dec 94 pp 1, 7*

[Article by Ivan Horský: "E. Kukan on Brussels and Before the Summit in Budapest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Slovak Foreign Minister E. Kukan is absolutely unattainable these days. He returned from Brussels during the evening of 3 December. There, on Friday, he had taken part in a meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and on Saturday morning, along with other partners from Central and East Europe, he met with U.S. Secretary of State W. Christopher. Today, he is accompanying President M. Kováč in Budapest, where a two-day Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit is being held.

It is even possible to say that the recent and coming days will shake Europe. The NATO Council, involving the member countries' foreign ministers, approved, so to speak, a timetable for the Alliance's expansion toward the East, thus sending a clear signal to all doubters that it really intends to do this. Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev, however, reacted surprisingly curtly to this decision. Nevertheless, it did not unsettle the NATO members too much. Kukan, in reply to a question on how he assesses the situation, said very diplomatically: "The NATO states are convinced that, sooner or later, Russia will sign the documents on cooperation with NATO because it is in its interest. In their view, Kozyrev is facing a rather complicated situation at home because certain circles, including some close to Yeltsin, are accusing him of making too many concessions to the West. Moreover, he was, perhaps, trying to gain time for Moscow so it could draw up its strategy for the CSCE summit, where B. Yeltsin is scheduled to meet B. Clinton today."

The issue of NATO's expansion was also the main topic of W. Christopher's aforementioned meeting with his partners from Central and East Europe. It was the second (after Warsaw, during the U.S. President's visit) such meeting, but this time the foreign ministers of the three Baltic countries were invited along with the eight partners. The U.S. secretary of state, according to Kukan, "has made it absolutely clear by this meeting that NATO does not intend to discuss whether it will accept new members, and he accentuated that the decision bears the unequivocal signature of Washington. Therefore, he laid great emphasis on the potential applicants for membership in the Alliance expressing their opinions on this matter, and he listened to them carefully. This is also very important for him with regard to the domestic political scene, which, following the change in the ratio of forces in Congress, has altered significantly. This is also to the benefit of expanding the Alliance."

It is absolutely essential, however, for Slovakia and the other former members of the Warsaw Pact to maintain

good relations with Russia. "I personally emphasized, and W. Christopher then referred to this in the discussion, that we are not interested in squeezing Russia out of Europe. On the contrary, it is necessary to do all we can to ensure the closest possible ties to it. But, at the same time, I underlined that, although we understand some of Moscow's interests, it also must understand ours. And membership in NATO is among them," said Minister Kukan.

In the general view, stabilizing the situation by means of democratic development and, so to speak, with a functioning market economy in its foreground must also be in Russia's interest. It does not make sense to leave this gray area in a vacuum. "The zone of stability, which will thus come closer to the CIS's western borders, must also inevitably manifest itself positively in the situation in the post-Soviet republics, including Russia. However, this will require some time, while all of the local political forces are aware of such an opinion on the processes getting under way," said the head of Slovak diplomacy.

The current CSCE summit in Budapest will obviously say a great deal in this regard. The preparatory meeting, which lasted almost two months, however, was unable to agree on the definitive wording of the final document. It drafted several working versions, but, in the end, none of them were passed. So, the final decision will be up to the heads of state and government or the foreign ministers. Kukan said the following about the real possibility that the CSCE will be turned into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: "This involves a process of remodeling the current system into a regional organization, like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the Organization of American States (OAS). Incidentally, the UN Charter had also only envisaged such development in Europe. In view of the fact that it was the main theater of the Cold War, it was impossible to realize this process. The CSCE was just a halfhearted attempt in this regard and has already become obsolete because it does not correspond to the changed situation."

Nonetheless, only the course of the hectic diplomatic talks—and, obviously, the outcome of the U.S.-Russian summit in Budapest—if they do not lend a final form to the shape of the United Nations European mission, will determine the framework within which this transformation process will take place. In no way—and W. Christopher declared this unequivocally during the Brussels meeting with his 11 partners—will the United States permit this to replace NATO and prevent the admission of new members. According to the head of Slovak diplomacy, it is Washington that "has to assume the role of arbiter in this regard because only it can formulate a balanced policy toward Moscow, a policy that also takes into consideration the interests of those applying for membership in the Alliance. The head of the Department of State is aware of this, and, therefore, he also emphasized that he will continue in the tradition of the meetings in Warsaw and Brussels." This is a good sign.

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Kukan Warns of Impact of Domestic Events

AU0812070694 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 3 Dec 94 p 1

[Commentary by Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan]

[FBIS Translated Text] The foreign policy of new states venturing as independent entities upon the international stage is always followed very carefully. In the case of Slovakia, it is no different. The very way in which Slovakia came into being rightfully aroused attention in the world. Therefore, all the steps taken by the government and parliament in domestic as well as foreign policy and all statements made by representatives of the state and political parties are monitored and evaluated very carefully. In negotiations with my foreign counterparts, I was sometimes surprised at how well versed they were on the situation in Slovakia, how accurately they knew what this or that politician said on which occasion. Not only representatives of European states but also representatives of many geographically distant developing countries often inquire about the details and circumstances of such statements.

This attitude of foreign countries and their interest in Slovakia are understandable. We have to get used to the fact that developments in our country are under a microscope and are being watched very strictly. We may find this unfair at times. In fact, some of our measures or statements frequently meet with instant and fierce criticism abroad, and we know that, if similar events occurred in West European countries, hardly anyone would notice them and, if anyone did, he definitely would not react to them as strongly as he does to developments in Slovakia.

What does that mean for us?

First, whether we like it or not, the responsibility of all Slovak politicians and statesmen for Slovakia's image in the world is exceptionally high in this situation. Each of their statements, even if seemingly oriented purely toward the domestic political scene, has a direct impact on how Slovakia is viewed abroad. The same applies to all government decisions, bills passed by the National Council, and steps taken by the president of the Republic or party representatives. And, naturally, our foreign partners will also compare those acts with our reality. Regardless of how well or poorly their lenses may be focused, this is what creates Slovakia's image—our image abroad, which we discuss so much at home.

Let us be honest. Let us acknowledge that what really counts today is our own deeds. They can be interpreted in various ways, even negatively and tendentiously, but eventually objectivity will always prevail. Therefore, let us not search for explanations and justifications elsewhere, in a self-serving way, and let us not shirk our responsibility. In these days, when a new government is taking shape, all of these aspects are getting a specific flavor. It seems to me sometimes that, when certain

circles of our politicians make radical statements in responding to foreign reactions to developments in Slovakia, it is as though they want to boost their own courage or that of their fellow travelers. At the same time, they are losing contact with reality.

The best way of putting one's arguments to the test is through contacts abroad and talks with partners. There it will really be shown whether we can defend our truth or whether our proclamations prove unconvincing and shallow. What I want to say is that it is up to us how we shall assert ourselves in the world and how we will be viewed by the outside world. References to tradition, history, and culture, that is all fine. But it is everyday reality that is being mercilessly evaluated today. We ourselves create this reality and bear responsibility for it.

Republic's Response to EU Demarche Published

AU0812121294 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 Nov 94 pp 1-2

[TA SR report: "Slovak Republic's Response Received Favorably; Demarche Is an Expression of Interest in Our Country"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"Yesterday we handed over to the General Secretariat of the European Union (EU) the Slovak response to the EU demarche so that it may be reviewed by the ministers of foreign affairs attending the current session of the EU Council of General Affairs," Jan Lisuch, the Brussels-based ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the European Union, told yesterday's Radio Journal program of Slovak Radio. Initial information suggests that the Slovak Republic's response was received favorably.

According to the ambassador's words, the demarche is an expression of the EU's interest, in the positive sense of the word, in developments in Slovakia, a country being counted on as a future member of the EU. Yesterday, on page 3, we published the full text of the EU demarche. Today we publish the full text of the Slovak Republic's response:

The Slovak Republic

- acknowledges the contents of the demarche delivered to the Government of the Slovak Republic, the president of the Slovak Republic, and the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on 24 November 1994,
- appreciates the EU's sincere interest in the continuation of the transformation process in the Slovak Republic,
- assures all members of the EU that the Slovak Republic respects and adheres to all democratic norms, conventions, and commitments arising from international agreements and the Charter of Basic Human Rights and Freedoms,

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- understands the EU's demarche as an effort of the EU to help the Slovak Republic to democratically and fully integrate into European security and economic structures, including full EU membership,
- worked out a draft bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Hungarian Republic and, five months ago, submitted this draft to the Hungarian side. Repeated initiatives to sign the treaty have come from the Slovak side, and it is exclusively the matter of the Hungarian Republic when it will constructively approach the Slovak proposals. The Slovak Republic would appreciate an EU initiative toward the Hungarian Republic that would make the Hungarian Republic respond to the Slovak proposals in a more flexible and accommodating way. The Slovak Republic assures EU members that ethnic Hungarians have the same rights and duties as all other citizens of Slovakia. The Slovak Republic would welcome similar attention to the position of the Slovak minority in Hungary,
- is sincerely interested in the consistent implementation of the principles of the democratic system and the market economy and in cooperation with all European states on the principles of equality and friendly relations,
- assures the EU that, as a sovereign and independent state, in line with its own interests and needs, it will remain a stable element in Central Europe and will not deflect from the path of democratic reforms and principles.

EU Grants Loan Worth ECU130 Million

LD0512192894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 5 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The finance ministers of the European Union member states have decided in Brussels today to grant a loan worth ECU130 million to Slovakia. The loan is earmarked for backing the Slovak Republic's balance of payments, and the condition of drawing the loan is that the policy of economic reforms backed by the IMF and the G-24 group will be continued.

HZDS, SDL Agree on Provisional Budget

LD0712203694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Leading representatives of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] had talks in Bratislava today for almost four hours. The main question that interested journalists was the budget. Nora Parikova noted the replies of Vladimir Meciar and Peter Weiss.

[Parikova] I should like to add that also taking part in the talks for the SDL were Deputy Chairman Pavol Kanis, Robert Fico, Jozef Kosnar, and Stefan Rusnak. Peter Weiss said the following about today's meeting from the SDL's point of view:

[Begin Weiss recording] As to the economic policy and the budget, there are differing views between the HZDS and the SDL. The solution of the budget problem will probably be a provisional budget because the HZDS, in view of its conceptual reservations toward the budget prepared by this government, does not want to vote for this budget. We have agreed on a joint policy in submitting the law on the conflict of interests. This policy should be agreed upon and implemented by Katarina Tothova and Lubomir Fogas. As to the situation in the National Council of the Slovak Republic, we were interested, above all, in whether the HZDS intended to revise some of the decisions that were made during the night of 3 to 4 November. We have found out that, in view of a number of circumstances, as well as with regard to the agreements with the Association of Workers of Slovakia and the Slovak National Party, such a revision will not take place. [end recording]

[Parikova] As to different viewpoints on the conception of the new election law, Weiss said that political development in Slovakia was not yet completed and society was not ready for an immediate transition to the majority system. At the moment, the starting point could be a combination of proportional and majority systems, HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar said on today's talks:

[Begin Meciar recording] In the sphere of economic policy, the HZDS builds on the principles and strategy of revival and is assessing the conception of the Party of the Democratic Left as a practical matter. There will be a provisional budget. A law on the budget is not passable at the moment because it cannot cover its income component with real incomes, and if, for example, it counts on a certain amount of money from the National Property Fund, that cannot be technically done because privatization actions are not ready. There are two possible solutions. One is that Jozef Moravcik's government presents a draft budget to parliament and then this draft would be considered as the basis of the provisional budget, which, however, is unacceptable. The second is that the budget valid for 1994 would be taken as the basis of the provisional budget, and, in a month's time and not later than in February, a definitive budget would be submitted for approval.

As for political development, we have agreed that early elections are not a solution. As for the questions of future stability, we think it is necessary to adopt laws that would make it possible to carry out some necessary measures to improve relations in political life. We have agreed on jointly adopting the law on the conflict of interest, which the two sides consider necessary, although the two sides have different ideas about its contents. We have proposed to the SDL that we start work on changing the election law, from the current proportional law to a majority law. They accept it with certain reservations. That is natural; their analyses have not been worked out in as much detail as ours. We have proposed, too, other steps aimed at stabilizing the political regime in our country so that the situation could be democratic, free, and more peaceful. [end recording] [passage omitted]

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Horn Briefs Media Following CSCE Summit

LD0712194794 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700
GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] There is a realistic chance of Hungary becoming a member of NATO in two to three years' time, and there is serious support for this, Prime Minister Gyula Horn said today at a press briefing following the CSCE summit.

[Begin Horn recording] It was pointed out during the discussions that Hungary was expected to be the first, or among the first to be admitted into NATO. [end recording]

A condition of the military organization is that Hungary should create good neighborly relations in the region. However, NATO accepts that Hungary's special situation in East-Central Europe should be appreciated. It is enough if we think of the Balkan war or the large number of Hungarians living beyond our borders.

The largest neighboring state, Ukraine, by the way, considers Hungary's rapprochement with NATO to be a sovereign Hungarian decision. However, the Russian leadership has serious reservations.

[Begin Horn recording] Russia feels that its own security will be threatened if certain neighboring countries enter the organization and if by this NATO and one of its capitals gains a role in international relations in the region, which—so to say—might relegate the regional role of the Russian player to the background. [end recording]

The prime minister discussed this and the fostering of bilateral relations with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. With Ukrainian Prime Minister [as heard] Leonid Kuchma, Gyula Horn discussed not just the future possibilities of economic cooperation but the tightening of mutual border controls. The Hungarian prime minister also reported on the subjects and the atmosphere of his talks with Romanian President Ion Iliescu.

[Begin Horn recording] The talks with President Iliescu were held in a spirit that could not exactly be described as full of affection or harmony—but this is not at all unusual in the history of Hungarian-Romanian meetings. The dialogue was rather open and frank. President Iliescu objected to the fact that there had not been any high-level meetings in Hungarian-Romanian relations for five years.

We naturally devoted a lot of space to the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania. We mentioned again—and availed ourselves of a specific proposal in connection with—the Romanian education bill.

We mentioned statements made in parliament by the chief of the Romanian intelligence office that were offensive to Hungary. We also raised many other things that in our view are important to mention concerning our relations. [end recording]

The prime minister proposed to Iliescu that Hungary and Romania should be among the first to sign, simultaneously, the minority protection document, which will be prepared soon by the European Union. [video shows Prime Minister Gyula Horn speaking, aircraft taking off and landing on aircraft carrier, Horn's talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Romanian President Ion Iliescu]

Horn Views Domestic, International Role

AU0712173394 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in
Hungarian 3 Dec 94 p 8

[Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn by Dezso Pinter, place and date not given: "I Do Not Exclude the Possibility of Personnel Changes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The existence and the results of the government coalition are largely influenced by whether we can come to an agreement with the Free Democrats on basic issues, because the decisions that are to have a great impact on the country's future will be formulated in the coming weeks," Prime Minister Gyula Horn told MAGYAR HIRLAP. Horn expects Hungary's international role to become stronger in the wake of the CSCE summit in Budapest.

[Pinter] Hungary will come in the forefront of world political interest when the summit of the presidents and prime ministers of 52 CSCE member states begins on 5 December in Budapest. With regard to the growing number of debates between the Free Democrats and the Socialists, are we to expect disturbing domestic political circumstances to arise during this time?

[Horn] Apart from the transport difficulties, no. Everyone is aware of the significance of the summit for Hungary. In addition to this, the Hungarian Republic will take the chair of the CSCE next year, which means new possibilities in developing our relations. I cannot see any domestic political obstacles to utilizing these possibilities but, in the future, the country's situation should not be depicted in a darker color than warranted by reality. We have to endure the afflictions in the interest of the honest goals that we chose together. The transformation cannot succeed without a modernization that will require further sacrifices, and without preparing and consistently implementing the reform of state administration and of other areas. We should not widen the undoubtedly bleeding wounds, our strength is needed for construction.

[Pinter] Predictions that the government coalition will not have a long life continue to be made. What is your reply?

[Horn] Hungary does not have any tradition of cooperation between a left-wing and a liberal party, the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] are both learning the roles in a coalition. The ideology and the work practice of the two parties are different, and the joint governing has actually

brought these differences into the limelight, rather than making them disappear. This is also shown by the fact that it is often the government's Socialist Party members who have to carry the burden of the rather unpopular measures; the coalition partner either does not accept these in parliament and other forums or it is rather reluctant about them, and sometimes it is the first one to criticize the government. Sometimes I feel that the SZDSZ want to play the role of internal opposition. In spite of all this, I do not consider the problems of cooperation dramatic and, at the moment, I cannot see a reasonable alternative to this coalition. The existence and the success of the government coalition are largely influenced by whether we can agree with the SZDSZ on fundamental issues, because the decisions that will have a strong impact on the country's future are being formulated now and in the coming weeks. I am thinking of the concrete issues of privatization, the restrictive budget and its implementation, the handling of tensions between the interest representation bodies and the government, the media issues, and the formulation of the modernization program that we want to bring before parliament in the spring. These issues will be the tense tests of coalition cooperation. The Socialists are not dealing with the thought of a split but they have decided that they will give authentic and detailed information to the public on those conflicts that our partner makes public.

[Pinter] Are you planning to change the government?

[Horn] The experiences should be assessed six months after the government was formed. I do not exclude the possibility of personnel changes but the assessment of the whole government's work requires a one-year period of grace.

[Pinter] Does this mean that the leadership of certain ministries will be changed at the end of January?

[Horn] If it is obvious that no progress has been made or a person's suitability is questionable then we need not wait a whole year. People who do not meet the requirements cannot rely on the period of grace. This principle prevails in many areas of society and the economy; why should it not prevail in the government?

[Pinter] A concern has been raised both in Hungary and abroad: "The country's international image is negatively influenced by the fact that an increasingly more obvious gap is opening in the MSZP between the so-called trade union lobby and the liberal groups that speak the same language with the SZDSZ." Can you see this contrast?

[Horn] This approach is unacceptable for me. During its five-year existence, one of the MSZP's most important merits is that it managed to create harmony among the various views within its lines. Recently, a crucially important agreement was achieved in the Interest Coordination Council between the employers, employees, trade unions, and the government on the draft 1995 budget, and this can also be of decisive importance as

regards the social and economic agreement. The National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ] played a rather constructive role in the debate. Therefore, I find it absurd that Socialist MSZOSZ leaders are accused of left-wing deviation, and exaggerated and unfounded goals in interest representation, while their expertise and willingness for compromise played a decisive role in completing the agreement.

[Pinter] The European Union [EU] and the IMF have, for the time being, rejected Hungary's latest application for loans. How does this influence foreign investors?

[Horn] This does not at all mean that Hungary's importance in the region has decreased. We are receiving the largest amount of capital from abroad, about \$1.5 billion this year which corresponds to the average of many years. The Czech leadership, together with other governments, is also conducting a rock-solid propaganda of success in the developed countries. Some people say perhaps we should also follow this road but I am not so sure about this. In the East-Central European region, Hungary has gone furthest in the changes that involve deep domestic problems but which are unavoidable for the future, and this also applies to the establishment of private property, the banking system, and the stock market among other things. The EU is struggling with internal conflicts and financing problems. The problems are further increased by the fact that some countries of the European Free Trade Association [EFTA] are joining it; less is left for our region. It is obvious that the EU also has to come up with new solutions. The international financial institutions do not yet have a program whose implementation would mean a serious support for this region. Presumably they have tied up their resources somewhere else.

[Pinter] Why was Budapest chosen for the CSCE summit?

[Horn] To a large extent, the reason is that Hungarian foreign policy continues to enjoy much international respect. Hungary stands closest to becoming an EU member—which is due around the turn of the century—out of the region's countries striving for European integration. Having Budapest as the site was also supported by the fact that it has hosted many major international conferences and it has become a recognized conference center.

[Pinter] With whom will you have separate talks from among the guests at the summit?

[Horn] The series of meetings will begin with Russian President Yeltsin who himself initiated this meeting. Bilateral relations and the issues of economic cooperation will be discussed among other topics.

[Pinter] Is Moscow exerting pressure on you and the Hungarian Government to have the Russian viewpoint asserted more in connection with the NATO membership of the Visegrad countries—Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia?

[Horn] I am not aware of such Russian efforts although some politicians in Moscow reject the idea of the Visegrad countries joining NATO; however, I see these as private statements. Naturally, the stance of the Russian leadership influences NATO—primarily the United States—when it has to decide on our membership; therefore it is advisable to have a dialogue with Moscow on this issue, too. If for none other reason than that many participants of Russian politics are not very familiar with NATO's role, namely that it is a defense organization and has never committed aggression. Hungary and the region's other countries that are waiting for NATO membership would like to have security guarantees established for themselves, largely learning from the lessons of the south Slav crisis. NATO can be the only guarantor of security since it has the means.

[Pinter] Who and with what means can persuade Russia not to hinder the NATO membership of the region's countries? Do you expect any progress on this issue at the Budapest summit?

[Horn] The superpowers have the final word on the issue of NATO memberships but we are living in an age when sovereign national decisions also play a role in such arrangements. Therefore, if Hungary or any other country of the region wishes to join NATO in the interest of its own security then none of the powers can prevent this decision.

[Pinter] What other separate talks will you have at the summit?

[Horn] We will meet the French, Italian, and Spanish Government heads and Helmut Kohl. To Kohl, I will confirm that Hungary considers tightening Hungarian-German relations to be of primary importance because Germany has proved its commitment toward the East-Central European transformation and especially to Hungary through deeds. If the EU does not grant us a loan for changing the structures then we will seek the solution in bilateral relations. We would like to hold negotiations on this issue with Germany and many other West European countries.

[Pinter] In your view, what can Kohl do for the European integration of Hungary and other East-Central European countries?

[Horn] The German leadership consistently supports the Visegrad Four to be given clear guidelines on the tasks and possibilities of the road to the EU. I have no doubt that it will continue to do this in the future and endeavor to dispel the unfounded concerns that are emerging in the EU in regards to Hungary. Germany's attitude is extremely important for us.

[Pinter] What can Hungary and Germany achieve together at the CSCE summit?

[Horn] The delegations will make joint decisions and many documents are waiting to be finalized. Two countries cannot achieve anything without the agreement of the others.

[Pinter] You have stated a number of times that the West is acting against its own interests when it neglects East-Central Europe. What is at stake?

[Horn] The political changes are fast; while economic changes are slow and painful in our region. We are following an untrodden path, history has not yet seen mass privatizations similar to ours. This has to be done from the top down, and rather quickly, while the market economy and capitalism took hundreds of years to evolve through the original accumulation of capital, from the bottom up. In addition to this, we have to create a market economy together with the system of social partnership, while conditions for the latter were only established in the West in the last few decades. In Hungary, destruction and construction are concomitant, amid huge social tensions.

If the economic changes are not assisted, West Europe's stability might also become endangered. The environmental damages and the dangers of migration are flooding everything and everyone, while conflicts between nations which can be attributed to social tensions are increasing. Frightening and uncontrollable processes might be started. Anyone who believes that West Europe can hermetically shut itself off from these effects is wrong. Many people take pleasure in frequently misunderstanding us. None of us are requesting aid from West Europe; we are asking for cooperation and possibly for loaning the expenses of establishing the conditions. Cooperation is at least as good a business for West Europe and the world as it is for us. Our market is huge and it is not a region in the Third World. Here, within the framework of suitable economic structures, millions of skilled people are waiting for adequate tasks.

[Pinter] In this situation, can Hungary play any kind of mediation role between Europe's eastern and western half?

[Horn] This is an immense and unavoidable role for us. For its location alone, Hungary can mediate between West and East, and it actually is using this possibility because innumerable contacts are already now being made with Hungarian mediation. Budapest has kept its eastern links and it has been open toward the West since the most difficult times. We undoubtedly can still feel the positive effects of this, and so can the sides that seek contacts through us. Hungary is on the best way toward becoming a financial service center in the region. We are spearheading the reforms and, if the reform process is stalled in Hungary, this will also affect the region's other countries. The state of our infrastructure that also influences the West's market expansion is an important factor. If we do not receive support to improve our infrastructure then very many plans will not be implemented.

[Pinter] Due to the often contradictory political statements, it is embarrassingly difficult to assess whether rapprochement or antagonism is increasing in the relationship of the four Visegrad countries?

[Horn] The Central European Free Trade Agreement does not reduce the significance of the four because the Visegrad countries appear as a positive political notion for the West. I do not understand those—for example, the Czechs—who want to weaken this effect. I am convinced that our sovereign national decisions do not become endangered if we coordinate our policies regarding the EU. If we do not do this then what will happen to the concrete issues as regards our linking to the trans-European infrastructure and energy delivery systems? The EU membership of the EFTA states endangers the already existing advantages of all Visegrad countries. Would not joint action make sense?

[Pinter] Which individual interests and viewpoints hinder cooperation most?

[Horn] A view exists that the individual efforts of various countries for EU membership can expect a bigger success. They might be right. However, I assume that the EU will make a political decision and, rather than rewarding lobbying, it will reward the level a country has achieved in fulfilling the requirements.

[Pinter] An open competition has started among the Visegrad countries in gaining access to the EU. Does this competition harm cooperation?

[Horn] Not at all because it is for a noble goal, for strengthening the democratic institutional system, and for establishing the market economy system. Competition would only become dangerous if it acquired a nationalist color.

[Pinter] Mainly due to the issue of the Hungarians living in minority status beyond the border, tension often characterizes Hungary's relations with the neighboring countries. Before the elections, you promised that, with your help, a new phase would be opened in this system of relations with, among others, Romania and Slovakia. Can you now see the signs of this?

[Horn] Our steps toward our neighbors have had positive reactions from Washington to Moscow, and our intentions were also welcome by the neighbors in question. We do not have illusions; it is impossible to change antagonistic feelings that evolved for long decades or centuries. However, Hungary's attitude toward Slovakia's and Romania's integration efforts is explicitly supportive, rather than rejective. As opposed to the government that was turned out of office in May, rather than making our relations dependent on the handling of minority issues, we say that all possible means have to be seized within the framework of bilateral cooperation to improve the situation of Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries. It is out of the question that we have given up on this goal to the slightest extent. At the moment, the unresolved nature of the Bos-Nagymaros water power station is a heavy burden on our relations with Slovakia; we need repeated negotiations that lead to quick agreements because the Szigetkoz [area along Danube river at Slovak border] cannot be left without

water. The division of water has to be done on the basis of mutual decision; neither side can be left at the mercy of the other, not mentioning that the guaranteeing of unhindered shipping gives us international obligations.

[Pinter] Can the CSCE summit in Budapest contribute in some way to the ending of the south Slav war?

[Horn] I hope for progress because the CSCE cooperation has already had some advantages. It has to be decided what role the CSCE and the United Nations will take. Some burdens can be removed from the United Nations. However, in the current situation, all depends on whether Serbia's leadership, headed by Milosevic, will keep itself to the international agreements it has accepted: To not supporting the Bosnian Serbs in the war. This is the key to ending the war.

[Pinter] Is Central and East Europe threatened by the emergence of a danger similar to the south Slav conflict?

[Horn] This is a very much existing danger because very many nationalist and militant leaders have been aroused by the fact that the community of nations has proved to be incapable of doing anything about curbing the south Slav war for years. The danger will increase extremely if the region is left on its own to solve its deep and desperate problems. Former times have left an array of unsettled issues as a heritage but no one must advocate the reexamination of the peace treaties.

[Pinter] Which country does Hungary see as its main ally in protecting its security while it is not a member of either NATO or the EU?

[Horn] We are in a special situation because we do not have enemies in our neighborhood and our intentions are identical to those of our neighbors in many respects. The historic reconciliation that we advocate is the best security policy: Hungary does not have any demands of territorial revision, and our integration plans cannot be directed against others due to their nature. I honestly hope that Hungary's increasing international role—which is partly due to the CSCE—in the region and generally in Europe will not benefit only us.

Horn: NATO Accession Not Contingent on Russia
LD0712154094 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Gyula Horn has held a news conference at which he reported on his bilateral meetings during the CSCE summit. The radio was represented at the news conference by Miklos Keleti.

[Keleti] It would be contrary to the principle of national sovereignty and would create a dangerous precedent if we make our accession to NATO contingent on Russia's stance, Gyula Horn said. Russia considers the planned expansion to be a threat to its own security; thus, the old reflexes are still active in this sphere, he added.

Talks on the subject will continue early next year in Moscow between Boris Yeltsin and Gyula Horn. The Hungarian prime minister observed that the leaders of the NATO countries are facing a dilemma concerning the opinion of Moscow. Those from the West encourage us to continue the Hungarian-Russian talks, Gyula Horn said, because they believe that from here, we, Central Europe, are better acquainted with the Russians by virtue of our geographical situation and historical experiences.

Concerning his discussions with Romanian President Iliescu, the prime minister said—I quote: The talks were held in a spirit of what could not exactly be described as full harmony.

Gyula Horn also dealt with reports of a government reshuffle. He said that in January they will assess the government's work, and if the need for personnel changes arises he will not be averse to this.

Foreign Minister Views CSCE Summit Results

LD0712223194 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1945
GMT 7 Dec 94

[Studio interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by correspondent Karoly Monostori; correspondent identified by caption; from the "Evening Question" program on 7 December—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] The Hungarian and foreign press and news agencies give conflicting assessments of the results of the CSCE summit that ended in Budapest yesterday. [passage omitted] Good evening. The guest today of "Evening Question" is Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs. [passage omitted]

[Monostori] We remember well the live relay yesterday afternoon which, I believe, was a world premiere—because the world public was able to see, live, what kind of political debate was taking place at this summit. The viewers saw clearly that the European security conference had strayed far away from its true goal—to preserve peace and be suited to the handling of various crises.

[Kovacs] This expectation was indeed justified, but the document alone would not have settled the Yugoslav crisis. It probably would not have halted the tragedy of, and around Bihac. Let us not forget—it was not the CSCE that tried to settle the Yugoslav crisis. It was the United Nations, the EU [European Union] and NATO that tried, unsuccessfully, to settle the Yugoslav crisis. These are organizations that have wider legitimacy—the United Nations has about 200 member states...

[Monostori, interrupting] It has military armed forces...

[Kovacs, interrupting] Well, the United Nations has peacekeeping forces. In connection with means of coercion I would mention NATO, rather, which has the world's most important military force. Therefore, a

wider-ranging organization than the CSCE and an organization with incomparably more significant means were both incapable of resolving the crisis. Seeing that, I believe it would have been illusory to expect a solution from the CSCE. We would not be just if we were to hold the CSCE responsible for the failure to find a solution.

However, we rightly say that this conference met, the heads of state and government of this enormous region stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok were here, and no document was approved, no stance was formulated on the Yugoslav crisis. The reason for this was that when agreement might have been reached, such a more mildly formulated document was not satisfactory for Bosnia, the side most concerned and experiencing the most suffering. It did not want to accept an empty document, or at least one that said little from its viewpoint. However, the reality was that owing to the opposition of certain countries, nothing more was possible.

On such an occasion the dilemma is whether we should be satisfied with the few results, or whether we should follow the principle of everything or nothing.

On Hungary's part we made an initiative. Mr. Prime Minister [Gyula Horn] tried to get a statement approved. This approached the issue—Bihac—and in connection with Bihac the Bosnian situation—from an expressly humanitarian viewpoint.

It asked for the warring sides' agreement, collaboration in two things: One was an immediate cease-fire; the second was ensuring the unimpeded passage of humanitarian deliveries. Neither are political issues. There was even no agreement about this, because after failing to approve a substantive document on the Yugoslav crisis, Bosnia said that this was not satisfactory for them, and it [Bosnia] could not approve it.

[Monostori] I imagine that the conference was also an excellent opportunity to force a decision—I can think of no other way to word this. There was an enormous difference between the speeches by Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton, and this made it clear that the period of peace following the Cold War had come to an end, and there was quite serious confrontation between the two great powers.

[Kovacs] NATO's foreign ministers, the North Atlantic Council, held a session on 1 December and a decision was reached at this to begin an examination of a very circumspect expansion of NATO. They will now examine the conditions of expansion and the consequences of expansion. For the time being they will not examine which countries are affected by expansion, nor when. Therefore, they will not set up a timetable now.

However, in the following year there will be a thorough internal exchange of opinions about the conditions and the consequences, and they intend to release the results of this at about this time next year. This is what happened at the North Atlantic Council session. The

reaction of Russian foreign policy to this was of rejection. That evening, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev refused to sign the Partnership for Peace program, which had been prepared after several months of work. It is interesting that the contributions made in the morning of Thursday, 1 December, including the contribution by the U.S. secretary of state, still praised Russia's joining Partnership for Peace that day. They did not think that at 1900 in the evening Kozyrev would say no to the document. The NATO leadership was surprised by this.

We think that this very circumspect expansion—which is promoted by the United States, and with which there was agreement at the session of the North Atlantic Council—will, in truth, stabilize the region. It will not draw new lines of separation, it will not arouse suspicion. Therefore, in our conviction it is not contradictory to Russia's interests. Russia has an interest in the stability of its neighboring region.

[Monostori] I remember well the speech of Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, the time when he was only a parliamentary deputy in the Hungarian parliament, when only a few people were in the assembly hall. He said that, ladies and gentlemen, we should not forget that if Hungary intends to join NATO, it can set such conditions that it wants to store atomic, nuclear weapons on the territory of the country that intends to join.

[Kovacs] The essence of the matter is that NATO can ask to place nuclear weapons on the territory of Hungary, if it joins NATO. However, there are NATO member states that have not given their consent to this and this does not mean that NATO would break ties with them. NATO is a democratically functioning organization, which takes cognizance of the member states' reservations in certain issues. It is widely known that the opinion of Denmark is different on a series of matters. But I could mention Greece, Spain, or some other countries, too.

That is to say it will not be a novelty for NATO, if, let us say, following or simultaneously with its admission Hungary lays down—let us say in the Hungarian Constitution—that it does not wish to store or station nuclear weapons on its territory. The two things do not exclude each other. It does not make membership impossible.

Now, should it happen that nuclear weapons are stationed on the territory of Hungary, or Slovakia, or any other country of the region, this again would not change the actual balance of military forces. For, from this point of view, the important thing is the balance of strategic forces, the parity of strategic nuclear weapons. This is existing. They do not have to be stationed here because they can reach the entire territory of Russia from the far side of the ocean, and vice versa.

The matter in question can only be the location of tactical nuclear weapons. They do not really count in the strategic power relations.

[Monostori] The Budapest [CSCE] conference has just ended, in the company of the prime minister you will travel to Essen at the weekend. Six countries who wish to join the EU have received invitations to Essen—not to the meeting, only to a briefing following it. What do you, Mr. Foreign Minister, expect from this meeting? To what extent can Hungary get closer to the EU?

[Kovacs] The number one aim of Hungarian foreign policy is to the country's adjustment to the Euro-Atlantic institutional system. It equally means joining the EU and NATO. We examine these two matters in unity, because these are complementary processes that reinforce each other. [passage omitted]

I think that this invitation is a very good initiative. [passage omitted] This, of course, does not mean that now everything will be decided in Essen from one day to another. It means that the EU has again taken a step toward its extension. They ask and need the opinion of those countries that intend to join. I consider it an important development, a step forward.

Kovacs Interviewed on NATO, EU Membership

BR0712140894 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 7 Dec 94
p 18

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Sergio Sergi in Budapest; date not given: "Hungarian Minister Kovacs: 'Moscow Has No Right To Close the Doors of Europe to Us'"—first paragraph is L'UNITA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The countries of East Europe are pressing for entry to Europe. Five years have now passed since that momentous change in the course of history, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the nations of the former Warsaw Pact bloc are knocking on the door to Brussels, home to the EU [European Union] and NATO. In Budapest and Essen this week, the leaders of the Central and East European countries are playing their best cards in the hope of convincing the European heads of government of the need to step up the process of integration. Hungary may consider itself one of the countries in pole position in the race for the EU and NATO, a competition that is beginning, but which will encounter many an obstacle: Both the European ruminations on the speed of expansion and the Russian "revolt" regarding the eventuality of the new admissions to membership of the Atlantic Alliance, which has given rise to fresh disputes and uncertainties over the last few days. Laszlo Kovacs, Hungarian foreign minister and president of the CSCE for 1996, trusts that Moscow will not remain adamant in its stance.

[Sergi] What is your verdict on Moscow's refusal, as expressed by your counterpart Andrey Kozyrev, to take further steps in the process of cooperation with NATO?

[Kovacs] I hope that it will not be the Russian leaders' last word. I think that they cannot remain isolated. If they do not join the partnership project, Russia will be

on its own, and this is not in Moscow's interests. They must reconsider their position, they must realize that they have no right of veto on this issue and accept that fact. They must play an active role in the process of building up a security structure covering the whole of Europe and in which the CSCE, NATO, WEU [Western European Union], and the Council of Europe all have a part.

[Sergi] It seems clear that Russia is taking steps to regain a predominant role...

[Kovacs] It cannot expect a predominant role. Russia is one of the countries in the CSCE; it is undoubtedly larger than a lot of other countries but, I repeat, it must accept the fact that it has no right of veto at all. I believe that the refusal to sign is not really the Kremlin diplomats' last word.

[Sergi] The Central European countries have applied to negotiate with the EU for membership. There is also disagreement, and this phase is the subject of debate. How do you see it?

[Kovacs] Without membership of the [EU], neither the country's security nor its economy nor, indeed, its social modernization can be achieved. We are calling for a sort of schedule of dates for achieving this goal. We would like the Commission in Brussels and the Union to form an opinion on Budapest's application prior to the 1996 intergovernmental conference. After the conference, at the end of the same year or at the beginning of 1997, we would like to open membership negotiations as such. Basically, according to this schedule, we would like to complete negotiations by the end of the century, in 1991 [as published], so that Hungary can enter the Union as a full member in the year 2000.

[Sergi] Do you think that this timing for the enlargement process can be maintained for all the countries awaiting membership?

[Kovacs] We would like the decision to be made on the strength of an appraisal of our situation, not together with other countries. We would like EU membership to be decided case by case, one by one. Each country will conduct its own negotiations; we are not in competition. We expect a signal in this direction from the Essen summit.

[Sergi] Chancellor Kohl, the current duty president, invited you and the others to Essen at the last minute. Are you pleased?

[Kovacs] We will sit at the same table as the Fifteen, and we will set out our position. Of course, we are aware that Essen is a staging post on a long journey, so we do not expect the final decision to emerge from this meeting. It is a major milestone in the preparations, both for Hungary and for the Union itself. We must all prepare for integration, because otherwise there will be no stability and no prosperity in Central and East Europe.

CSCE Delegate Sees Need To Accommodate Russia

AU0812072394 Budapest *MAGYAR HIRLAP* in Hungarian 7 Dec 94 p 3

[Interview with Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, head of the Hungarian delegation to the CSCE, by Zoltan Gyevai; place and date not given: "Most Decisions Are in Harmony With Russia's Interests"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Gyevai] It seems that, in most of the documents adopted at this meeting, Moscow enforced its will; therefore, some people speak about Russia's success here. Do you agree with this evaluation?

[Gyarmati] I do not accept this. I think that most decisions are in harmony with Russia's interests. But we made these decisions not because Moscow enforced its will, but because we realized that this is Europe's universal interest too and because taking into consideration Russia's legitimate security interests is also our interest. The dialogue and debate to commence within the CSCE will aim at trying to develop a security structure by bringing different views together, a structure that fulfills everyone's interest in the best possible way. I am not afraid that Moscow will dominate in this debate; rather, I would be afraid if Russia did not participate in such a debate.

[Gyevai] How do you envisage the possible results of this debate?

[Gyarmati] Only structures adjusted to each other are capable of functioning efficiently. I am sure that we cannot—and we should not—subordinate one to another. In my opinion, the Russians will clearly realize that this cannot be done either in practice or in principle, and this does not serve their interests or others' interests either.

Editorial Assesses Results of CSCE Summit

AU0812072194 Budapest *NEPSZABADSAG* in Hungarian 7 Dec 94 p 3

[Unattributed editorial: "A Porcelain Shop"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The shop window was just like the shop itself but, fortunately, the shutters cannot be rolled down. It would definitely have been futile to expect a pan-European conference to provide answers to the basic questions of global security. It was also an exaggeration to expect the diplomats of 52 national states representing 1 billion people to clarify here and now things that could not be clarified in the discreet workshops of the big ones. If Bosnia, NATO, and the German issue heat up old superstitions between the old, big, and allied democracies like the British, French, and U.S. democracies, it is not strange that the new Russian half-democracy loudly protects the fragments of its superpower status. Lumbering superpower elephants

trampled and trumpeted in the porcelain shop of European security, and they learn with difficulty and forget with difficulty.

If Washington wants a different NATO than Paris, if everyone wants a different pan-European role for himself and the institutions, and if power relations and—yes—spheres of interest must be redistributed, then noble principles and intentions appear in the shop window in vain. These are models without value. Of course, it makes a difference what models and values are declared, because it makes a difference to the extent to which they turn away from these models when their practical interests so dictate. From this point of view, it is indeed a result that, at least on the level of intentions, the meeting in Budapest confirmed the demand for a democratic, secure, and uniform Europe. It is a concrete and important result that, on the issue of Karabakh, the meeting succeeded in confirming the principle that no one can use peacekeeping and international crisis management for selfish superpower goals. Moscow also accepted this and, thus, fear of the revival of Russian threat can now (generally) diminish elsewhere too. If Moscow gets more and more substantial guarantees from NATO, the justified Russian fears will also be able to diminish, including the "fears" used as an excuse. If they succeed in stipulating the normal basic principles of national minority protection at least on paper and through the institution of a European chief commissioner, those who are heading into Europe in a "homogenized" way will find it more difficult to disregard these principles. The CSCE summit carried out what it could: It presented a new model, with the hope of values.

This hope is essential precisely because a European crisis is always a world crisis. The collapse of the security system is a greater danger than the Bosnian tragedy; besides, the latter cannot be solved without solving the former.

In spite of failures and hopelessness, the general uncertainty in West and East Europe upgrades, rather than diminishes, meetings similar to the recent one in Budapest. It makes people understand what functions and what does not function; it brings the deep trends of major politics to the surface, and the political elite in Europe is confronted openly with the problems facing this continent.

Thus, it is also understandable that many people display better "goods" than the ones in the shop. Clinton wanted to demonstrate that Europe is important for the United States. However, an increasing number of Americans think, but in a broader sense, what the President thought when he said "let's go home" at Ferihegy Airport in Budapest. The United States wants to take upon itself neither problems nor expenses from Europe. The British and the French speak about a united Europe in a way that makes sure that this does not make an exaggeratedly major power out of Germany. The Russians agree to forming a partnership with NATO if it does not mean turning themselves into a too-small power.

NATO expansion and the Bosnia-debate in Budapest did not cause, but signaled, that the development of a new big-power security system in Europe will take many years. The turning of the CSCE into an organization is a secondary result of all this—not the most important one, but not an insignificant one either. The same applies to the failures and results of the Budapest summit.

PM Horn Discusses Topical Political Issues

AU0712140694 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 2
Dec 94 p 7

[Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn by Istvan Leko in Budapest; date not given: "The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary Are at the Same Level"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn, who has now fully recovered from his serious automobile accident in May, has granted an interview to LIDOVE NOVINY. This is the first interview given to the Czech press by the democratically elected Hungarian prime minister.

[Leko] It is being said that, over the past four years, Hungary has squandered its chances and has not made use of the advantage it had in 1989 compared with the other Eastern Bloc countries....

[Horn] I think that squander is too strong a word. Hungary has not made use of its chances. After all, it was the first country to venture forth on the road of reforms. It had a chance in the sense that private enterprise and certain market mechanisms have a more than 20-year tradition in Hungary and that, in 1989, Hungary took a series of steps that—in the end—led to its unequivocal independence from the Warsaw Pact. This was duly appreciated by the world at that time and our country's prestige increased greatly. We had an opportunity notably in our promising starting position and, therefore, the creation of a market economy could have been less complicated. Our foreign policy position could also be better. Five years ago, unlike the majority of surrounding countries, we did not have to start from scratch in our political and economic relations with the West. It is true that today we are at effectively the same level as the Czech Republic and Poland.

[Leko] Prime Minister Klaus declared recently that the Czech Republic has jumped ahead of the other Visegrad countries. At virtually the same time, you said that, from the point of view of social and economic reforms in these countries, Hungary is in the lead....

[Horn] In my opinion, Hungary is in the lead, because its socio-economic transformation goes further. Otherwise, Mr. Klaus has the right—of course—to assess the state of the Czech Republic as he thinks fit. I think, however, that it is not a bad thing to compete over who is succeeding better in creating the conditions necessary for membership in the European Union [EU]. I consider this

to be civilized competition, and it does not matter if we provoke one another toward taking effective and rapid steps.

[Leko] Antall's government did not approve a series of—so-called—unpopular measures, which now await you. Is it possible to say that, after this year's electoral triumph, the socialists are starting where they left off five years ago?

[Horn] I absolutely disagree with this statement. Today's situation is different from the one in 1990. Almost half of the state's property has, in the meantime, been transferred into private hands, nearly 700,000 private firms have been established, we have become members of the Council of Europe, and, on the initiative of the German Government, we have signed an Association Agreement with the EU. This is to say nothing of the immense sociopolitical changes. On the other hand, the situation is difficult, because our domestic and foreign indebtedness has increased (\$24 billion gross—editor's note) and the current socialist-liberal government has major tasks to deal with.

[Leko] Before the elections, the Socialist Party said that it is necessary to do something about the one million unemployed. Party officials have declared recently that the number of unemployed will go up by 220,000 next year. What kind of reaction do you anticipate?

[Horn] Let us be precise; the Socialist Party never said in the campaign that, if it wins the elections, unemployment will begin to fall. We said that this and next year has to be a period of stabilization, which, of course, does not mean shock therapy. We are taking serious steps to halt the increase in the budget deficit, but this will not involve drastic measures that would mean a decline in the standard of living. Naturally, our government is not neglecting the social sphere. We want to make sure that pensioners, families with several children, and people living on their salaries alone are no worse off this or next year than they are now.

At the same time, however, the EU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the World Bank are demanding stabilization measures. It is vitally important for Hungary to bear in mind these demands, otherwise foreign resources would be closed to us and we would not get the credit necessary for our stabilization program and future growth. I consider the government's plan to stimulate—by budgetary and other means—enterprise, investments, and exports to be very important. This and next year the government wants, despite its modest financial means, to create the basis for further growth.

[Leko] The Hungarian Government is counting on substantial energy price hikes as of next year. Is this not a risky step?

[Horn] It is a very difficult task. The previous government was supposed to have raised these prices, because, according to the agreements with the IMF and the World

Bank, at the beginning of 1994, energy prices should have been at the level of costs. Postponing this step would lead to great tension in the energy industry and would represent an obstacle to the prepared privatization of this branch. We have also decided that we will use the money the energy price increases will bring into the budget to establish a compensatory system for the population and public-legal institutions.

[Leko] Articles are appearing in the foreign press in reaction to the statements by Hungarian Government politicians that the economic situation in Hungary is very bad. Will this not put off those in the West who support Hungary's rapid entry into the EU?

[Horn] It is really difficult to find the correct balance: To give a real picture of the country and, at the same time, not to lose favor by being too pessimistic and deterring Western investors. I am an optimist, however. After all, we have stated clearly what we intend to do.

What is most important for foreign investors? First, political stability; we have that. Next, the security situation. Ours is no worse than in neighboring states, and we are striving to improve it. Third, economic stability. We consider this to be a key task, which can only fill foreign investors with confidence. They will find clear conditions here: The Hungarian Government is determined to create taxation and interest conditions for domestic and foreign investors in the coming years that will not be changed each quarter.

Joining the EU, however, requires structural changes. This does not only involve transforming the economy and industry, but mainly the pension and social and insurance systems, which in Hungary are out of date. I believe, however, that the Czech Republic is grappling with the same problems. These bad systems are costing the state a great deal of money; this does not just concern redistribution, because people who do not need social allowances at all are involved in it. The reform and harmonization of the legal system is another very important task.

[Leko] Do you think that it is possible to talk about Hungary joining the EU before the year 2000?

[Horn] I do not harbor any illusions. There is a chance of joining around the year 2000. The main thing will be the extent to which Hungary manages to fulfill the criteria for entry in the next five years. And, something else—the EU is grappling with considerable internal problems. I realize that it does not always devote too much attention to expansion. At the same time, there is no country among the Union's states that would disagree with the view that it is necessary to integrate the Visegrad Four. Discussions are being held on the method, means, and date for this, but I believe that these issues will also become clearer with time.

[Leko] Hungary's admission is, however, inconceivable if its relations with its neighbors are tense. The current

Romanian governing coalition, and even developments in Slovakia, do not purport that Hungary's mutual relations with these countries would improve in the future. You claim that you are striving for the best possible relations, but two partners are necessary for each agreement....

[Horn] Prerequisites for agreement should indeed exist on both sides. As far as Slovakia is concerned, I last met with Mr. Meciar at the beginning of August. We spoke at length, and relatively constructively. What he will do in the event that he manages to form a government, only he can say. We respect the results of the Slovak elections; we will negotiate with people who are ready to reach an agreement. On the basis of what Mr. Meciar said to me in August, I do not believe that he would not be sincere. His actions, however, will decide.

Neither Hungary nor Slovakia—or even the Czech Republic—will get into the EU if they have conflicts with their neighbors. The EU does not need members who are at odds with each other. It is not only a national interest to have good relations among countries, but they are also indispensable in view of entry into the EU.

[Leko] The aforementioned states are demanding that the inviolability of borders be enshrined in basic treaties. Hungary, in turn, is demanding European-standard rights for the Hungarian minorities in surrounding countries....

[Horn] We are constantly declaring that we do not want to change the borders; we have no territorial claims, which is a certain positive shift in view of the Helsinki Agreement. It talks about the possibility of changing borders by peaceful means on the basis of negotiations. We do not have—and we will not have—territorial claims against our neighbors. The issue of the minorities, however, is immediately associated with this matter. Not because Hungarian demands would be on the agenda, but because this corresponds to the international standard.

There are a number of misunderstandings here, however. I read recently in a Slovak daily that the Horn government is no different from the previous Hungarian Government, because they both bear responsibility for the well-being of the Hungarian minorities in the surrounding countries. We are saying, though, that this role has to be fulfilled by the state on whose territory the minorities live. At the same time, the Hungarian Government supports the endeavors of the Hungarian minorities and, if it is necessary, we talk about this on an international level.

I am convinced that it is in the interest of Romania or Slovakia to comply with the justified demands of the minorities, otherwise these states will be isolated from the advanced part of Europe.

MSZOSZ, HSP Sign Cooperation Agreement

LD0712203594 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Horn, on behalf of the HSP [Hungarian Socialist Party] and Laszlo Paszternak, on behalf of the socialist-social democratic platform of the MSZOSZ [National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions], have signed a cooperation agreement. Attila Kert reports.

[Kert] The present agreement confirms an earlier agreement signed in January. According to this, the socialist-social democratic platform of the MSZOSZ and the HSP continue to form election alliances. According to this, with the support of the Socialists, 100 trade union candidates will run in the local authority elections [scheduled for 11 December] throughout the country. The cooperation agreement also applies to the by-elections, scheduled to take place later.

Following the signing of the agreement, HSP Chairman Horn said that the agreement between the largest parliamentary party and a platform of the largest trade union is an important stage in cooperation between social partners and could also facilitate the soonest possible conclusion of a social-economic agreement.

On behalf of the trade union Laszlo Paszternak also stressed the importance of the social pact. He said that the MSZOSZ was interested in the conclusion of the pact as soon as possible, as well as in the success of their joint candidates' success in the local authority elections.

Governor Assesses Central Bank's Future Policies

MS0812112894 London THE EUROPEAN in English 9-15 Dec 94 p 19

[Interview with Peter Akos Bod, departing head of Hungary's Central Bank, by John Nadler; date and place not given]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] When the Hungarian Socialist Party won May's elections, the incoming government announced that it would replace the governor of the Hungarian National Bank, despite laws which ostensibly guarantee the independence of the central bank and its president. After six months of pressure to leave, bank president Peter Akos Bod said he would step down on 14 December. Critics warn that the government has compromised the autonomy of Hungary's central bank by forcing the governor out. In an interview with The European, Bod spoke about his departure and the bank's future:

Q: Why did you resign?

Bod: It was clear that the government wanted a change at the bank for political reasons. I decided to resign if I got guarantees that the central banking law would not be changed and if my deputies remained in place. And since I had the word of the prime minister that central banking

autonomy—although there was some damage done to it—would not be hurt through a change of personnel or legislation, I decided to leave.

Q: Over the past six months has Hungary's socialist-liberal government tried to influence the central bank?

Bod: The bank is autonomous in its monetary policy operations but has a lot of common issues with the government. There are so many occasions to clash. If there is an open dispute between the governor and the central bank every professional decision might be read by MPs and the general public as part of it.

I decided that if I insisted on the formal independence of the central bank I may undermine its de facto independence. It is a rather hard choice. At the end of the day, you would be responsible for weakening bank autonomy.

Q: Given that you were pressured to resign, should safeguards be created to protect central bank independence?

Bod: Legally it is all right. It is the difference between de facto and de jure independence. Most of the central banking law is correct except that it allows the bank to finance part of the government's deficit.

But what is important is not the law but the practice. The Bank of England is not independent by law but I don't think the British prime minister would go on television and say: "I don't like its governor."

That was the situation here.

My resignation was partly meant to educate the general public. My resignation will serve the long-term interests of the bank because the next government will be much more careful in handling issues regarding its governor. I just hope that politics will develop in a direction where party cards will not count inside the bank.

Q: Given the state of the Hungarian economy, what should central bank policy continue to be?

Bod: The crucial problem for me and my successor is that monetary policy has reached its limit of effectiveness. Interest rates are as high as 15 per cent in real terms, 30 per cent in nominal terms. It indicates that it's not monetary policy but fiscal policy that should now bear most of the burden of the adjustment.

The deficit remains large—six to eight per cent of GDP. This is not very high by European standards, but given the propensity to save in Hungary and the need to invest in industry, both the economy and the budget have claims on savings which are not enough to finance the two. You can't correct this with higher interest rates because ultimately the budget crowds out investors.

It is the feeling of many international agencies that the Hungarian budgetary deficit is too high and the 1995 budget is not bold enough. If you are not bold enough in year one when the government is at its strongest, what

then? It is not monetary policy that can do much now. The answer is labour policy, wage moderation, and budget policy.

Opposition Official Views Chance for Conservatism

AU0712162994 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 5 Dec 94 p 7

[Interview with Gyorgy Csoti, deputy chairman of National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee and foreign affairs spokesman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Jozsef Botlik; place and date not given: "There Are Good Chances for Conservatism"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Csoti] I do not criticize the government because the opposition always has to do that. I would prefer not to have to do this. Speaking about foreign policy, the government program prepared in June is basically close to our program; I could even say that it is a continuation of the foreign policy followed by the late Antall cabinet, albeit with slightly different concepts and emphases. However, there is one essential difference. Everyday practice is totally different from the written government program. We hear ambiguous declarations that can be misinterpreted, declarations that are not at all in harmony with the government program, especially on Hungary's European integration and the ethnic Hungarian minority living beyond our borders. Surprising statements are made in connection with the basic treaties to be signed with our neighbors, namely that these basic treaties should guarantee the adherence to the CSCE and Council of Europe norms in order to safeguard the rights of Hungarian minorities living beyond our borders. This is an extremely mild and hazy formulation, a totally unacceptable formulation.

[Botlik] Why?

[Csoti] Because there are no such norms or, better said, the existing norms are so weak that they do not fulfill at all the demands of the Hungarians living beyond our borders. In another chapter, the government program says that the European practice should also be followed in the Carpathian Basin regarding the national minority issue.

[Botlik] Does the program refer here to the German minority in South Tirol or the Swedish minority in Finland?

[Csoti] Most probably. We welcome this effort, because the government program speaks properly about this important issue. However, it follows a totally different position on the issue of extremely urgent basic treaties with the neighboring countries. This is the position I criticize. As for Hungary's prestige, the fact that the prime minister and the foreign minister often make contradictory statements that can be misinterpreted primarily regarding our NATO membership and Hungary's European integration damages Hungary's international prestige. [passage omitted]

[Botlik] What are the chances for conservatism in Hungary?

[Csoti] The elections held in May brought landslide-type changes here. However, one should not draw the conclusion that the conservative ideals failed in Hungary. I think that the voters simply were unable to tolerate the difficulties, but the press also played a decisive role in the final results. In the past four years, the previous government tried to restructure Hungary's economy and, naturally, it was bound to be unsuccessful and unpopular. The first positive signs in our macro-economy only emerged at the beginning of this year. However, the population did not yet feel this. Therefore, one cannot blame them for not liking us and for voting for someone else. Before the elections, I expected a close struggle between the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]. Although I did not exclude the possibility of an MDF defeat, I did not expect such a defeat. Although the present coalition has a two-thirds majority, one should not disregard the fact that 1.5 million people, or one third of the voters, voted in favor of the conservative ideals.

[Botlik] In your opinion, what is the situation of the MDF?

[Csoti] I connect the chances of the MDF with all the Christian-democratic, conservative, and liberal forces, the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], and some other organizations outside parliament. In case of a more rational policy, the Smallholders' Party could also belong here. The opposition should get its act together. This took place within the MDF at our long national conference. We must work in a united way, but this does not mean that any group should give up its views; instead, they should take a common stand, by adjusting their views. Various issues should be clarified through internal debates and then represent a uniform position in politics. This is needed not only for the MDF but also for the forces close to the MDF. We hope that this cooperation will prove to be successful in the upcoming local government elections. The final goal is to create some kind of a party alliance or union among the opposition parties for the renewed success of the conservative ideals.

Politicians Comment on Budapest CSCE Summit
WS0712151594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
7 Dec 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Ewa Kaszuba and Zbigniew Lentowicz:
"Reactions in Poland After Budapest Summit; Before a
Door to 'Cold Peace'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After Clinton's "yes" and Yeltsin's "no" concerning expansion of NATO into Central-East Europe, President Lech Walesa confirmed Poland's determination to join the organization. After the Russian president said, "Let us not repeat old mistakes because we will move from the Cold War to a cold peace," Lech Walesa objected to a new division of Europe and said, among other things: "No country has the right to get in the way of the aspirations of another country."

"President Walesa said what every Polish politician should have said after such a speech by Yeltsin. He showed respect for our neighbor to the east, but it was also unambiguous," comments Janusz Piechocinski, of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). Politicians emphasize Poland's determination to join NATO and do not agree that our sovereignty would be put in question if we make such a decision. Some believe, however, that this should not entail isolating Russia from Europe. "Politicians should express the same views about the international policy of the Polish Republic wherever they appear. Therefore, I was glad to find out that Mr. Kwasniewski and Mr. Pawlak invited President Lech Walesa to meet and discuss more than current issues," Piechocinski adds.

Press the West, Calm the Neighbor

"It is obvious that we should exert pressure on the West and display ironlike consistency as far as our integration into NATO is concerned," says Henryk Gorzyszewski, one of the leaders of the Christian-National Union. According to the head of the National Security Office at the President's Chancellery, in the area of European security and our bilateral relations with Russia, a lot will depend on the internal processes going on in this huge country. This is why our strivings should take into account the need to inform and calm our neighbors.

"Boris Yeltsin stated in Budapest that shifting NATO's borders to the western extremes of the CIS 'spells the end of Russian democracy.' This attracted my attention," Gorzyszewski stresses. "It would be a mistake to unnecessarily provide arguments to extreme communists and nationalists, who are dreaming of rebuilding the Soviet Union or reviving the Russian empire. This would only strengthen the forces that are unfavorably disposed toward Poland."

The SLD Also Wants To Talk

"Poland should join NATO. This is beyond discussion, and no country has the right to impose a veto," stresses

Tadeusz Iwinski, of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. He does concede, however, that he was disconcerted by the news coming from Budapest because it may mean that we will once again see tension in international relations.

"While we are heading toward NATO, which is our irrevocable and sovereign decision, we may think about the pace of that advancement. The proposals submitted by the Russians should be at least partially considered, if only so as not to give the impression that we are placing Russia in a situation from which there is no way out." According to Iwinski, extension of NATO within the next year might encourage Russia to take a few military and political steps. It might try to depart from the strategic partnership with the United States and from the Eurostrategic partnership with Germany, which is just now emerging. It might also strengthen cooperation with Muslim countries and China, or it might even go as far as to declare Poland a hostile state. Iwinski deems this a black scenario but adds that such possibilities must also be taken into consideration. This threat would disappear if the prospect of joining NATO were deferred by three or four years.

"We have lost some time because we did not talk with the Russians; we did not try to explain why we want to join NATO. We must talk with them and create a network of agreements because otherwise the Cold War might be revived, albeit on a smaller scale," Iwinski warns. He also says that rapid extension of NATO might also prove detrimental to democratic forces in Russia. Iwinski believes that this issue should be thoroughly discussed by several groups, such as the government, parliament, and the head of state, or by individual Sejm committees.

"We must think a step or two ahead; we must see the black scenario as well. In Poland, there are not many people who think along these lines, and there is no discussion of this," he concludes.

The SLD's Longin Pastusiak is convinced that the sharp words that appeared in the statement by the Russian party were spoken first of all for internal use—not only to calm oppositional critics, but also to appease the Russian military complex, to which the authorities must pay a debt that was incurred not long ago. Aside from that, as future talks on European security structures are drawing near, Russia is trying to obtain a better bargaining position to gain the most in the future.

"However, even though we differ on the role of NATO in Central Europe, we cannot isolate ourselves. One must talk with Russia, one must talk with everyone in order to explain the principles of the policies for the security of Poland and Europe," Professor Pastusiak explains.

West Remembers Yeltsin's Words

The PSL's Janusz Piechocinski believes that the Budapest conference has not brought Poland closer to

the Western security systems. "It has even widened the distance because it showed that the determination of the Russian authorities is far greater than we had expected and that Russia will very aggressively continue to veto the strivings of Central-East European countries." Piechocinski stresses that decisions concerning our admission to NATO will be made in Western capitals, which do not want tension in relations with the great Eastern partner. The firm response of the West was only for public opinion. However, the words spoken by Yeltsin will be remembered for a long time, and politicians will take them into consideration, he predicts.

Surprising Was the Tone, Not the Objection

"Russia's objection to the prospects of extending NATO to the East did not come to me as a surprise. What took me aback was the tone in which Boris Yeltsin communicated this message. This means that the Russians do not want to understand the essence of the transformations that are taking place in Europe. I believe that they are inevitable and that the Russian empire must adjust to them," stated Jerzy Onyszkiewicz yesterday on Radio Zet. What disconcerted the former minister of national defense was how easily the official Russian authorities are taking over some of the slogans of the Russian nationalist "red-and-brown" opposition.

The stand taken by Yeltsin did not surprise Tomasz Nalecz of the Labor Union [UP], either. According to him, it is nothing new for Russia to try to settle its internal conflicts by taking a more rigid stance in international policy. What comforted Nalecz was Clinton's statement, which meant another step on Poland's long road toward NATO. The UP politician believes that the words spoken in Budapest should be interpreted rather calmly.

Russian Pressure Must Be Endured

"I can see no reason for us to explain to Russia what we are doing and play the strange role of one who ought to explain his behavior. If the East were ready to understand us, our motives and arguments would be all too clear," says Jan Parys, leader of the Movement of the Third Republic. He believes that the behavior of the Russian diplomatic services cannot be justified only by the country's internal frustrations. "This would be an oversimplification." On the basis of many political reactions, one can say that the concepts that are voiced today prove that there is another, a Moscow vision of Europe, that is different from the Western vision.

He believes that it was symptomatic that, at the same time Yeltsin was present at the CSCE session, when he was submitting peacekeeping proposals for the continent and speaking about military stability, Russia was getting ready to invade Chechnya, a small country that could not threaten the superpower in any way. "This may mean that the Kremlin authorities are not ready to reach an agreement and that they are unable to use peaceful methods. The foreign policy of the Russians," Parys

says, "suggests that it is far from reality, and it increasingly often resembles 'enchanted reality.'"

"It was very important that the Western delegation adopted a clear and unambiguous stand in Budapest, even though we should not expect relations with Russia to be a little worse." According to Parys, Poland has no choice but to consistently strive for Euroatlantic structures: "We should not have to endure the Russian pressure," he stresses.

Foreign Minister on Walesa's Visit to Japan

LD0712203894 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent Krzysztof Wojna, from Tokyo] Now a brief assessment of today's activities given at a meeting with Polish journalists by Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski:

[Begin Olechowski recording] One can see the will to develop political cooperation. The Japanese Government, which clearly discussed relations with Poland before President Walesa's visit, has decided that it is important to have lively political relations with Poland. The prime minister spoke extensively about this, pointing out what an important country it is in that part of the world and how important Poland's success is for the success of that part of the world as a whole. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Walesa Tries To Lure Investment

LD0712201394 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent Krzysztof Wojna, from Tokyo] The Japanese gave a very warm welcome to President Walesa, with all the honors. However, for the time being, they do not intend to change their position on the issue most important to us: the issue of our debt and the resumption of credit guarantees for medium- and long-term exports to Poland. We owe Japan \$1.7 billion. Japan was against reducing Poland's debt in the belief that any such reductions mean rewarding a debtor. This position has been adopted not only with regard to Poland. Japan has adopted it toward all of its insolvent debtors.

It transpires from today's conversations between President Walesa and representatives of large concerns that there is interest in Poland, although it is a long way from interest to possible investments on a large scale. It seems the Japanese in their economic strategy do not attach much importance to our part of Europe and do not intend to get involved in a competitive battle for this market with the European Union, which has Central and East Europe close at hand.

However, the president's visit is supposed to be a significant contribution to the promotion of Poland in the Pacific. Here is Lech Walesa's vision, which he presented

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at a luncheon given in his honor by the Keidanren, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations.

[Begin Walesa recording] Poland is the most stable country and has all the conditions to be a stable country. It is a country of one nation and one religion. That is why in this transition period there are no reasons for any arguments. Also behind us are enormous markets of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as the unhappy, but still lovable, Russia. We want to prepare all this for you, and we would like you to come and do business, great business, and we can make some money out of it as well.

You are the only ones, unique and the best. If I have persuaded you even a little, I do not have to worry about my second term in office. I strongly believe that we can be successful and that we can live in a happy, peaceful world, in which Japan can play a part worthy of its great magnitude. [end recording]

Fails To Get Credit Guarantees

LD0712221094 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish
1830 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In Tokyo, President Lech Walesa has failed to persuade the Japanese Government to unblock credit guarantees for Japanese investment in Poland. During a meeting with the president, heads of several Japanese concerns merely declared their willingness to take part in enterprises in Poland. A Polish-Japanese air transport agreement was signed during the visit.

[Correspondent Piotr Jazwinski] The Polish president's visit to Japan has received high protocol status because Walesa is the only head of foreign state invited this year to pay an official state visit to the Land of the Rising Sun. The ceremony of welcome of Walesa and the people accompanying him by the emperor, who has been ruling for five years now, took place in the forecourt of the Akasaka Palace, the Tokyo residence of the Polish president, from where the imperial couple invited the Polish visitors for brief private talks at their own palace.

The main purpose of Walesa's visit to Tokyo is to persuade Japanese business to increase investment in our country. The president spoke about this during a meeting with representatives of seven Japanese economic organizations. So far, Japanese companies have invested about \$6 million in Poland. The trade turnover does not exceed \$300 million.

[Begin Walesa recording] I, as allegedly a man of success and a revolutionary, can only come here and ask you to Consider what is being created. I can also only say: Lose a bit now for the sake of profits later. [end recording]

[Jazwinski] In response to the president's appeal, the Marubeni concern declared its willingness to take part in the construction of Polish motorways. Mitsubishi and Matsui are also interested in big investments in Poland.

These concerns announced that they would be sending trade missions to our country.

During talks between the president, the persons accompanying him, and Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, the issue of unblocking credits for Japanese investment in Poland, frozen three years ago, came up. The Murayama government could not bring itself to take that step.

[Begin Olechowski recording] The Japanese are very much afraid that, if they reopen government credits for Poland—it is always the issue of government credits—this would embolden and serve as an incentive for other borrowers to also ask for debt reduction, knowing they would again get new credits. [end recording]

[Jazwinski] Above all, the Japanese want us to start repaying the capital of our debt, which amounts to nearly \$2.5 billion.

Just like 13 years ago, during Lech Walesa's first visit, Poland is associated here with the names of Frederic Chopin, Marie Curie-Sklodowska, and John Paul II. On the other hand, in Poland the names of Japanese concerns are known better than those of Japanese authors or scientists. Consequently, a great many visits will be needed before Poland is associated with good business.

Assured of Guarantees

LD0812125694 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Japanese Government has given an assurance that it will grant credit guarantees to Japanese investors in Poland. President Lech Walesa, on the second day of his official visit to Japan, said at a news conference that he was convinced he had succeeded in persuading the Japanese to invest in Poland. He also stressed that he did not come to Tokyo to borrow money.

[Begin Walesa recording] We are coming today to your country not to get loans but to persuade you to build your own companies and make money in our country. [end recording]

The questions concerned economic relations between our two countries, Russia, NATO, and whether possible Japanese credits could help Lech Walesa win next year's presidential election. Without any hesitation, President Walesa replied yes because they would contribute to economic development.

Earlier, Lech Walesa met leaders of political parties and the leadership of the Japanese-Polish friendship parliamentary group.

At midday, together with his wife, he hosted dinner in honor of the emperor and his wife.

Today we have also found out that the Japanese Government has partially changed its mind and will, after all, set in motion additional instruments to activate the

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economic relations with Poland—namely, it will guarantee credits to be used by Japanese investors for investment projects in Poland.

More on Coalition Preelection Pact With Walesa

WS0712133894 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Dec 94 p 3

[Article by Agata Nowakowska and Pawel Wronski: "How Will Relations Between the Coalition and the President Develop: Truce or War?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) want to work out a truce with Lech Walesa for the period leading up to the presidential election. They want to present their offer during a meeting with the president.*

The decision to invite Lech Walesa to a session of the presidiums of both clubs was reached at a coalition meeting held yesterday.

"The president never refuses this type of invitation," Secretary of State Lech Falandysz commented on the offer.

Lech Walesa is to decide whether to accept the invitation upon his return from Japan.

Christmas Truce or War

"Perhaps it is worthwhile to develop an agreement with the president before the holidays. Our chief concerns are the budget bill and approving a new constitution. We want to learn Lech Walesa's intentions," Jerzy Szmajdzinski (SLD) told GAZETA WYBORCZA.

According to him, two scenarios are possible: Lech Walesa will either agree to cooperate or will wage war and veto the bill concerning salaries for state-sector employees and the budget bill, attempting to also block speedy passage of the new constitution.

"We will then have to pull certain solutions out of the drawer," warns Szmajdzinski.

The coalition had already threatened the president with the Small Constitution. PSL and SLD deputies "spontaneously" prepared a draft amendment limiting the powers of the president.

Lech Walesa had promised at the time that he would not reject the coalition candidate for finance minister, and the SLD leader promised that the coalition would not touch the Small Constitution in return.

"The president had also promised that he would not meddle in economic issues. He is not keeping his word," states an influential SLD politician.

Limit the President?

As we learn from unofficial sources, the coalition is considering, among other things, the introduction of a law prohibiting the president from vetoing economic

ills. It also wants to reduce the two-thirds vote majority required to reject a veto to a simple majority. It also hints that the new constitution will not curb presidential authority.

Officially, the coalition politicians deny that they want to alter the Small Constitution. "We want to have an agreement with the president until 1996, even at the price of self-sacrifice on both sides. Otherwise, both democracy and this country will be destroyed," warns Zbigniew Siemiatkowski (SLD).

The coalition is promising Walesa that the meeting will be closed, and television cameras will not be allowed. "The president has no grounds to fear public laundering of the event, similar to that organized by the Freedom Union," says an SLD politician.

The coalition lacks nine votes to amend the Small Constitution. It is counting, however, on some support from the opposition. "If Walesa keeps on vetoing every bill, we will know what he is driving at—dissolving parliament. This is a hunt, in which the entire parliament is the prey," says one of our interlocutors. He claims that the opposition will also want to avoid such a situation.

What About the Head of the Defense Ministry [MON]?

The coalition wants to speak with the president on appointing the head of MON.

"The nomination of Longin Pastusiak as acting head of MON would be a striking violation of the Constitution," states Falandysz.

Szmajdzinski retorts: "The Small Constitution does not provide for the absence of a defense minister. This is a visible flaw. So far, Falandysz has examined those flaws; now it is our turn."

"The premier is the 'prime minister' [preceding two words published in English], meaning the chief minister, and as such can appoint a deputy minister, eventually making him acting head," says Szmajdzinski.

There is already a precedent: When the Ministry of Finance had an acting head, Waldemar Pawlak appointed Jan Kubik as deputy minister.

"At that time, the president did not intervene because it was an element in a tug of war between the Sejm and the government. Right now it would be a serious limitation of his powers," says Falandysz.

He points out that the president has special powers in regard to three ministries and is responsible for state security.

The coalition, however, does not exclude the possibility of compromising on the issue of the defense minister. "Appointing the defense minister may be one of the elements of an agreement with the president: We will

back out of Pastusiak, and Walesa will back out of Okonski. We will jointly appoint the minister," an SLD politician told us.

Pawlak Does Not Rule Dissolution of Parliament

LD0712180794 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1706 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 7 Dec—Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak told journalists present at the Office of the Council of Ministers on 7 December that, "when watching Mr. Falandysz," deputy head of the Presidential Chancellery, he could not rule out that the president's aim was to dissolve the parliament.

The prime minister declared that the leaders of the coalition parties wanted to hold a meeting with the president to discuss the announcement of his intentions to veto the law on pay for public-sector employees and to lodge a complaint about the taxation law with the Constitutional Tribunal.

"It seems to me that, if we think seriously about what is happening in the country, there are barriers, which, when crossed, bring about such effects that further political activity starts to be quite harmful for everyone involved," the prime minister said.

Legal Aspects of Sejm Dissolution Over Budget

WS0812093194 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Dec 94 p 3

[Article by Artur Domoslawski: "The Budget Bill and Dissolution of the Sejm: What Does it Mean To Pass a Bill?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Deputies in the Sejm are speculating as to the deadline for passing the new budget, so as not to provide Lech Walesa with a legal opportunity to dissolve parliament.*

As we recall, the Small Constitution provides that the president may dissolve the Sejm if the budget is not passed within three months of the date a draft fulfilling all necessary requirements is presented to the Sejm. Differences in reports prepared by constitutional law experts at the urgent request of the head of the Sejm Chancellery pertain to the issue of what is implied by "passing a bill" in the Small Constitution.

Version I: Three Months for the Sejm

According to Sejm expert Professor Pawel Sarnecki, the president may dissolve the Sejm if it does not complete work on the budget bill and forward it to the Senate within three months. A delay in finalizing work on the budget beyond the deadline, whether the act is in the Senate or returned to the Sejm, no longer gives the president an option to dissolve the Sejm.

Professor Kazimierz Dzialocha, an outstanding constitutional lawyer and former judge on the Constitutional

Tribunal, agrees. He quotes a judicial decision passed by the Tribunal, stating that the Small Constitution implies that it is the Sejm that is to pass bills, not the Sejm and the Senate. This is provided for in Article 17 of the Small Constitution: "A bill passed by the Sejm is handed over by the speaker to the Senate."

Thus, "passing a bill" means, as the lawyers claim, its first being passed by the Sejm (and not by both the Sejm and Senate, and then by the Sejm once more if the Senate makes any amendments).

Version II: Three Months for the Sejm and Senate

Less optimistic for the Sejm are comments made by Assistant Professor Zdzislaw Jarosz. He claims it is possible to understand from the Small Constitution that the president may dissolve the Sejm even if the budget bill is passed in the Sejm within three months but is not passed by the Senate and is not returned to the Sejm within that period.

According to Jarosz, there is no general provision in the Small Constitution that the Sejm is to pass bills. He believes it is quite the contrary: Both the Sejm and the Senate are organs of legislative power, and one of the articles of the Small Constitution states that bills are "passed by the Sejm and the Senate."

In the opinion of Jarosz, the term "passing a bill" is used in the Small Constitution with different meanings. The words "pass," "accept," and "approve" are used interchangeably.

In this context, claims Jarosz, one may assume that, if Article 21, Paragraph 4 of the Small Constitution mentions "passing the budget bill" within three months, without a distinct restriction that it is to be passed by the Sejm, it means a bill passed by the parliament (the Senate included).

The only fully effective measure for preventing the dissolution of parliament by the president is passing the budget within three months not only by the Sejm but also reading the bill in the Senate and repeatedly passing it through the Sejm, Jarosz advises parliament members.

What Does the Tribunal Say?

The Constitutional Tribunal claims (in one of its explanations issued in connection with a judicial decision) that the Sejm must pass the budget bill within three months, but only under the condition that the draft put forth by the government meets legal requirements. It is not necessary for the Senate to approve it or for the president to sign it within this period.

According to this interpretation, the president would not have the right to dissolve a parliament that had passed a budget bill not yet read before the Senate. According to the Tribunal, the president would also be unable to dissolve parliament if the government had presented a draft not fulfilling legal criteria (for instance, those of the budget law), due to which the Sejm was unable to amend and pass it within three months.

Walesa Does One Thing, the Sejm Another

Last week, the coalition conceived a new plan for surprising the president. It would be applicable only if the parliament were able to pass the bill and send it on to the president to sign. If Walesa then vetoed the budget, the Sejm would refuse to consider it. The Small Constitution does not give a deadline by which the deputies are to investigate the matter. The veto would thus be stuck in the Sejm for an indefinite period of time, and, according to provisions of the Small Constitution, the budget approved by the parliament would come into effect with the beginning of the new year.

Poll Shows Weak Support for Dissolution of Sejm

WS0712151594 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 7 Dec 94 p 1

[Report by "NIKA": "Little Joy With Dissolution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The possibility of the president dissolving the Sejm is received with just as much dissatisfaction as indifference, suggests a study conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center. Every ninth respondent would be satisfied if the president made the decision to dissolve parliament and hold new parliamentary elections. At the same time, 36 percent of respondents are not interested in reports on the Sejm's sessions.

We would receive the president's decision to dissolve the parliament:

	Percent
With dissatisfaction	39
With indifference	39
With satisfaction	11
Hard to tell	11

Bigger Workload for Military Intelligence Services

LD0712212794 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1805 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 7 Dec—There is more and more work in Poland for the Military Information Services [WSI], maintain deputies from the Sejm National Defense Commission [KON], who today, during a meeting closed to the press, heard explanations from the head of the WSI, Colonel Konstanty Malejczyk, about the budget and the tasks of military intelligence and counterintelligence for 1995.

The increased WSI effort is connected, among other things, with the provision of counterintelligence cover for arms-manufacturing enterprises and more intensive activities by foreign special services in Poland, KON Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzinski told journalists after the proceedings.

The WSI budget, like those of all secret services, is secret. According to the WSI leadership, it is sufficient for the operations planned for next year. According to Szmajdzinski, it is comparable to the resources allocated for UOP [State Protection Office] and for operational activities of the police.

The head of the WSI explained to journalists that, at present, these services "come under the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, while the powers of the national defense minister remain as they are." On the other hand, the deputies believe that the WSI should come directly under the defense minister. According to them, a Sejm commission for monitoring the special services should also be set up as soon as possible.

Resita Rally Expands to 7,000 Protestors

AU0712131694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Approximately 7,000 employees of the industrial plants of Resita have resumed their protest action this morning. They are gathered in the square in front of the Resita Prefect's Office, where they are attending a rally that has been going on over the past four hours, reports our correspondent Doru Dinu Glavan. The crowd is being addressed from a microphone installed in the balcony of the prefect's office building by trade union leaders and employee representatives.

Romanian President Ion Iliescu has contacted the Caras-Severin County prefect by telephone, wishing to be informed about the situation in Resita. President Iliescu reassured the Resita workers; his message was conveyed to them by County Prefect Traian Zamfir, that he will ask the government to examine, as a priority issue, the situation created in that industrial center and find long-term solutions for the advancement of Resita industry.

Rally To Resume; Government Issues Statement

AU0812072494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The second day of the Resita workers' protest action concluded at around 1700 [1500 GMT] and it will resume tomorrow in the central square of the town of Resita. The County Branch of the National Trade Union Bloc and the Free Trade Union of the Resita Machine Building Enterprise issued a communique on behalf of the 7,000 employees who participated in the rally.

According to reports by our correspondent, the communique expresses the dissatisfaction with the statements made today at 1600 by the Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu in connection with the situation in Resita. The document also expresses the determination of the two trade union branches to continue their protest until the prime minister comes to Resita. Likewise, the communique states that the government team, which is going to arrive in Resita tomorrow and which is in charge of examining the situation, is not suitable to solve the current problems in Resita.

According to statements by trade union leaders, the rally will continue tomorrow, starting at 0830. According to reports by the ROMPRES news agency, trade union sources also said that numerous messages of solidarity from other trade unions had arrived at the address of the protesters and that there are concrete signs that tomorrow trade unions belonging to the county branch of CNSRL-Fratia [National Confederation of Romania's Free Trade Unions] and representatives of trade unions in Caransebes, Otelul Rosu, Anina, Hunedoara, and Timisoara will join those who participated in the rally today and they had announced that they will arrive in buses tomorrow.

This evening, the government issued the following communique:

The Romanian Government is concerned about the situation in the conflict at the Resita Machine Building Enterprise, brought about by the fact that salaries have not been paid in time and by the concern of employees about the production prospects for 1995. Yesterday, 6 December and today, 7 December, the sums appearing in the documents that were presented to the investment point of Krivoyrog for deliveries that were carried out have been released. The respective sums were transferred to Resita in order to have the salaries paid to employees of the Machine Building Enterprise.

Today, Mr. Nicolae Vacaroiu, Romania's prime minister, ordered that a team to include secretaries of state, general directors, and other experts in the Ministry of Industries, the State Property Fund, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, and the Ministry of Finance should be set up. Starting tomorrow, 8 December, the team will, in Resita, together with the leadership of the Machine Building Enterprise and of the Metallurgical Combine, examine the manufacturing program for 1995 and the possibilities of implementing that program. Measures and solutions that will result from this examination will be presented to the Executive Bureau of the government and of the Administration Council of the State Property Fund regarding adopting the appropriate decisions.

Romania's prime minister will arrive in Resita by 15 January 1995 to examine the means and ways of implementing the measures and solutions that are going to be reached.

Mr. Nicolae Vacaroiu calls on all employees of the Resita Machine Building Enterprise and Resita Metallurgical Combine to resume work in view of the fact that the Romanian Government and the State Property Fund are focusing their attention on the situation of the conflict that has been created in Resita with a view to finding solutions to this situation.

President Briefs Media Upon Return From CSCE

AU0712143994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Passages within quotations recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At about 1900 this evening, Romanian President Ion Iliescu returned home from Budapest, where he attended the CSCE summit. Our correspondent Sorin Croitorescu reports from Otopeni Airport:

[Croitorescu] On that occasion, President Iliescu held several meetings with heads of state and government. Upon his arrival at Otopeni Airport, Iliescu made a statement to the press. [passage omitted]

After making that statement the journalists wished to learn more details from President Iliescu. One of the journalists thus asked him his opinion on Russia's stance regarding the East European countries' wish to join NATO.

[Iliescu] "To a certain extent it is understandable that Russia is concerned over possibly losing its importance as a consequence of that process; nevertheless, I believe that the general spirit that prevailed at the conference and the speeches there indicated that we have reached a new stage. We are now erecting international relations of a different nature. Whereas, formerly, international life was dominated by two superpowers and ruled according to the logic of spheres of domination and influence of those superpowers, we have now reached a new stage of development, dominated by relations of partnership and equality among all countries, in which the logic of confrontation has been eliminated and, as opposed to that, they are seeking ways to further partnership and cooperation. In that context the expansion of NATO, as a body having a function other than that of one military bloc opposed to another, has to be seen from the angle of this altered context of the new reality on our continent.

"In that sense we have reiterated our interest in our integration within all European and Euro-Atlantic bodies, as a positive factor of the development of political life on our continent, one which does not exclude Russia from the process of furthering cooperation in Europe and in international political life."

[Croitorescu] Another journalist asked the head of state for further details of his meetings today with Jacques Delors, the acting president of the EU [European Union] Commission, and with Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze.

[Iliescu] "Mr. Shevardnadze was not there from the very beginning. As soon as he arrived, we agreed to meet. As I already said, I held meetings with the representatives of all 11 states that had attended the Istanbul [Black Sea cooperation] conference. Both of us were interested in our mutual briefing on the situation in our countries and in connection with the future Bucharest summit conference of the states of the Black Sea region. It was a very useful meeting, assessed as such by both parties.

"Yesterday I met with Mr. Santer, EU president-elect, and today with Delors, the outgoing president of that body. I think that both of these were positive meetings in the sense that they allowed us to reiterate our interest, as we are approaching a new stage in our relations with the EU, owing to the new status of associate country that our country will enjoy beginning next year—including all the problems raised by that new status related to our prearrangements in all domains, to adapting our legislation and our economic practice, to ensuring our economic and technological competitiveness, in view of our integration within the European community.

"I also pointed out as a positive element the fact that all six associated countries have been invited to the Essen

conference, at the end of this week, which the European Commission leadership also considers to be an important moment to mark this new stage of direct relations of the EU with the associate countries."

[Croitorescu] One of the reporters wanted to know more about the recent appointment to the presidential apparatus of Mrs. Rodica Becleanu, former Romanian television reporter.

[Iliescu] "Mrs. Becleanu is a person with a great deal of experience in the domain of the audiovisual media, an experienced television employee and one of the persons who were very active during the Romanian revolution and the entire revolutionary process Romania has gone through. She thus joins the presidency apparatus working in the domain of media dissemination on the activity of the president and the presidential institution."

[Croitorescu] The head of state was also asked about the contribution, in his opinion, of the Budapest conference to stabilizing the situation in the former Yugoslavia.

[Iliescu] "Of course, the situation in Yugoslavia was a preoccupation of the conference in general, as well as of all the participants. They showed a great deal of interest in connection with developments there over the past few days. Messrs. Juppe and Hurd had come to Budapest straight from Belgrade—I also had a meeting with Mr. Juppe last night—and I believe that it was an important moment that might represent an essential change and good prospects for the political settlement of the crisis in Bosnia and the Yugoslav space. As a positive new element, I can point out the accord concluded by the Croatian Government and the Krajina Serb region on the establishment of economic relations and the initiation of certain Zagreb-Belgrade contacts, as well as the new stances adopted by the UN Security Council and the Contact Group—their new offers and perspectives intended to stimulate negotiations, direct contacts, and dialogue among the interested parties and to find solutions that can be accepted by all parties, including the possible variant of the confederation of the Serbs in Bosnia. I mean the Orthodox Serbs, because actually the conflict going on there is not an ethnic but rather a religious one, as the Muslim Serbs are fighting the Orthodox Serbs. So there are new possibilities, including a possible confederation with the Yugoslav Republic.

"From this point of view, it seems that several new initiatives have been proposed, initiatives that were pointed out and emphasized during the conference. Of course, one cannot expect such a conference to settle all the problems or that, following such an intense and bloody conflict, with so much sacrifice, immediate solutions can be found and also accepted. As a matter of fact, the entire experience of the Yugoslav conflict proves that military conflicts can be easily triggered, but these are not only unable to solve any problems but also complicate and aggravate the climate and relations, thus

making it much more difficult to find solutions acceptable to everyone. Nevertheless, I hope the latest initiatives and efforts will facilitate the working out of solutions accepted by all parties."

[Croitorescu] Finally, President Iliescu was asked by one of the journalists whether he would accept to have the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] attend, as a negotiating party, the talks on the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty.

[Iliescu] "That would be an absurd thing to do. Relations between states are negotiated and solved by those states' representative bodies. As far as the ethnic or other minorities' own organizations are concerned, that is a matter pertaining to each state, depending on the extent they consider it useful and necessary to engage in internal consultations to adopt efficient positions.

"As far as we are concerned, we have never excluded such internal consultations. There is such practice in parliament, and the government also has a council for ethnic minority issues. Our foreign ministry also has

contacts with the representatives of various political forces, including the ones belonging to minorities, in connection with all the decisions made by the government or the foreign affairs ministry.

"Nevertheless, the UDMR's attending those talks as a negotiating party is something that is not done in the contemporary world."

Iliescu Wants HDUR Out of Basic Agreement

LD0712141594 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Romanian President Ion Iliescu has said there is no possibility of the HDUR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania] taking part in the discussions on the Romanian-Hungarian basic agreement. Ion Iliescu, returning home from the CSCE summit conference in Budapest, justified his standpoint, saying that inter-state relations can only be discussed by the institutions representing the countries concerned. The HDUR does not represent either Hungary or Romania.

UNPROFOR Reportedly To Reduce Bihac Forces
*LD0712163094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1601
 GMT 7 Dec 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, 7 Dec (TANJUG)—The United Nations said Monday [as received] it would temporarily withdraw one third of its 1,200-strong Bangladeshi peacekeeping battalion from the Bihac pocket in northwestern Bosnia.

U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman Col. Jan Dirk von Merveldt said he was confident that the Krajina Serbs controlling the northern outskirts of the Bihac pocket would not hinder the announced pull-out of part of the Bangladeshi battalion.

The Bosnian Muslims, lead by hardline leader Alija Izetbegovic, in late October launched an offensive on Bosnian Serb villages and defenses from the northwestern town of Bihac, a U.N.-designated 'safe area', bordering the Republic of Serb Krajina.

The Bosnian Serbs launched a counter-attack in early November, which coincided with renewed inter-Muslim clashes between forces loyal to the Sarajevo Muslim government and those led by moderate Muslim politician Fikret Abdic.

The REUTER and AFP news agencies quoted Merveldt as saying this was a temporary pull-out caused by inadequate supplies and the need for 'rotation.'

U.N. spokesman Thant Myint-U said the U.N. did not know when the troops would withdraw and when they would be replaced, explaining that the available supplies in the pocket were insufficient and that the Bangladeshi troops were in a very difficult situation.

Merveldt said plans for the withdrawal had not been completed yet, but the troops were scheduled for 'rest and recuperation' in a logistic base near the Croatian capital Zagreb.

The news agencies said that the Bangladeshi troops who were sent to Bihac hastily in October lacked winter gear and only two resupply convoys reached them.

Pullout Begins

*AU0712182794 Paris AFP in English 1804 GMT
 7 Dec 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] SARAJEVO, Dec 7 (AFP)—The United Nations Wednesday [7 December] began pulling out a third of the 1,200 Bangladeshi peacekeepers deployed in the besieged enclave of Bihac, a UN spokesman said.

Major Herve Gourmelon refused to give any details on the number of men in the first contingent leaving the pocket in northwest Bosnia for Croatia. The 1,200 Bangladeshi soldiers were deployed in three towns in Bihac pocket. The United Nations announced the pullout plan

earlier in the day, saying it was temporary and prompted by problems in keeping the troops supplied because of surrounding Serb forces.

Gourmelon insisted that it was "a precautionary redeployment in the light of logistical problems, threats against the peacekeepers and bad weather." "This is a temporary move and cannot be considered the beginning of a pullout of UN troops from Bosnia," he said.

The Bangladeshi soldiers were trapped in Bihac last month following a sustained counter-offensive by Bosnian Serbs against Moslem-led forces and had virtually run out of food and other supplies when a UN convoy finally reached them at the weekend.

Earlier another UN spokesman had said the withdrawal would begin next week.

UN Commander Denies Withdrawal

*AU0712213794 Paris AFP in English 2124 GMT
 7 Dec 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Dec 7 (AFP)—The UN commander in Bihac Wednesday [7 December] denied a report from his own organization that peacekeepers in the northwest Moslem enclave had already begun to withdraw.

"This report is false," Colonel Charles Lemieux said from Bihac.

The United Nations plans to withdraw the troops through the town of Velika Kladusa, which has been under heavy attack from Serb forces, and the pullout will proceed only when ceasefire talks with the Serbs conclude, he said.

He said talks were held Wednesday but yielded no agreement and would resume Thursday.

In Sarajevo, another UN official had said the world body had already begun pulling out a third of the 1,200 Bangladeshi peacekeepers deployed in Bihac.

The official, Major Herve Gourmelon, refused to give any details on the number of men in the first contingent he said were leaving the pocket for Croatia. The 1,200 Bangladeshi soldiers were deployed in three towns in Bihac pocket. [passage omitted]

France's Juppe Cited on Possible UN Withdrawal

BR0712164294 Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 Dec p 4

[Report by Baudouin Bollaert: "Bosnia: Juppe Speaks of 'Rapid' Withdrawal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Budapest—Could the Bosnian Serbs finally be ready to accept the Contact Group's peace plan? The signal that French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe had been waiting for since his talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on Sunday [5 December] has now arrived. The Serbian president—

who no longer wants "to hear about" Radovan Karadzic—had promised Juppe that he would endeavor to put pressure on the parliament in Pale. This was duly acknowledged.

On Monday a delegation of Bosnian Serb deputies led by the foreign minister went to Belgrade at Milosevic's invitation. And before returning to Pale it announced that the peace plan had to be reexamined. No more and no less. However, this piece of news is rekindling a faint hope in the minds of the French foreign minister and his British counterpart Douglas Hurd.

Exasperated by the criticism to which France has been subjected, as we know Alain Juppe issued a virulent plea in Budapest on Monday evening: "I prefer to keep moving rather than sit back in my chair!" Moreover, to strike an equal balance, on the sidelines of the CSCE conference he met with Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Croatian President Tudjman. As with Milosevic on Sunday, Juppe spoke candidly and firmly to them.

"The most urgent priority is a cease-fire," he said. "This urgency is counted in days, because the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] chiefs may not be far from calling for a withdrawal of the blue helmets. Then vital negotiations could be relaunched. And that would take weeks..." However, Alain Juppe believes that "we must stop the toing-and-froing by our diplomats and get the leaders together."

A Question of Days

For the moment he finds that nobody is rejecting the idea of tripartite meetings or rather bipartite meetings. "However," he added, "Messrs. Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic are laying down a great many preconditions." The former regarding Belgrade's recognition of their borders and sovereignty, and the latter regarding the lifting of the economic sanctions imposed on his country. Mr. Juppe is categorical on this point: "No lifting of sanctions without further progress."

This is the situation then. With all the unknowns of the peace plan itself. Although possible territorial exchanges had already been provided for in the Geneva text, the innovative element consisting of creating two distinct confederal entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina is more uncertain: While the word "confederation" does feature in the Washington agreement referring to the Croatian-Bosnian alliance, it is missing from the Contact Group's statement regarding the Serbs in Pale and in Belgrade.

Might it be desirable to hold an international conference aimed at resolving the impasse? Alain Juppe would not be hostile to such an undertaking. Indeed, the United States would regard it as "crowning" the efforts to achieve peace, rather than as a factor in unblocking the negotiations. Nevertheless the question has been asked; unless of course a real cease-fire should materialize before then and the UNPROFOR convoys be able to move around freely.

Serbs Offer New Talks on Contact Group Plan

AU0712162794 Paris AFP in English 1537 GMT
7 Dec 94

[Report by Bernard Besserglik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec 7 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs on Wednesday offered to hold new talks on a revision of a peace plan proposed by the international "Contact Group," an official statement issued in their stronghold here said. "We express readiness to immediately bring war to an end and open negotiations on the revision and the betterment of the plan to make the overall package acceptable," the statement added.

It said Bosnian Serbs heard "new interpretations" of the Contact Group plan under which further work on a map and definition of constitutional arrangements was possible.

The statement was issued at a press conference attended by Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb parliamentary assembly's foreign affairs spokesman Aleksa Buha after their delegation held talks in Belgrade Monday. Buha said there had been "approaches and initiatives from various directions." These were passed on by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic after talks in Belgrade Monday with the foreign ministers of Britain and France, Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe, and in contacts with the co-presidents of the Geneva peace talks, Buha added.

Karadzic said they had also been approached by Charles Thomas, a U.S. member of the Contact Group who suggested the Serb side take part in discussions.

The Contact Group comprises Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States.

Buha and Karadzic said the Serbs did "not care one way or the other whether the UN Protection Force remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Karadzic guaranteed that the troops would have safe passage out of Serb territory on condition that they take weapons and do not leave them to Moslems.

He dismissed reports of dissensions among Serb deputies following a Serb statement Tuesday saying that Buha and his delegation were not authorized to suggest consideration of a proposal for confederation between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia proper.

Further on Talks Offer

AU0712153194 Paris AFP in English 1506 GMT
7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec 7 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs have heard "new interpretations" of the Contact Group plan under which further

work on a map and definition of constitutional arrangements was possible, an official statement said here Wednesday [7 December].

The statement was issued at a press conference attended by Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb parliamentary assembly's foreign affairs spokesman Aleksa Buha after their delegation held talks in Belgrade Monday.

"We express readiness to immediately bring war to an end and open negotiations on the revision and the betterment of the plan to make the overall package acceptable," the statement added.

Karadzic, Buha News Conference

LD0712191294 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske
Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT
7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On the occasion of yesterday's visit by the Srpska republic [RS] parliamentary delegation to Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, and in connection with some other matters, Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, held a news conference in Pale this afternoon. Ljiljana Kovacevic reports:

[Kovacevic] Giving reasons for the official visit of the RS assembly delegation to the Serbian president, RS Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha said that the official visit was preceded by two visits to Slobodan Milosevic by RS parliament deputies at their own initiative, a previously held meeting of the Main Committee of the Serb Democratic Party of Serb Lands, and the Deputies' Club, at which an official delegation was set up for the meeting with the Serbian president on Monday, 5 December, to brief him on the conclusions and on current diplomatic initiatives. Minister Buha then read the following statement for the public:

[Begin Buha recording] We welcome the readiness of Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, to reestablish contacts with official representatives of the Srpska republic. We hope that these meetings will lead to the lifting of the sanctions on telecommunications, as well as the lifting of economic sanctions that Yugoslavia imposed against us, and thus contribute to the furthering of the peace process. Our delegation [words indistinct] new interpretation of the Contact Group plan. We welcome the new interpretation that allows for work to continue on the maps, for a constitutional organization, and a final agreement to be established prior to the final adoption of the plan.

We express a readiness to end the war immediately and start talks on adjusting and improving the plan so that the entire package can be accepted. [end recording]

[Kovacevic] Speaking about the RS delegation's visit to the Serbian president, President Karadzic said it had been set up and sent to Belgrade so that individual

contacts, mainly involving the opposition, could stop, although all decisions, President Karadzic said, even those referring to the rejection of the Contact Group's plan, were adopted unanimously.

Journalists were also interested in the stand of RS officials on the recent visit by French and British Foreign Ministers Alain Juppe and Douglas Hurd, as well as the information that the meeting in Belgrade had led to new interpretations of the Contact Group peace plan.

Minister Buha replied that officially the Contact Group had made no new proposals and that the Serb side had requested, above all, a peace agreement on the end of the war, after which it would be possible [words indistinct].

One of the questions was how to [words indistinct] federal relations between the RS and the FRY, which was raised at the Contact Group's meeting in Brussels, although [words indistinct].

Replying to one of the questions, RS President Momcilo Krajisnik said that the establishment of confederal relations between our republic and the FRY cannot replace the problem of maps on territorial separation, and added:

[Begin Krajisnik recording] The maps are one problem and they must be altered, while a confederation is another problem that ought to be discussed in the future. [indistinct passage]

We believe that all those who advocate Bosnia as a single state tacitly or publicly support a war option. We do not need war to separate, we are already separated. I believe that we would need a war on a much larger scale to reunite us into a single Bosnia-Herzegovina. [Words indistinct] independent state [indistinct passage] [end recording]

[Kovacevic] RS Vice President Nikola Koljevic stressed that what significantly restricted optimism regarding the resumption of the peace process was the fact that the Muslim-Croat military alliance, with the participation of the regular army of the Republic of Croatia, had launched an offensive against the RS in the region around Kupres, Glamoc, and Srbobran. He said that a fresh appeal had been launched to the UN secretary general on the Republic of Croatia's involvement in the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, and added that unless the Croatian aggression against the RS was publicly condemned there could be no resumption of the peace talks on the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis.

Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska Republic, also spoke about the Croatian Republic's aggression against the RS.

[Begin Karadzic recording] We consider that this interference on the part of at least four regular Croatian brigades in the RS [words indistinct]. [Word indistinct] testing of the international public to see how it would react to the Croatian aggression against our Serbs in the

RS and the republic of Serb Krajina. If the international community now fails to condemn Croatia we can expect a large Serb-Croat war. Right at the beginning of the aggression Croatia must be told that it must withdraw its forces from the RS. Any other behavior would be an encouragement to Croatia to continue the aggression. [end recording]

At today's news conference of the RS leadership, apart from the questions regarding the normalization of relations between the RS and the FRY, the resumption of the peace process and the latest Croatian Army's aggression against our republic, there was also a mention of relations between the Serb side and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces].

Croatian Army Reportedly Attacking Bosnian Serbs

LD0712200094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1932 GMT 7 Dec 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Petrovac, Bileca, Dec. 7 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb army sources said Wednesday that civilian projects in the western Bosnian town of Glamoc were destroyed by joint Bosnian Croat and Croatian forces.

The Bosnian Serb army command said the joint Croatian and Bosnian Croat forces were using all kinds of artillery weapons to shell Glamoc and surrounding villages, badly damaging the Serbian Orthodox church in the town.

The Bosnian Serb army sources said that Bosnian Serb defenses remained unchanged and that accommodation was provided in the town of Grahovo, about 40 km northwest of Glamoc, for about 4,000 refugees from nine villages in the Glamoc area.

The source said that the Croatian attacks, which abated after the Bosnian Serbs' fierce response, were limited to the use of long-range artillery.

The Bosnian Serb army command in the southern Bosnian town of Bileca said that scores of trucks carrying regular Croatian Army troops and military equipment arrived in the area of Popovo Polje in southern Bosnia from the direction of the Croatian town of Dubrovnik.

The source said that at the same time Bosnian Croat troops were amassing in the area.

The Bosnian Serb army command for Herzegovina ordered a state of combat readiness for its units in the area because of a possible surprise attack by joint Croatian and Bosnian Croat forces.

The Bosnian Serb army said the fiercest fighting between Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred in the upper course of the Neretva River, especially near the town of Glavaticevo, about 80 km southwest of Sarajevo.

UN Demands 'Immediate' Croatian Withdrawal

AU0812132894 Paris AFP in English 1307 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 8 (AFP)—United Nations forces in Bosnia demanded Thursday the immediate withdrawal of Croat forces from the country.

The call followed claims by the Bosnian Serbs that regular Croat troops were aiding Bosnian Croat (HVO) forces in military actions in territories controlled by the Bosnian Serbs in southwest Bosnia, near Grahovo, Glamoc and Kupres.

"We call for an immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Bosnian territory, including both Croat troops and those from the so-called Serb republic of Krajina," Thant Myint-U, spokesman for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), said.

He said that for several days UNPROFOR had observed "significant participation of Croat troops in a current Bosnian Croat offensive in western Bosnia" in an area between Livno and Glamoc.

He said that represented "a clear breach of international law and a violation of the sovereignty and territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina." He added that the presence of Croat troops was considered by UNPROFOR "as a destabilizing element" which risked extending the conflict.

Croat Forces Liberate Serb Stronghold of Celebici

LD0712125694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] After the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] forces had liberated Celebici yesterday evening—an occupied village in Livno Municipality and a major Serb stronghold with many fortifications and bunkers—the Serbs tried to consolidate their forces during the night and regain their lost positions by launching a combined attack. The HVO forces prevented them from doing this, and in a counterattack, liberated the village of Bojmunte, northwest of Celebici, the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna defense ministry's information service reported this morning.

According to the same source, panic and chaos prevail in the ranks of the Serb forces, and even General Mladic visited Glamoc yesterday in an unsuccessful attempt to consolidate the ranks of the Serb army.

Combat Focus Shifts to Bosanska Krupa

AU0812094194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 8 Dec 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Overnight and this morning Karadzic's and Martić's chetniks have been relentlessly attacking Bihac. Hundreds of tank, howitzer, and mortar

shells have been fired at the suburbs of Zegar, Vedro Polje, Izatic, and Klokot. They attempted several infantry breakthroughs, particularly on the Zeljava part of the front. In addition to this, defense lines along the entire border with the so-called republic of Serb Krajina, that is, the Republic of Croatia, are under constant artillery and tank fire.

The chetniks are also intensively attacking the Velika Kladusa municipality in an attempt to either enter it or raze it to the ground. In line with their usual practice they shelled the Cazin municipality overnight and the focus of attacks is increasingly shifting to the Bosanska Krupa part of the front. In this area, the chetniks have been savagely attempting to break through the defense lines; they have been destroying villages on the left bank of the Una River, or to put it more precisely, whatever is left of them. All in all, the offensive in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina continues, the scope of the attacks is escalating and the tragedy and agony of the area continues.

Bihac Demands Croatia Stop Krajina-Bound Convoys

LD0712231294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 7 Dec 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Although there had been no respite throughout the day, in the early hours of this evening, Karadzic's and Martić's chetniks intensified their attacks on Bihac and this entire part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hundreds of artillery and tank shells are still raining on the defense lines here and the outlying district of Zegar. Early this evening the chetniks attempted again to break through [words indistinct]. The city center of Bihac has been shelled again. The number of casualties is still rising. In the course of today, chetniks have been launching extremely heavy attacks in the Bosanska Krupa area and attempting to break through onto the left bank of the Una. The demolition of Velika Kladusa, a dead and shattered town anyway, has continued throughout this period. [passage omitted]

Commissioner in the federal government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Mirsad Velagic today sent a letter to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman regarding the bleak situation in the Bihac region caused by aggression primarily launched from the territory of the Republic of Croatia. A number of demands have been addressed to the Republic of Croatia, including the one demanding of Croatia to deny passage to convoys heading for the so-called republic of Serb Krajina until free passage is secured to the Bihac region. How long can this situation go on, is the question that sums up tonight's drama and tragedy of the Bihac region and its people.

Srpska Assembly Leader Foresees War With Croatia

LD0812121994 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 8 Dec 94 (Tentative)

[FBIS Translated Text] Kotor-Varos, 8 Dec (SRNA)—The regular Army of the Republic of Croatia is taking part in the war in the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina despite the fact that some international players do not want to admit this, Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the Srpska republic people's assembly, told Kotor-Varos Radio this morning.

"This war, which is being waged for Western interests, is not based on international law and that is why we are not surprised by the fact that the international community is not carrying out any punitive measures against Zagreb," Krajisnik said.

He recalled that the Srpska republic's leadership lodged a protest with the United Nations recently, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the regular Army of the Republic of Croatia from the Srpska republic's territory or the Srpska republic would take resolute steps to force it out of the Serb areas.

"Regardless of our aspirations, now it is evident we are bound to find ourselves in a situation in which we will have to enter an armed conflict with Croatia's interests because it wants to defeat the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] militarily and then to do the same with significant parts of former Bosnia-Herzegovina", Krajisnik pointed out.

According to Krajisnik, "we have to be prepared to defend Serb areas together with the RSK and then eventually to solve the disputed issues in a political dialogue with Croatia."

UN Personnel Wounded in 'Incidents' in South

AU0812112594 Paris AFP in English 1059 GMT 8 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 8 (AFP)—Five UN personnel were wounded, including one seriously, in artillery fire and mine incidents in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, a UN official told AFP.

Two Spanish UN soliders were "slightly injured" when shells exploded at a locality around three kilometres (1.5 miles) north of Mostar, the official said. "We don't think it was a (deliberate) attack" against the UN Protection Force, said the official.

Meanwhile three people were wounded, one seriously, when their Landrover struck a landmine on the Mostar-Tomislavgrad road, said the source without elaborating.

Party: Contact Group's Attitudes 'Unacceptable'

AU0712163894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Social Democratic Party today held a news conference at which journalists were

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addressed by the party's vice president, Zlatko Lagumdžija, and Adil Seko. [Name indistinct] has the details:

[Correspondent] Speaking about the developments on the international scene concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina, party representatives said that the international community's hypocritical attitudes to Bosnia-Herzegovina are being revealed in the most brutal way. The Contact Group's attitudes toward our country are unacceptable. The Social Democratic Party takes the view that the so called quiet stage in the creation of a small greater Serbia is currently under way. The breaking up of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the confederation of the so-called Serbian Republic and the unrecognized FRY is being openly offered.

(?Even) the Republic of Croatia approves of this move, not taking into account the Knin Serbs and the same standards that the international community will apply to solving the crisis in Croatia. The Social Democratic Party holds the view that no one has the mandate to accept negotiations with the Contact Group about this issue, unless he is authorized to do so by the assembly. The view of this party is that the continuation of the negotiations should be made conditional on Pale's acceptance of the peace plan, its implementation, and the mutual recognition of all former Yugoslav republics. This was stated by Zlatko Lagumdžija, vice president of the party. [passage omitted]

Silajdzic Warns of New Genocide Under UN Aegis

LD0712220894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A protest meeting was held in Sarajevo today of the association of citizens of the Bihac, Una-Sana, Banja Luka, and Jajce regions in connection with the alarming situation in the Bihac district. At the same time, this was an appeal to the world democratic public, to all UN members, the UN Security Council, NATO, the EU [European Union], the Contact Group, the Conference of Islamic Countries [title as heard], the Contact Group of Islamic countries, U.S. President Bill Clinton, and the German and Austrian Governments.

It is a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina in which 600,000 Bosniaks and Croats lived before the war. This figure is now between 250,000 and 300,000. Serb aggressors cruelly killed 65,000 civilians and 250,000 were expelled to over 80 countries.

Addressing those gathered, Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said it was an occasion to send a message to our people in Krajina, fighters and civilians alike, to say that the state was doing everything in its power. The second message was sent to the world. In Prijedor alone there are three large concentration camps: Keraterm, Trnopolje, and Omarska. In fact, stressed Prime Minister Silajdzic, there are over 40 concentration camps that were set up by Serb aggressors. For instance, Ljubija,

where many people were killed, is rarely mentioned. There was a horrible genocide in the area that borders with Bihac. Our message to the world would be: May there be no other genocide under the UN aegis.

The first stage, Prime Minister Silajdzic said, has already been completed. Its aim was to starve the people. We have no means of feeding this people. The United Nations is either not capable of doing it, or it does not want to. If there is a fresh genocide, it will be under the UN aegis. We do not believe that the unity of the world and Europe has to be based on the blood of innocent Bosnian victims. Bosnia has practically become a ghetto—starting with Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Sarajevo, etc. All these ghettos are awaiting the same fate. In order to avert a new genocide one should not seek unity in the blood of innocent victims, as this would be the end of Western unity.

Today's meeting was also attended by the head of the Islamic community, Reis-ul-Ulema Mustafa Cerić, the ambassador of the Turkish Republic to Bosnia-Herzegovina, representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament and government, representatives of the Army and the Bosnian Ministry of Internal Affairs, of the Bosnian Academy of Sciences, and by other eminent persons.

Silajdzic Denounces Lack of International Action

BR0712160394 Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 Dec 94 p 4

[Interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Ariane Quentier and Xavier Gautier in Sarajevo, date not given: "Haris Silajdzic: 'We Are Now Fighting Alone'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [LE FIGARO] You have condemned the passiveness of the United Nations, especially since the crisis in Bihac. Have your relations with the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] reached the point of no-return?

[Silajdzic] The problem stems from UNPROFOR. It is not respecting its "humanitarian" mandate and prefers to concern itself with politics. The situation is dramatic now in Bihac, Srebrenica, and Sarajevo. The Serbs are blocking the roads and the United Nations cannot or does not want to unblock them. If it is unable to do so, then it should call for help!

Why has the United Nations slipped gradually into paralysis? In Bihac it witnessed the deployment of Serbian tanks but considered it was too early to react. Then, of course, it was too late. It let civilians be crushed.

[LE FIGARO] Is that a criticism leveled specifically against the chief of the Blue Helmets in Bosnia, the British General Sir Michael Rose?

[Silajdzic] We asked him to request air strikes to protect Bihac. Despite flagrant Serbian aggression, he did not do so. Two days earlier, though, he had promised he would...

[LE FIGARO] Will the Blue Helmets leave Bosnia?

[Silajdzic] Do not ask me. Other troops could replace them.

[LE FIGARO] Only on Sunday [4 December] you said you wanted them to stay.

[Silajdzic] We Bosnians were the ones who called them in. The Serbs wanted none of it, but the United Nations has to do its job. Why has no humanitarian convoy yet made it into the Bihac enclave?

[LE FIGARO] On the one hand you criticize the powerlessness of the United Nations, but on the other hand you are doing everything you can to get the Blue Helmets to leave...

[Silajdzic] That is not true. The United Nations is not a charity organization. The men and their leaders must have the will to carry out their mission. Today everything points to the fact that the UN resolutions were adopted by countries who knew at the time that they would not apply them.

[LE FIGARO] UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali suggests demilitarizing the security zones. The idea is to prevent the Bosnians from launching attacks which then provoke, as we saw in Bihac, Serbian counteroffensives. What do you think of that idea?

[Silajdzic] Our people has been forced into ghettos: Gorazde, Zapa, Srebrenica, Sarajevo, and now Bihac. Fighting is a question of life or death. Has the world forgotten that just to the east of Bihac, in the region of Prijedor, 23,000 people were murdered (by the Serbs in 1992—LE FIGARO editor's note)? Do you remember the concentration camps in Keraterm, Trnopolje, and Omarska? There are 46 mass graves in this region, one of which alone contains 4,500 bodies...

The UN Secretary General should finally admit that he is powerless to do anything because certain governments are playing a dubious game.

[LE FIGARO] Which governments?

[Silajdzic] In NATO, the British lead the way. The root of the problem lies in the fact that everyone is pushing for a negotiated solution. That is all very well. But if that is impossible, what then? Carry on as you are doing, talking about negotiations while people are dying? Do you want to see new concentration camps being set up? That is what is threatening the Bihac enclave today.

[LE FIGARO] Washington has changed direction. What would be the consequences of an American alignment on what you call the European policy of "appeasement?"

[Silajdzic] When Defense Secretary William Perry mentioned the "military superiority" of the Serbs, I said it was highly cynical to speak of defeat while we are

deprived of weapons by the embargo. However, President Clinton then reassured us that the U.S. position had not changed.

[LE FIGARO] The Americans promise many things but do not have a single soldier on the ground. What have they done for you?

[Silajdzic] Thanks to them, relative peace has been restored in Sarajevo and Gorazde, but then they just send us letters and more letters. Washington has not supplied us with a single bullet, and nor has Ankara...

[LE FIGARO] Are you not now more isolated than ever?

[Silajdzic] If it refuses a people the right to survive, the West will lose all credibility. We are now fighting alone against fascism (Serbian fascism—LE FIGARO editor's note). If, to save NATO's unity, we have to hand over a democratic Bosnia Herzegovina to the Serbs on a silver platter, then that is the beginning of the end.

Izetbegovic Statement on CSCE, ICO Meetings

AU0712200594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received the earlier announced statement by President Izetbegovic, forwarded to us by the B-H PRESS news agency. Namely, after his return from Budapest and Geneva, where he participated in the work the CSCE and Islamic Countries Organization contact group, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, granted a request by B-H PRESS editorial and issued the following statement:

I believe that I have spoken a lot about this lately. I might even add that our occasional sharp reactions do not mean that we are less interested in a peaceful resolution to the war, which has been imposed on us. On the contrary, just as hitherto, we will continue to search for a honorable and early peace, because our people need peace. However, from time to time, one must tell the world what is going on here. And what is this world doing?

It evidently wants to end the war at all costs, and, in doing so, it is easier for it to bow to the stronger side. However, the world should be told that by doing this it is actually prolonging the war. In the quest for peace, we will use military as well as political means—military wherever we must, political wherever we can—President Izetbegovic said.

They reproach us for rejecting a cease-fire at the CSCE summit yesterday. This is not true. We rejected a Russian attempt to equate us with the aggressor. They are calling on both sides not to hinder the passage of food convoys. Again, they are calling on both sides to end hostilities. Such an appeal implies that we are stopping convoys, too, which is absolutely not true. We have never halted any convoys. This can go on no longer. We say, tell the Serbian side to let convoys through and

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finally name the one who uses food, natural gas, water, and medication as means of waging war.

Has this misfortune that has been going on for three years and is constantly spreading not demonstrated that nothing can be accomplished with lies and half-truths and that this is merely prolonging the agony? Say finally who is doing evil in Bosnia and you will help by doing so.

As for this cease-fire, without any limitations or conditions, it effectively means the beginning of an occupation. The Serbs, who constitute 31.7 percent of the Bosnia-Herzegovina population, have occupied 70 percent of the country and now they are willing to stop. It seems that the Russians sympathize and support them in this demand. We have offered a three-month cessation of military activities and this proposal is still on the table.

Is our situation in any way connected to the crisis in NATO, provided of course that you agree that a crisis exists, was the next question by the B-H PRESS reporter.

Izetbegovic answered that the crisis of which you speak is evident. You know, NATO came into prominence as a Western response to the Soviet threat. It is, so to speak, the child of a confrontation that lasted between the two blocs for more than 40 years. The Europeans are now thinking: There is no more confrontation, there are no more threats, we no longer need the United States and its NATO. I believe that this conclusion was made too early, although we shall see about this. The trouble is that this affects the situation in our country, negatively, that is. Our drama is taking place in a changing world in which everything is fluid and undefined. New alliances are being forged and this sometimes creates unexpected and unforeseeable difficulties.

The next question by B-H PRESS reporter was how a solution could be expected.

Nobody in the world at this moment can give you a definitive answer to this question. But one thing is sure: We will continue to defend ourselves, President Izetbegovic told B-H PRESS.

Minister Announces Sarajevo Electricity Measures

AU0712212294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In view of the grave energy situation in Sarajevo, Faruk Smajlbegovic, energy minister in the Government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, met with the leaders of the municipal government, Sarajevogas, and the electricity distributing network today. The main purpose of the meeting was to find solutions for a more even distribution of the energy resources.

Briefing the reporters about the conclusions of today's meeting, Minister Smajlbegovic said:

The obligation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina electricity generating industry and the municipal authorities is to distribute equally all available quantities of electricity to all residents on the territory of the city of Sarajevo. If residents were to adhere to the above measures and maintain a low consumption of electricity, all households could have electricity 24 hours a day, Smajlbegovic said.

Many people use gas-driven generators without a license. These persons do not pay for the gas, however, but demand payment in foreign currency for their services. One of the measures that we will undertake in cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs is to stop the work of gas-driven generators that do not serve the survival of the citizens.

The situation is the same with electricity, Smajlbegovic said. We will finally press charges against the managers responsible for disregarding the measures for the correct distribution of energy. The director of the electricity distribution service is responsible for the distribution of electricity in Sarajevo, Smajlbegovic emphasized, and the director of Sarajevogas is responsible for the distribution of gas.

Because of inconsistencies in the distribution of energy resources, especially electricity, at the level of Sarajevo, we have determined a new plan of electricity distribution in town. This new plan envisages that the Energy Ministry will approve the electricity for the priority users, while for all the rest the electricity will be allocated by the Sarajevo Executive Council. So far we have had a negative situation in which five entities distributed electricity to the consumers, the head of municipal government (?Sefik Okelic) said, speaking about the measures that his cabinet is taking to secure a better electricity supply for the Sarajevo residents.

Silajdzic on Energy Situation

AU0712212194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In view of great interest of the Sarajevo residents in the juster distribution of electricity, we have decided to reduce the number of priority users and cut the hours of their use of electricity, Prime Minister Silajdzic said while briefing reporters on the most recent government measures aimed at securing a fairer distribution of the burden caused by the lack of this energy resource in Sarajevo.

Many residents are currently without electricity, natural gas, and heating, and for this reason we must distribute the quantities available more rationally. These are temporary measures until the situation regarding Sarajevo's energy supplies improves, Prime Minister Silajdzic said.

General Admits Receiving Weapons via Third Party*MM0712144494 London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 3 Dec 94
p 8*

[Report on interview with General Jovan Divjak, Bosnian Army deputy commander, by As'ad Taha in Sarajevo; date not given: "Admitting Delivery of U.S.-made Weapons to Sarajevo Through a Third Party, Deputy Commander of the Bosnian Army Tells AL-HAYAH: Israeli Experts Are Training the Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo—In an interview with AL-HAYAH, the deputy commander in chief of the Bosnian Army, General Jovan Divjak, has revealed numerous facts which contradict the recent news reports about the retreat of the Bosnian forces in Bihac.

He spoke of Russian and Israeli support for the Serbs and said that "Israeli experts are training Serbian units in rapid intervention in Kojnec" [as transliterated] in Bosnia. He denied that the Bosnians had received U.S. military aid but pointed out that U.S.-made arms "had recently arrived through a third party."

The Bosnian military official expressed his doubts about any possible participation by Croatia in the war against the Serbs, as its officials had stated, and accused Croatia of trying to normalise its relations with the Serbs.

Divjak said: "Our army has not withdrawn from all the territory it liberated recently prior to the Serbian counteroffensive." He affirmed that the Grabic heights, considered one of the strongest Bosnian strongholds, are still in the hands of the Bosnian Army.

The Bosnian military commander spoke about the reasons that led to the retreat of his forces in Bihac, saying that following the liberation of 250 square km of land, "the contact lines between us and the Serbian enemy extended to 50 km from Bosanski Krupa in the far northeast to Kolan in the far southeast. This prevented the deployment of adequate forces from the 5th Corps in the southern, southwestern, and western areas, on the borders of Serbian Krajina, particularly in the area of Licko Petrovo and Biljevski which is considered the land outlet from Croatian Krajina to Bihac. He pointed out that this area was one that could easily be penetrated by tanks and heavy armor "in which our enemy is superior to us."

General Divjak admitted that the Bosnian Army had made a mistake by deploying token forces on the borders with Croatia, ruling out the possibility of any intervention by the Krajina Serbs "who represented the principal force in the attack against us." He added: "The offensive waged against our army in Bihac was one of the strongest and toughest offensives launched against us since the beginning of the war. As is known, militias from the Serbs of Krajina and Bosnia as well as the militia of (Muslim) dissident Fikret Abdic have participated in the offensive. This is in addition to the arrival of endless supplies of tanks, fuel, and infantry from Serbia to join

the attacking Serbian forces in Bihac. The number of those participating in the offensive was estimated at 20,000 Serbian soldiers supported by tanks.

At the same time, Divjak affirmed that forces of the Bosnian Army were still in control of the strategic Grabic hills and the city of Velika Kladusa. He said that the area was unlikely to fall, adding: "In the past five days, we have succeeded in bolstering our defense lines well." But he admitted that the humanitarian conditions have reached their worst point "after the Serbs deliberately bombed populated areas."

AL-HAYAH asked the Bosnian general about American military aid to Bosnia. He said: "We have not received any U.S. aid, either in the form of arms or in the form of military experts or in any other form. These were media rumors spread by the French, the British, and the Russians to justify their helping the Serbs." However, he admitted "the presence of American military experts to help in building the federal army. Perhaps we will get some American weapons but through a third party."

Islamic Leader on International 'Indifference'*AU0712202194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Dec 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] As he was not able to attend the international human rights conference that opened in Kuala Lumpur yesterday, Mustafa Cerić, Reis ul Ulema of the Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in place of an address envisaged for today sent a written statement to this gathering, carried by the MINA news agency. In his address, entitled *The Illusion About Human Rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Dr. Cerić says, among other things:

The passivity of those who have been called or sent in the name of humanity to protect human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina is being covered up by international indifference and confusion. The entire world is witnessing the first public genocide against a people in the history of mankind. Precisely those who should have ended this genocide are instead spreading ignorance and causing confusion about the actual facts.

Recalling numerous paradoxes connected to the attitude of the world toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, Reis ul Ulema Mustafa Cerić singled out the following for the conference:

First, they recognized the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state; however, they would not allow the lifting of the arms embargo to enable the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to defend themselves.

Second, they maintain that the borders of a sovereign state cannot be altered by force; however, they recognize the creation of the so called Greater Serbia at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina territory as a fait accompli.

Third, they advocate a multinational, multiconfessional, and multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, while they circumvent the presence of the Muslim cultural component in this diversity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Fourth, they preach freedom and democracy; however, they are waiting for the Bosniaks to capitulate to the force of fascism.

Babic Calls For Withdrawal of Croats From B-H
LD0712202994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1952 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 7 Dec (TANJUG)—Milan Babic, the foreign minister of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], said this evening that the agreement on economic relations between the RSK and Croatia will be impossible to implement unless the regular Croatian Army withdrew from the Srpska republic.

He specified that units of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] had to withdraw from Mt. Dinara and Serb Podinarje and thus stop encircling Knin.

Babic stressed that no provisions from the agreement—especially the one on the opening of the Okucani-Lipovac highway—will be implemented until this happened.

RSK To Allow UN Bihac Forces To Withdraw
LD0712211094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2013 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 7 December (TANJUG)—The UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] command in Zagreb has sent a request to the main headquarters of the Serb army of Krajina [SVK] to make possible the evacuation of part of the peace forces from the Bangladeshi Battalion from Bihac to Pleso airport near Zagreb.

The letter says that the evacuation would be organized in groups of 80 to 100 soldiers in six or seven convoys in the battalion's trucks. As the statement of the SVK main headquarters says, quoting the letter from the UNPROFOR command, the soldiers would leave Bihac "only with their personal belongings, without arms."

However, the letter of the peace forces' command does not state to whom the members of the Bangladeshi Battalion (550 people)—who are stationed in the zone controlled by the Muslim 5th Corps—are leaving their arms and equipment, the statement by the SVK command stresses.

According to the Serb SVK information, the UNPROFOR Bangladeshi battalion has 59 armored personnel carriers, 53 off-road vehicles, 36 load-carrying vehicles, 42 trucks, and seven ambulances and other equipment.

This hardware, the statement says, was transported to Bihac between 28 September and 23 October this year, something that bears out the earlier claims by the Srpska republic that the peace force battalion from Bangladesh was arming the 5th Corps.

The SVK says in its statement "that it is only a logical conclusion that the Bangladesh battalion's weapons and equipment are already in the hands of the Muslim forces."

"Bearing in mind the circumstances surrounding the UNPROFOR battalion from Bangladesh, the government of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] has decided—despite UNPROFOR's mistakes and bombardment of its territory—to allow the Bangladeshi battalion to withdraw across its territory at a time and under conditions determined by the government and the General Staff of the RSK army," the statement stresses.

Granic: Croatia May Question UN Forces Mandate

LD0712185694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The regular talks between the foreign ministers of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Turkey were held in the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Croatia. Ministers [Mate] Granic, [Irfan] Ljubijankic and [Murat] Karayalcin called for an immediate end to hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially around Bihac, and for the acceptance of the peace deal in line with the contact group's plan. Tihomir Vinkovic has a report.

[Vinkovic] The host of the meeting, Minister Granic, expressed the hope that the next meeting would be held in Sarajevo in the spring. He had the following to say about today's talks:

[Begin Granic recording] We discussed all important issues concerning the present situation in the region, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia. As far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, we expressed firm support for the Washington agreement and the contact group's original plan. We will do everything for the international community to exert the strongest pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the contact group's plan. We also discussed the situation in Bihac and how to coordinate international diplomatic, humanitarian and all other efforts to help Bihac.

As to the situation in the Croatian occupied areas, we hope that the international community will help implement the economic agreement with the local Serbs and present us, as soon as possible, the plan for the reintegration of the occupied areas. In other words, we hope that negotiations on political issues will be launched and that a plan acceptable for the Republic of Croatia will be presented. If not, the Republic of Croatia will not be prepared to extend UNPROFOR's mandate. We reached a high degree of accord on all important issues. [end recording]

Croats Release Spanish Aid Workers, Officer
LD0712140594 Madrid RNE-1 Radio Network in Spanish 1300 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The war in Bosnia is far from coming to an end, and today there was more concern. A group of uncontrolled Croatian elements blocked the

road out of Mostar and detained 150 trucks with aid workers, including several Spaniards, in Mostar. Nearly at the same time as this news broke—and this incident is now over—the UN observers command reported that Spanish Captain Alfredo Carlos Chamorro, held yesterday in Banja Luka by the Serbs, has been released. He says that he intends to carry on working in the area. Gloria Cacho reports:

[Cacho] The 150 UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] trucks with UN peacekeepers and aid workers, belonging to the Movement for Peace, Disarmament, and Freedom, and to Medicos del Mundo, are now traveling freely on the road linking the coast to Mostar after having been held for several hours by uncontrolled elements of the Croatian Army. Throughout the day members of the Spanish UN peacekeeping battalion have maintained contact with the Croatian command to attain a solution to this problem, which lasted the whole night.

Capt. Alfredo Carlos Chamorro, held since the day before yesterday in Banja Luka by the Bosnian Serbs, is well and has recovered the freedom of movement he needs to fulfill his mission. According to Defense Ministry sources, Capt. Chamorro this morning spoke to a Spanish officer in the UN observers command and said that he wants to carry on with his tasks, that is to say, verifying the fulfillment of the UN Security Council resolutions on the military aircraft exclusion zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Further, he asked for his tour of duty in the area to be extended.

RSK Troops Shoot Down Croatian Recon Plane

LD0712135494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1308 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 7 Dec (TANJUG)—Members of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] army air defense have shot down an unmanned Croatian Army reconnaissance plane in the Petrinja area, the RSK army headquarters information service said today.

Its statement points out that the plane was equipped with the latest Western equipment. This confirms that the arms embargo is not being implemented in Croatia's case.

The main headquarters of the RSK army is of the opinion that the Croatian side is carrying out thorough preparations for aggression against the RSK, despite the cease-fire agreement.

Member of Parliament Views Future Options

AU0712130194 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 2 Dec 94 p 7

[Interview with Luka Bebic, chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of Internal Politics and National Security, by Darko Djuretek; place and date not given: "Croatian Patience Will Be Rewarded"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The members of the Parliament are discussing in the current session of the Chamber of Representatives the current military and political situation caused by the situation in the Bihac pocket. Luka Bebic, the chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of Internal Politics and National Security and a HDZ member of the Croatian Parliament, analyzes the situation for VECERNJI LIST and speaks about the steps Croatia can take to defend its strategic interests as well as about the scope of parliamentary decisions.

[Djuretek] After the members of the parliament have discussed the situation in Bihac and the present political situation behind closed doors, how would you assess the scope of decisions that might be taken by the Croatian Parliament?

[Bebic] During the last couple of days two joint meetings of the Internal Politics and National Security Committee and the Foreign Policy Committee were held behind closed doors. The problems you have mentioned have reached a climax now, the situation in this area is becoming clearer. I mean the solution to the occupied Croatian areas and the issues connected to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We always have to bear in mind that three different authorities have constitutional powers—the legislative, that is the Croatian Parliament, the executive, and the legal power—and all of these will have to make their own decisions on these problems.

Inefficiency of the UN Protection Force

[Djuretek] Why are you pointing this out?

[Bebic] Because the Parliament, which according to the Constitution decides on war and peace, cannot take on the power of the president of the Republic regarding the executive and operative policy making, since the president is, apart from being the head of state, also the head of the complete executive power. His constitutional powers are clear.

On the other hand, the government is responsible to the Parliament and to the president. The Parliament, as the legislative body, makes political decisions that have to be carried out by the government. If its powers are precisely defined, its responsibilities will be clear, too—toward the state and its people, and toward the political, military and the complete political situation with which Croatia is now confronted. I expect the Parliament to clearly define its attitudes toward the international community, toward the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], the United Nations, the UN Security Council. It is clear what the powers of the Parliament are.

[Djuretek] The inefficiency of the UNPROFOR has been definitely confirmed by the situation around Bihac.

[Bebic] We have claimed innumerable times so far that the UNPROFOR is inefficient, and the situation in the Bihac pocket has clearly confirmed it. After the meeting

behind closed doors 10 days ago we concluded that Croatia would cooperate with those international powers that are trying to find a peaceful solution to the present situation. We also said, however, that if these measures proved to be futile, Croatia would make a policy of its own according to its national interests and its right of defense and of establishing the constitutional order in the whole of its internationally recognized territory.

The situation around Bihac has proven that the rebel Serbs from Croatian territories are attacking the territory of another state. The international community is not entitled—neither according to the UN Charter nor according to relevant UN Security Council resolutions—to silently accept the attacks by the Serbs from the occupied Croatian territories against the territory of another state. The Croatian Parliament has to assume an attitude regarding this problem.

Time Flies

[Djuretek] What will happen if the international community does not succeed in stopping these attacks?

[Bebic] If the international community does not stop them, which it should do according to UN resolutions, nobody can prevent Croatia from applying the measures of the constitutional state, which result from its sovereignty, with the aim to establish constitutional order in the whole of its territory by using all available means, including special police units, because law and order are established in every state with police forces.

[Djuretek] In other words, this is a time of very important decisions.

[Bebic] Yes, it is. The most eminent representatives of the international community have asked us not to make an intervention. This means that they indirectly approve of a possible Croatian intervention in its territory if attacks from the Croatian territory are launched against another sovereign state.

We have been cooperative and patient to the maximum regarding the requests made by the international community. Time flies, however. It flies because the Croatian Parliament and the Croatian political leadership clearly declared that the agreements that should have been implemented by 21 November [1994] should be implemented by 20 December. They have not been signed yet, neither will they be signed in the meantime, but it is important that they be carried out, that is, that the implementation of those things starts, though they cannot be carried out right away.

[Djuretek] There will be no exception in other words.

[Bebic] If the things we required do not happen by 20 December, which was also in a way accepted by the international community when it extended the UNPROFOR mandate, Croatia should require that the United Nations start withdrawing UNPROFOR from Croatia. I am speaking about things the Parliament and

the parliamentary bodies are in charge of according to its standing orders. The inefficiency of the international community, proven already many times both in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, has reached a climax in the current Bihac crisis. It has proven to be totally inefficient.

Approval of Serbian Occupation

[Djuretek] Is it inefficiency or the lack of will to do anything?

[Bebic] This policy has been incorporated into the UNPROFOR mandate since the beginning. Because of the present position of, especially, UN French and British forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are attempts to prevent NATO from doing what it is permitted to do by the United Nations. This has been justified by the safety of the UNPROFOR. It can be seen from the danger in which these units are (and this unfolding of events was probably planned at the very beginning) that it is actually the cuckoo's egg that still justifies the NATO inefficiency. [sentence as published]

[Djuretek] And which waited for this situation?

[Bebic] Yes. All the things that some of the UN Security Council and NATO members would like to do are blocked. Russian, English and French units have been showing this tendency all the time, thus protecting the Serbian occupation.

[Djuretek] Croatia has so far been extremely cooperative with the international community, for which policy it is criticized at home because Croatia has to protect its basic rights as a state. How would you assess the circumstances under which Croatia could take certain decisive steps to defend its rights, regardless of their price?

[Bebic] Croatia has respected all important international policy makers who wanted to bring the crisis in the former Yugoslavia to an end, but Croatia has its national interests too and wants to protect them, even if it were in a situation in which it would have considerably fewer friends than now. We have friends in all international powers who are a guarantee that the cooperativeness of the Croatian policy would be rewarded. If in no other way, then by the silent support of the Croatian decision to take the steps every proud and honorable nation would take after all peaceful options have been exhausted.

Strengthening of the Croatian Army

[Djuretek] Is there still a chance for a peaceful solution?

[Bebic] There is always a chance for a peaceful solution. If we did not believe in it, we would not be as patient and consistent. I personally do not think that the Serbs, neither in Croatia nor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will accept anything unless they are forced to. They have decided to take the war option despite the present pressure by the international community for a peaceful

situation. They will never come to a peaceful solution, unless there is force behind the peaceful solution. We can hope to reach a peaceful solution only if the Serbs realize before force is applied that Croatia has its military power, too, and that there is the international community, which would support such an option.

Therefore it is necessary to develop the Croatian military power. In connection with the Croatian areas that are temporarily occupied I would like to repeat that the only possibility is to use special police units that will establish law and order in the whole of Croatian territory.

[Djuretek] The fact that the international community has been averting Croatia from actions of liberation is considered as interfering with Croatian internal matters. Is Croatia independent in making decisions of this kind?

[Bebic] I would like to answer with a counter-question. Which head of state would pass the fatal decision to intervene in Bihac, for example, if high-ranking officials of a superpower require of Croatia not to do it. Croatia cannot make a war against the whole world. Apart from that, Croatia has already been threatened with sanctions if it passes such a decision.

Great Responsibility of the President

We can say that Croatia is a sovereign country, that we are entitled to take sovereign decisions in order to establish law and order, but the Croatian leadership and especially the president of Croatia, as the commander in chief of the Croatian Army, has a big responsibility, so that it is questionable whether he will ever make such a decision. It is not the responsibility of the Parliament or of the government, it is primarily the responsibility of the president. The commander of the military forces, the General Staff and the Defense Ministry can take such decisions independently of the Parliament and the government.

Such decisions are not taken in meetings, they are taken after all circumstances that play a role at a particular moment have been assessed. The Parliament will set the political border beyond which Croatia must not go. I think that the Parliament should have maximum requirements at the decisive moment, we should have no illusions about the UNPROFOR any longer or about the local Serbs, who will always play their endless games and who will never accept anything unless they are forced to. It is known who has to take these operative, real decisions. This is clearly stated in the Constitution.

Therefore I do not want us to lament on what should have been done because many elements might have changed by the time we make such an analysis.

[Box, p 7]

It Has To Be Negotiated

[Djuretek] Many sharp words have been used about the negotiations between the Croatian authorities and the

representatives of the local Serbs and about the signing of an agreement with them. What do you think about it?

[Bebic] Negotiations are necessary in every war. I do not accept agreements with Serbia or Yugoslavia if the Republic of Croatia has not been previously recognized. It has to be negotiated with rebels who are making war against Croatia in Croatian territory. We have to negotiate in order to reach solutions that will confirm undisputable political issues, such as that Krajina is the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and that an autonomy or something else is a constitutional matter.

There is nothing more to discuss after 20 December because all options for a discussion will be over if nothing happens by this time; if there are still no borders. Croatia has been extremely cooperative in talks so far, but they can be held only within clearly defined conditions, which include the constitutional and the legal order of the Republic of Croatia in the whole of its territory.

[Box, p 7]

Responsible Political Moves

[Djuretek] Some members of the Parliament have demanded a Croatian military intervention in Bihac. There are opinions that it was a mistake that Croatia did not intervene, and on the other hand there are people who say that it was a wise step. How do you see it?

[Bebic] You are right. I think that President Tudjman and the Croatian leadership have been very careful in making political moves in the present critical situation, especially during the last 20 days. Should Croatia make an intervention, this could only happen in order to enforce the UN Security Council Resolution 769, which defined the UNPROFOR deployment along the Croatian border with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Had the UNPROFOR been really deployed along these borders, there would have been no attacks by rebel Serbs from the Croatian territory against another state. If it comes to an intervention, it will have to end at the border of the sovereign State of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even if no special agreements with Bosnia-Herzegovina are made, Croatian forces should not cross the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina based on the agreements partially signed in 1992. An intervention should only establish control of the border.

Former Rights Party President Interviewed

AU0712120694 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian
24 Nov 94 pp 6,7

[Interview with Dobroslov Paraga, former president of the Croatian Party of Rights, by Tihana Tomcic in Rijeka; date not given: "Mikelic Should Have Been Taken Straight to Remetinec as Soon as he Got Out of the Helicopter"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Members of the HSP [Croatian Party of Rights] met in Rijeka to celebrate the fourth anniversary of the establishment of the party in this region. Dobroslav Paraga came to Rijeka as well and we took this opportunity to ask him about the situation in his party, about the New Croatian Right, and about Croatia's most vital question—the reintegration of the occupied areas.*

[Tomicic] How are your fellow Rights Party members managing after the court ruling, how and where do they work?

[Paraga] As is the case in all of Croatia, the HSP does not have a permanent office in Rijeka, and the current regime is to blame for this, both the County of Primorje and Gorski Kotar and the Republic of Croatia in general. It is a disgrace that a party that first stood up to defend the Croatian nation against greater-Serbian evictions is today itself being evicted, has no permanent offices, either in Rijeka or throughout Croatia. However, the present status of the party, which is today practically an underground organization, does not mean we have been completely destroyed and that the regime has the power to ban us. The HSP Central Committee managed to hold its session to set the scene for the party's second general assembly, which is scheduled for February, 1995. We hope our situation will improve by then, for the world has heard about our plight. The latest in a series of efforts to internationalize the abuse of power by President Tudjman and his HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] was Ivo Banac's speech at a CSCE meeting in Budapest. There he presented the HSP's case and the ruling party's attempts to deprive it of its legitimacy and thus declare it a renegade party as an instance of the authorities interfering in Croatia's judicial system. Furthermore, some major Croatian organizations, like the Independent Trade Union Confederation of Croatia, not only recognized us as the legitimate Party of Rights, but also invited us to their congress as the only representatives of the so-called rights party members. I think that even the executive authorities must consider the views of an organization comprising 450,000 members, who recognize our position in Croatia, and we will continue to fight for the legality of the HSP with the support of those major organizations in Croatia and abroad. When we fully restore our legality, the authorities will have to answer for their actions and we will tell the public about everything that has happened. We are still active, which is something that other parties would surely not manage. We have even managed to neutralize the stigma of Nazism and fascism attached to the HSP. Consequently, even the Zagreb Jewish Community knows the difference between fascists and the HSP. It is now obvious where the origins of potential extremism and fascism lie, and where the strongest resistance to possible dictatorship lies, a dictatorship that is practically in effect in Croatia as an authoritative system par excellence, though this dictatorship is not fully out of the closet yet, in the sense of disbanding the parliament or banning the activities of political parties. It is, however, my opinion that

the Croatian regime does not need to keep anyone underground or disband parties, for almost every party except the HSP has members who are HDZ agents.

Liberals Are Not Ready for Change Either

[Tomicic] Another attack on the opposition?

[Paraga] Of course, on the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] and others. I am convinced that replacing the Croatian authorities would not actually mean any changes in Croatia, because the opposition does not want to change anything, they merely want to criticize the ruling party for the sake of their existence as an opposition. Consequently, it is criticism for the sake of criticism, not for the sake of change, for neither the liberals nor any other party are ready to make changes. My comment does not apply to parties in the making, like Mika Tripalo's party, which has a 100-day head start to show what the Action of Social Democrats is prepared to do to prevent the political and every other collapse of Croatia. The HSP requested the assistance of the Croatian parliamentary parties, but not only did they connive at the attack on the party but even rejoiced over it, as they had secretly hoped for it. This rebounded on the opposition and, consequently, today there is no party that is not influenced by the HDZ, from the Croatian Union of Christian Democrats and the Croatian Peasants Party, some of whose members went over to the HDZ, to the HSLS, whose members would do the same given a hint by Tudjman. Let us not forget about the symbiosis of some leading HSLS members and the HDZ extreme right in Livno, when they were ostensibly terribly concerned about the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats, who were actually stabbed in the back. And it would have all been even more tragic had it not been for the Washington Agreements.

[Tomicic] Would you comment on the present situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Until now, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] were advancing, but the situation is changing in favor of the Serbs again.

[Paraga] Bihac is yet another catastrophe that should have been avoided by the concerted action of the present Croatian authorities and Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities. In other words, their supplies corridor leading through the territory of Croatia to the Serb criminals in west Bosnia should have been cut off. Of course, the situation which was obviously designed by the Croatian regime, makes it clear that they have an agreement with Belgrade and Milosevic, and that they still want to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina. A case in point is Bihac, but also the fact that thousands of Milan Martić's Serb criminals were allowed to help Karadžić's units, that Abdić's deserters were also allowed to take part in the fighting from Turanj to Cazin in support of division and a new aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is primarily a sign of weakness and lack of determination on the part of the Zagreb authorities, which have actually given the

green light to such developments. The inevitable conclusion is that the Washington Agreements are melting away. All this points to the fact that the same people make decisions in Zagreb and Belgrade. For instance, Tudjman would rather negotiate with Borislav Mikelic, a war criminal sentenced to 20 years of hard labor in Zagreb, than with the president of a country recognized by the United States, which has also lifted the embargo against it. The fact that Tudjman cannot negotiate with Izetbegovic, but chose a man convicted of war crimes by the Croatian courts instead, illustrates the situation and the functioning of the Croatian legal and political system. The leading man in Croatia violates court rulings, i.e. Franjo Tudjman is destroying our constitutional system from the top and threatens the existence and survival of the Croats by lending a helping hand to Mikelic, Karadzic, and Milosevic. He practically recognized their sovereignty on the territory they occupied and, unfortunately, we have nobody who could control and curb executive authorities, or even warn them that Borislav Mikelic must be arrested the moment he lands at Zagreb airport. There is no extraterritoriality, he is not exempt from Croatian laws. Mikelic should be taken to Remetinec prison the moment he steps out of the helicopter! Instead, the authorities imprison members of HOS [Croatian Defense Forces, a paramilitary HSP force] and members of the Party of Rights, critics are baffled, and tremendous pressure is brought to bear on judges, for the Pantovcak [elite residential district of Zagreb where the ruling party leaders live] dictatorship will break the backbone of every judge defying its will. The only thing we members of the Party of Rights can do is to tour the world warning against such tendencies. We are not willing to compromise, like Budisa, and betray national interests. We are asking countries that recognized Croatia to protect us from the regime that is acting against Croatian national interests.

Federalization—an Anti-Croatian Act

[Tomicic] What do you think about the idea of federalization of Croatia?

[Paraga] Some parties have already fallen for that, first of all Budisa [leader of the HSLS] who first refuted it and then swallowed the bait once again. This is tantamount to dismembering Croatia, to cantonal divisions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and will lead to full atomization of Croatia. We will not accept federalization of Croatia, but only Croatia divided into regions, with a high degree of economic, cultural, and every other autonomy. I think that economic autonomy is most important, for money is taken away from all regions and used for the needs of people who now inhabit Tito's mansions. In other words, federalization will be the end of Croatia and whoever imposes it, be it Galbraith or a Russian, is acting against Croatia, for it is not our goal to get further divided but to form the only federation possible, that between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Tomicic] What do you think is the solution for Bosnia and Croatia? We are approaching the deadline for negotiations with the Croatian Serbs, the termination of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate will soon be on the agenda. In short, there are signs of impending hostilities. Do you consider the war option, which you have hitherto advocated, to be the best solution?

[Paraga] No, I think Croatia is not ready for war. I believe that, without long-term consolidation of internal forces, Croatia is not capable of undertaking that which it will have to tackle sooner or later—breaking the aggression and enabling the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees. However, some have made empty promises that it will be done when we cancel the UNPROFOR mandate or when the authorities say they are ready to do so. I must say these are unrealistic promises, because we do not want the authorities to keep telling lies and ruin what is left of Croatia. In my opinion, we cannot afford to take any military action before securing a sound military economy and preparing the country to function in the state of war. In other words, I think that we do not stand a chance before we are fully prepared for war. Who do we have that can be a match for the Serb officers? Who? Gojko Susak or over-the-hill Bobetko, who was never in a war and whose "merits" are obvious, especially when characterized by experts familiar with military strategy. We cannot rely on them and their like, for they are neither trained nor prepared to lead Croatia into a military showdown with the Serbs by a long shot. The only factor capable of making a speedy consolidation, without which we cannot expect to make any changes in the war, is the potential of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army to grow into a strong, respectable force, but even they cannot do that without large quantities of weapons. Their advantage is the fact that they are constantly fighting and that they, as opposed to the Croatian Army, are a true match for Serb officers.

Breaking the Serb Military Machinery Forever

[Tomicic] How come the Muslims, i.e. the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, are so well armed in spite of the embargo, while the Croatian Army, as you put it, has not managed to prepare for war in the course of the past three or four years?

[Paraga] First of all, their strong will to survive has not diminished, for they have no other place where they can exist as a nation. They do not have another country and their will to survive has even overshadowed their modest military and weapons potentials. You see, when the Serbs launch an organized offensive with full artillery support, whether as units or divisions, they effectively suppress the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, striking at the very heart of it, since the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army does not have such powerful artillery and is not able to strike from a distance like the Serbs with their canons. However, I think they have nevertheless gotten many weapons deliveries by means of small planes and that the

United States has made many military concessions to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, and the fact that the United States has a vested interest in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina arouses the hope that its stand against the aggressor will turn into active support, and not remain forever in the form of declarations or of withdrawing ships that enforce the embargo.

[Tomicic] Do you think NATO will get involved?

[Paraga] Even if it does, it will not be for the sake of Bosnia, but for the sake of the United States and 55 countries of the Islamic Conference that support Bosnia and account for much of the pressure. Anyway, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other countries hold hundreds of billions of petrodollars in banks in the United States and U.S. presidents have always steered clear of coming into conflict with them. After all, there are powerful Islamic forces in those countries that can become radical and create serious problems, if the United States is not supportive of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Muslims. That is why the U.S. Congress ratified the decision to lift the embargo and help the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government. Furthermore, Washington, i.e. NATO, could get more actively involved, since their interest in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina takes precedence over the bleak alliance with the British or the French based on tradition and history. As for a possible solution, I think that a long-term solution lies in the collapse and defeat of the Serb military machinery. We cannot leave this war unresolved, without having a victor and a loser. This war must have a definite end for the sake of principles in the world, which would amount to nothing if the war does not end with Belgrade's capitulation. We need the defeat of Belgrade and to bring criminals to justice, not just another Nuremberg for the sake of Nuremberg, but for the sake of peace in this region, as well as for peace in all of Europe. If we do not achieve that, this region will be a source of lasting turmoil, a threat to peace, for Serbia is the source of all evil—from the penetration of the Russians as their ally, to endangering other nations. The war will not end with the occupation and breaking up of Bosnia-Herzegovina or parts of Croatia, which could happen. They would only spread further toward Bulgaria, possibly also toward Macedonia and Albania, in the sense of dividing Macedonia. Greater Serbian machinery is a many-headed monster and if all of its heads are not cut off, it will be a lasting source of danger.

Croatia Has Lost the War

[Tomicic] Speaking about the final solution, the Social Democratic Union for instance, contends that Croatia has lost the war.

[Paraga] Actually, already during the election campaign, I said Croatia was defeated. It would be stupid to claim it was not. Only Milas and Tudjman still claim that we liberated two-thirds of the country and that only one-third is still occupied. That is nonsense. We know who let the Yugoslav National Army leave Croatia and under what terms. After all, the talks in Karadjordjevo prove

that there was an agreement on exchanging territory and people. Actually, Croatia lost the war with the fall of Vukovar. Indeed, not all of its territory is occupied by Serbia, but the framework imposed on the free part of its territory have practically turned Croatia into a governorate of Galbraith, Kerestijanac, and some diplomats who do not really understand what is going on. If they offer a federation on the model of the United States, they do not understand what the concept of greater Serbia is about, nor do they understand this region. We could have just preserved Yugoslavia as a federation, but that was impossible not because of us but because of the Serbs who make the existence of any federation on this territory unfeasible. I guess what they mean by federation is to have the Serbs in it as a nation, while it would actually only be a time-out for the Serbs, a chance to regain their strength, regroup their forces, before they break that federation as well. After all, Yugoslavia did not fall because of the Croats but because of enormous Serbian appetites.

[Tomicic] Since you said that Croatia has no military potential to liberate all of its areas, and that the policies of the Croatian authorities are useless and wrong, the only way to change the situation is to change the regime.

[Paraga] The fall of the present regime is a prerequisite for change.

Tudjman Is Among Those Who Violate the Constitution the Most

[Tomicic] But you said that even the opposition is not able to make major changes. Is that view of yours not too pessimistic?

[Paraga] You are right, it does seem pessimistic, but I am not in politics to deceive or cheat people, but to tell them how things really stand, give them hard facts and then talk about our situation. I think we must make a change in the parliament, and if the parliament should grow stronger in the sense that the Croatian Democratic Community becomes the opposition, we could soon curb even President Tudjman and put him in the framework of the Constitution and the law, which defines his authority and responsibility. He violated the Constitution, we have established that as a fact. He is among those who violate the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia both on the domestic and international scene.

[Tomicic] When do you think you will be able to restore your status on the Croatian political scene?

[Paraga] That is a difficult question to answer. Probably when we become stronger than those who placed us in this position. I hope it will happen one day, but I cannot tell you exactly when that will be. I would like it to happen today. I can only tell you that is bound to happen some day, because the present regime has compromised itself and lost face so many times that they would be replaced in a flash, if there were only more freedom of the press in Croatia. No one can sanction and accept

such politics on any level and I think that unions can play an important role, if they manage to avoid the control that the system is trying to impose on them. They are the strongest factor that could stop this wheel of power with regard to social turmoil and welfare problems, if they only had enough will and courage, because they are the most numerous and most represented organization in all of Croatia. Unfortunately, we cannot expect that from any party. Except perhaps from this one, but we have been pushed underground and cannot communicate with the public.

Schwartz's Ideas Disastrous for Croatia

[Tomicic] The New Croatian Right has been founded. You talked about Nazism and mentioned the case involving the Jewish Religious Community. Were you referring to them?

[Paraga] Yes, they are Nazis. I know that for a fact because I know them personally. If I did not, I would probably not be so sure, but since I know them I am sure. I hate labeling people, for I was labeled so many times myself, but I am convinced about them. Mladen Schwartz is not the rightist he claims he is in his column in HRVATSKO PRAVO [Croatian Right] "On the Right Channel." Quite the contrary, he is a political nonentity and I think he made the mistake of his life when he established contact with neo-Nazi organizations, most of which will soon be banned, while on the other hand, it is out of all proportion to attempt to implement any kind of Nazi ideology in Croatia or to create an elite in the Croatian society on the model of feudalism. But I think what happened to him is no coincidence, for he has been eradicated as the worst eradicators were eradicated too. [sentence as published]

[Tomicic] What would be your reaction to such an organization if you were in power?

[Paraga] I think the regime wanted to label us as such, but failed for want of arguments, because we are really not Nazis. On the contrary, we have always condemned Nazism and fascism. We think they should be given a chance to speak in public, but that would provoke such a violent backlash that there would be very few people who would not demand that such an organization or party be banned. Advocating Schwartz's ideas would have disastrous consequences for Croatia and the Croats, as they would for any other nation in the world. What good would it do to provoke such a small nation in Croatia, a minority like the Jews? I was at the Jewish Community when Bujanec came as a pure agitator-agent. I did not put any such ideas in their heads; they did not learn that in the HSP. They were under full control while they were in the HSP, and when they left they showed their true colors. They could never hear, see, or read anything like it in the HSP. I think neither Schwartz nor Bujanec would have appeared if it had not been for attempts to recruit individuals for anti-HSP activities. Let me remind you that Bujanec, in one of his statements you published in NOVI LIST, welcomed the healthy forces in

the HDZ lead by Vladimir Seks. Furthermore, let us not forget that Seks sat in the front row at the Jewish Community while people were making noises outside and that he stood up in the middle of an interesting debate to say it had nothing to do with the Croatian reality, although it was about the New Croatian Right. I guess they think this is all artificial, that somebody else is pulling the strings, that they are far too marginal to be dangerous. But others thought like that too until the situation gained momentum. Moreover, tolerance of them is also odd, for the New Croatian Right did not only draw the media's attention, but publicly promotes its activities, prints its programs, distributes fliers without problems.... They suddenly have money, though they were broke when they were with us. How is it that they can now organize conferences, hire conference halls when they did not have a penny to their name when they were in the HSP? Therefore, somebody is backing them.

Definitely: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina Two Independent Countries

[Tomicic] Considering this distribution of power, how "right" is your party on the scale of right-wing parties?

[Paraga] You see, we have not changed really. HSP members have changed, but the HSP program we are trying to follow has remained the same. We have only made some minor changes, in that we once used to advocate Croatia united in its countries, i.e. Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while we now think those are two independent countries. Indeed, we are still trying to promote cooperation and link the two countries in a legal manner, not by advocating divisions or occupations, for this war has shown what that entails. If our program is said to be "right," my question is who are those who labeled it as such. I said: we have a clear program for full democratization for any country. We have a clear-cut division of power and other basic elements of democracy. We lean toward the right when defending state borders, sovereignty of the Croatian nation, i.e. we are "right" in defending the country against the aggressor, for we think there should be no negotiations until the aggressor is on our territory. We advocate active defense, not a defense of withdrawals and cease-fires. That should be characteristic of every party, not only of the right.

[Tomicic] I asked that because you seem rather mild compared to the New Croatian Right, so it seems that your party has suddenly lost one of its main characteristics?

[Paraga] We have always been like that, but we were anathematized and people got the wrong impression. Has the HOS ever made an attempt on anyone's life, blown anything up, killed anyone? Never. That was all animosity on part of the people in power, for somebody actually bothered to defend the country while they were hibernating, claiming that the Yugoslav National Army and [former federal defense minister] Kadijevic would not get into war. It is not my fault that they betrayed Slovenia, that now they even want to wage war on

Slovenia, and that Slovenia helped me arm my men. We are a party of the right in the sense that we are a traditional, conservative, and civic party that will not give up the values of civil society, but we are not a repressive party of right orientation. However, speaking of fascism, I was the first antifascist in Croatia! I also spoke up against the regime that, though it was called communist, had quite a few elements of fascism, like the present regime. I told those who label me as a fascist: "Gentlemen, it is you who are

fascists!" Neither my ideas nor methods reveal traits of fascism. I have never thought some people are inferior or that people can be killed without trial. On the contrary, I stood up against that. I want personal safety for every individual and for society in general. If a person can be taken to Mt. Sljeme (mountain north of Zagreb) and be killed there, then we have a jungle. That is not Croatia. I said if that starts happening, I will be the first to go to the woods to fight against that regime!

Crvenkovski Facing Difficulties Forming Cabinet

LD0712145694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1231 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 7 Dec (TANJUG)—Seven days before the deadline for the formation of a new government of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia expires, the current prime minister, Branko Crvenkovski, is faced with unexpected problems in filling posts in the new cabinet, TANJUG learned today in Skopje.

In addition to internal coalition disagreements on some key posts in the future administration, over the past few days the tripartite League for Macedonia has suffered powerful setbacks in the media for its indirect interference in what happened at the Skopje discotheques "Hard Rock" and "Sileks", something which is adding to the difficulties Crvenkovski is having in putting together a new cabinet.

The public has been acquainted with the fact that the vandals who demolished "Hard Rock", because of unsettled scores in connection with racketeering, were people hired to maintain security at meetings of the victorious League for Macedonia.

Accusations are also being made by parties which are partners in the coalition—the liberals and the socialists—of "deals with criminals" who are close to individuals in the Social-Democratic Alliance for Macedonia (SDSM), whose leader is Prime Minister Designate Crvenkovski.

It has been learned that the distribution of portfolios in the new administration according to the successes of the parties in the elections has been put on ice.

Attempts by the liberals to get their people appointed to posts which would enable domination of the economic and financial affairs of the state administration are not meeting with understanding among the leadership of the SDSM.

Besides the unfortunate circumstances in the victorious coalition itself, which won a comfortable two-thirds majority in October's parliamentary elections, meeting the demand that Albanians also be represented in the government is another important problem.

According to what has been learned so far, talks between the prime minister designate and representatives of the relatively moderate Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity of Abdurahman Aliti, one of the deputy speakers of parliament, have not produced concrete results. Disagreements arose over the number and also over the "value" of the portfolios on offer to Albanian representatives.

The deadline for forming the Macedonian Government expires on 15 December and there is public speculation that the head of state, Kiro Gligorov, may intervene in a decisive way.

Creation of Securities Exchange, Stock Market

95BA0042A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 21 Oct 94 p 9

[Article by S.M. Vankova: "A Market Barometer of the Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *With the opening of the Skopje securities market, the enterprises will be given the opportunity to establish their market value;*

All bank securities will be sold the moment the market opens; as of December, 50 shares from privatization will be quoted as well;

Only juridical persons registered to trade in securities and having their own brokers may be members of the exchange;

There will be two levels of protection from speculation: self-control and control by the Securities Commission

The board of the first securities market in the country will light up probably in the second half of next month. Actually, this will also mark the start of the first organized market barometer of the condition of the economy, through which the market entities will be able to determine their value.

The Skopje securities market, which was founded as a stock company by eight founders (the Privatization Agency, three banks, and four private enterprises), is only waiting for the permission of the Securities Commission; meanwhile, it is completing preparations in terms of procuring equipment, determining the locale, and admitting stock exchange members.

Only Juridical Persons May Be Members

The draft plan for the stock market, which was formulated by the Skopje Economics Institute, was based on the practical experience of the developed exchanges and the exchanges of countries in a state of transition. The main purpose of its internal documents and agencies is to establish adequate mechanisms and instruments to protect the interests of the investors and provide an overall guarantee for avoiding speculative transactions. The intention is to start under conditions of a high degree of trust, and thus to ensure a high rating for the customers and, therefore, successful operations.

"We expect to begin without major problems in our work, for in this area as well we have had the opportunity to learn from other countries in transition and to avoid their errors," claims interim exchange director Evgeni Zografski. "Something which will be quickly accomplished is the acceptance of exchange members. They must consist exclusively of juridical persons, banks, financial institutions, funds, and insurance companies, which may be registered for trading in securities, have their authorized broker, be able to function from the business and credit viewpoints, and have the permission of the Securities Commission. Actually, all interested

juridical and physical persons in the country will be able to sell their securities on the stock market through our members and their authorized brokers, who are simply middlemen in the purchase and sale activities. For the time being, we have seven or eight trained brokers. We believe that this suffices as a start. Subsequently, we may consider the training of more experts.

Bonds, stocks, certificates, and notes can be traded. At present, all that is available is bank securities; by the end of December, however, the stock exchange expects the appearance of about 50 shares of privatized enterprises in the country, which are profitable and which can become immediately subjects of trade. This includes the balance of the privatization shares held by the Privatization Agency, which must offer them for sale, through public announcements or else through the exchange, which becomes a matter of business policy. Furthermore, the shares from the privatization offered at the exchange will have their value determined and will be consolidated, for the existence of 5,000 workers and 5,000 stockholders usually implies difficulties in company management and administration. Actually, ensuring a more successful promotion of privatization is one of the reasons for the opening of the exchange, for the experience of Eastern European countries has indicated that shares cannot be sold without a stock exchange.

Unofficial Trade

Also interesting is the procedure for offering shares on the stock market. The regulation and the statutes call for special criteria for the several levels of trade. The highest is official trade, which implies taking the closest possible look before the shares are accepted. According to Zografski, at this point this is unacceptable to us. For example, we cannot set a criterion providing that only shares with three-year financial audit are accepted, when we know that not a single report has been financially audited. That is precisely why, taking into consideration the situation of the enterprises, the stock exchange has accepted an unofficial level of trade for the time being, this level is subject to much easier criteria for the acceptance of securities. Also very important is the feature of total revelation of all features, for the exchange cannot allow some business factors to be claimed by the company as business secrets. The enterprises will have to draft special prospectuses based on predetermined models, to enable a potential investor to gain precise knowledge as to where he is investing and why.

The internal documents and organization, Zografski emphasized, pay particular attention to the protective mechanisms and self-control in the operations of the exchange in order to avoid or promptly block any speculation threatening a potential danger of collapse. Any questionably sharp increase or decrease in the value of the securities will be a signal for closing down the market and determining the reasons. In accordance with

an honor code, those employed in the exchange (there will be no more than 15) and the brokers will have no right to spread alarming news. We must rely on their honesty, for otherwise there may be great upheavals, as is currently the case at the Moscow stock exchange. The brokers are, furthermore, forbidden to engage successively in several transactions at high or low prices, thus once again limiting the scope for speculations. Control and supervision of exchange operations will be provided by a special exchange service, and the safety guarantee is strengthened also through the right of outside control by the Securities Commission.

It is expected that initially the stock exchange will be open twice weekly. The procedure of the exchange's work will be known in advance and the number of days in the year during which it will be closed will be known and precisely determined. Special cards will ensure entry in the stock exchange premises and the auction method will be used in purchases and sales. The atmosphere of the actual exchange could be determined by public calls although the transactions will be recorded electronically.

Health Institute Issues Statistics on AIDS

AU0712181294 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 1 Dec 94 p 5

["E.K."-initialed report: "Over 1,000-HIV Positive Cases in Macedonia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first person with HIV in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] was registered in 1987. The person with the virus was said to be a hemophiliac who became infected while using a device for treating hemophilia imported from abroad.

Since then, a total of 30 people have contracted the AIDS virus. Of these, 17 have fallen ill with AIDS, while the other 13 only have the virus. According to the latest information of the Institute for Health Protection of the Republic of Macedonia, of the total number of infected, 13 have died, although two persons are said to have died of some other disease. Of the four AIDS-infected persons still alive, only one lives in the country, said Dr. Sotir Sotirovski, an epidemiologist at the Institute. The rest of them went abroad from where, in fact, they had come to the country. Of the total number of infected and fallen ill (30) since 1987, 20 of them are AIDS cases imported from other countries, while the remaining 10 are hemophiliacs. Even though these figures are official, they are considered to be far from reality. According to the calculations based on the World Health Organization's formula, there are over 1,000 HIV-positive persons in Macedonia today. Of the registered cases so far, 21 are men and nine are women. Among them there are two persons under the age of six. According to the municipalities, HIV-positive or infected persons were registered in Prilep, Tetovo, Bitola, Stip, Skopje, Ohrid, Kratovo, Kicevo, and Kavadarci.

Drnovsek Assesses CSCE; Relations With Italy

*AU0712173894 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in
Slovene 1430 GMT 7 Dec 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference today, Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek spoke about the CSCE summit in Budapest that ended yesterday and about Italian-Slovene relations. These relations were also the main topic of his bilateral talks in Budapest. In his assessment, the summit demonstrated that the differences in Europe are considerable and that, for this reason, the efficiency in the resolution of conflicts is lower. It has transpired that Russia is becoming a special partner and that there is no unity between Europe and the United States.

Regarding Slovene-Italian relations, he said that, in talks, all partners expressed support for our state and promised to press Italy further. Since Italy has been blocking us constantly in the last few months, following Norway's no to the European Union, integration into the European Free Trade Association has again become interesting for us, as this is also one of the ways in which we can access the European market.

Commission Publishes Preliminary Vote Results

*AU0712182194 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in
Slovene 1430 GMT 7 Dec 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Republican Electoral Commission published a preliminary report about percentage of votes given to individual political parties at the 4 December elections to municipal councils. The data encompass all 147 municipalities.

According to the currently unofficial data, the highest number of votes, namely 18.44 percent, were won by the Slovene Christian Democratic Party candidates for municipal councillors. The candidates of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia received 17.22 percent of votes, followed by the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia with 13.89 percent, and the United List of Social Democrats with 13.5 percent.

Closely behind them is the Slovene Peoples' Party with 12.36 percent of votes. The Democratic Party of Retirees won 3.6 percent, the Slovene National Party 3.44 percent, the Greens of Slovenia 3.07 percent, the Alliance for Primorska 1.36, the Democratic Party 1.32 percent, the Slovene National Right 0.71 percent, the Peoples' Democrats 0.67 percent, the Slovene Craftsmen and Entrepreneurs Party 0.25 percent, and the Party for Equality of Counties 0.06 percent. Independent candidates jointly won 2.41 percent of the votes.

In comparison to the State Chamber elections in 1992, the party that made the biggest progress was the Social

Democratic Party by more than 10.6 percent. The party that suffered the biggest drawback was the Slovene National Party, which lost slightly more than 6.5 percent, and the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, which lost little more than 6.2 percent. The Slovene Christian Democrats and the Peoples' Party have made considerable progress, too, the first by slightly over 4 percent and the other one by little more than 3.7 percent. The Democrats fell back by nearly 4 percent, and the Greens by less than a percent.

Drnovsek on Local Elections

*AU0712174294 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in
Slovene 1430 GMT 7 Dec 94*

[Report by Igor Juric on news conference by Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek in Ljubljana on 7 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Drnovsek's opinion, we need to wait for the second round of local elections for the final assessment. In his opinion, the results of the 4 December round show that nothing earth-shattering or spectacular has happened that could influence the balance of powers in the State Chamber and the government.

Drnovsek believes that, at the elections, the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS] strengthened its position at the local level.

The results of the 4 December elections will also not alter the relations with the coalition partners. The talks on the definition of the coalition relations with the Christian Democrats will continue. He expects that these relations will remain more or less the same as in the past two years.

The Christian Democratic ministers, according to him, work professionally in the government and future cooperation on such a basis is possible. However, he sees no reason to alter his opinion about the activities of party president Peterle in the last few months. For the time being, no firm coalition agreement exists yet, as everybody needed a time out for the preparations for the elections and the elections themselves. However, Drnovsek is primarily concentrating on relations with Italy.

The coalition talks will continue after the second round of elections. Although a new firm agreement is not in force yet, Drnovsek says he does not expect any problems in passing a budget memorandum and the law on financing of municipalities in the State Chamber, as the old coalition agreement remains valid.

Drnovsek also sees no reason for calling early State Chamber elections.

Federal

Jovanovic, Italian Official Discuss Bosnia

LD0712173394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1711
GMT 7 Dec 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 7 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic and Italian Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Livio Caputo on Wednesday urged a continuation of the peace process for Bosnia.

A government statement issued after the talks quoted Jovanovic and Caputo as saying a just and lasting resolution of the Bosnian crisis, acceptable for all Bosnia's warring sides, could be reached only through political means.

Jovanovic and Caputo agreed that there must be an immediate and lasting cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and that Bosnia's warring sides should sit at the negotiating table. An acceptable basis for the negotiations are the latest positions of the international 'Contact Group' for Bosnia, they said.

Jovanovic said it was necessary to completely lift the sanctions against Yugoslavia, saying this would significantly reinvigorate the peace process and secure the final resolution of the political crisis in Bosnia.

Caputo said Italy backed Yugoslavia's and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's efforts to help settle the Bosnian conflict peacefully. Caputo said Rome was willing to help reintegrate Yugoslavia into international organizations and bodies as soon as possible. Jovanovic and Caputo said it was in both countries' interest to improve cooperation, specifically once the sanctions were lifted.

Caputo reiterated at the press conference in Belgrade after the talks that Italy's view was that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia had to be resolved peacefully. Caputo said Rome was aware of a series of positive processes, which he said could serve as a framework for the future negotiations. He said the agreement on economic issues signed by Serb Krajina and Croatia Friday was of particular importance. He said one of the positive processes was the Contact Group's readiness to consider granting the Bosnian Serbs the right to confederate with Yugoslavia. He said the situation, both from the political and the logistic point of view, could be rendered more acceptable by the Bosnian Serbs' and Muslims' readiness to negotiate a possible exchange of territories.

Asked what he thought of Belgrade's role in the peace process, Caputo said it was of vital importance, and said only Belgrade could at this point exert necessary pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group plan. Responding to a remark that such pressure did exist but only insufficiently, Caputo reiterated Italian Foreign

Minister Antonio Martino's view that Yugoslavia's role in the resolution of this crisis was essential. He said the crisis could not be resolved without Yugoslavia's engagement and its full cooperation.

Caputo said his visit to Belgrade should serve as a link between Martino's visit to Belgrade this summer and Jovanovic's forthcoming visit to Rome.

Comment by Caputo on Bosnia

LD0712224994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2231
GMT 7 Dec 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 7 (TANJUG)—Undersecretary of state in the Italian Foreign Ministry Senator Livio Caputo said Wednesday the 'Contact Group' had made major breakthroughs for Bosnian Serbs.

Caputo told a press conference in Belgrade that it was now necessary for Bosnian Serbs to give an 'immediate' reply.

He said the influence of the Belgrade government on Bosnian Serbs was vital in making use of this new chance.

Caputo said a general ceasefire should first be established in Bosnia without any long stories about its possible ideal duration. Bosnian Serbs should then accept the Contact Group peace plan which he said was considerably improved over the past few days.

After this, it is necessary to negotiate a possible exchange of territories, and, finally, it remains to attempt a constitutional restructuring of Bosnia within its internationally recognized borders, Caputo said.

Caputo also said a formula should be found for a constitutional arrangement which would enable Krajina Serbs to accept their position within Croatia's borders. He urged also the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Croatia.

Italy will support the Croatian Government in placing its contacts and relations with Krajina Serbs at the highest possible level, Caputo said.

Serbs in Krajina set up their own state, the Republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution. The territory was placed under United Nations protection in March 1992, but has since been the target of four Croatian military offensives.

Caputo said the sanctions against Yugoslavia would be lifted at one point along the way toward peace. Bilateral relations and initiatives which can be taken under sanctions and once they are lifted were considered during the talks in Belgrade, Caputo said.

Caputo Wednesday conferred with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic and Deputy Yugoslav Premier and Federal Finance Minister Jovan Zebic. A government statement quoted Zebic as saying during the talks that there were objective preconditions and that business partners on both sides were interested in restoring comprehensive cooperation between the two countries. Zebic also said the Yugoslav Government was ready to resume the begun process of normalizing Serb-Croat relations, said the statement.

Commentary Views 'Quandary' in CSCE's Role
LD0712160294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1539 GMT 7 Dec 94

[By Bora Lalic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 7 (TANJUG)—The CSCE summit in Budapest left an apparent quandary, as to its future role and as to who will have the main say on European security and cooperation matters.

On the one side are the USA and NATO and on the other the Europeans.

The results of the summit are moderate. The gathering has shown that the forum, created two decades ago at the time of the Cold War, has not established its role in a changing global political setting, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union.

An urgency for change was present at the Budapest summit. A decision was made that as of next year the CSCE should no longer be a place of assembly but an organization.

The decision should constitute an important step in the evolution of the CSCE from a forum of periodical assembly into an organization that would tackle European security and cooperation issues on a permanent, active and organized basis.

Currently the CSCE is neither a forum nor an organization. It has overgrown its original role while the new one has not yet been defined.

Budapest has shown that the fate of a "new CSCE" depends in the first place on the coordination of stands of the two super powers, the USA and Russia, even though the USA thinks it is the only super power left.

It will also depend on the further development of relations between West Europe and Washington and if the forces prevail who consider that security and cooperation on the old continent should be within the competence of Europeans. Differences were also heard in Budapest. President Clinton made it clear he saw security in Europe under an expanded NATO umbrella and a leading role for the U.S. The expanded NATO would reach the borders of Russia, to include most countries of the former Warsaw Pact. Russian President Boris Yeltsin reacted strongly to this describing it as an attempt to isolate and sideline Russia on a territory

which is of vital importance to it, not only for the further transformation of the country, but also for its future. Stressing that Russia is a force not to be ignored when it comes to the stability of Europe, especially of Eastern Europe, Yeltsin warned Washington and NATO not to "sow the seed of distrust" among countries which are no longer adversaries but partners. "Europe has not yet freed itself from traces of the 'Cold War' and it would be dangerous to push it now into a 'cold peace'," he said. [no closing quotation marks as received]

Clinton showed no sign of giving way in Budapest, noting that nobody, not even Russia, will be given the right to veto the intention of NATO to expand into Eastern Europe. However, the U.S. President will have to take this view into careful consideration since the role of Russia, as a big country and big military power, should never be underestimated. Another reason is that, in Western Europe, there are forces who think that Yeltsin is right, just as they are convinced that European security and cooperation matters should gradually pass within the competence of the Europeans themselves. Such a conviction has been influenced by the war in Bosnia, a testing ground for European security, where both Washington and NATO have not passed the trial.

Serbia

Authorities Interrogate, Deport 15 Bosniaks

AU0712160994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian authorities have returned 15 people of Bosniak nationality, who had flown to Belgrade from Frankfurt, to Belgrade Airport. All the passengers returned had previously been interrogated for three full days. They were mistreated on the premises of the state security. After that, they were sent back to Frankfurt airport. The explanation given was that they were allegedly dangerous terrorists. The police in Frankfurt were quite clear that these people were citizens of the so-called Yugoslavia, that they were Bosniaks from Sandzak temporarily visiting Germany, and that they wanted to return home. The fate of two of the Bosniak passengers is still not known.

Health Institute Issues AIDS Statistics

AU0712142694 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 5 Dec 94 p 27

[Information supplied by "AIDS Advice Office, City Institute for Health Protection, 29 November, Street 54a, Belgrade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since 1987, when the AIDS Advice Office was set up, 812 HIV-positive persons have been registered. Of these, 298 were infected with AIDS and 241 have died. Among the infected, 69 percent are drug-users (see table below). Among heterosexuals, the number of infected women is rising significantly. In

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1989, 3 percent were women, in 1992—6 percent, and today they make up 10 percent of infected heterosexuals. Among those infected, 78 percent are men and 22 percent women. The number of infected women has been rising recently.

intravenous drug-users	206 persons	69 percent
heterosexuals	29 persons	10 percent
homosexuals	21 persons	7 percent
hemophiliacs	16 persons	6 percent
bisexuals	8 persons	3 percent
children of HIV-positive mothers	4 persons	1 percent
transfusion	3 persons	1 percent
cause of infection not identified	11 persons	3 percent

The table shows the number of persons infected with AIDS according to different groups in the total number of infected persons in our country.

Vojvodina

VMDK Intends To Assert Autonomy Issue

AU0812072594 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 3 Dec 94 p 3

["N.M.E."-initialed report: "The VMDK Speeds up the Autonomy Issue—They Are Opening a Diplomatic Offensive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians [VMDK] believes that time has come to try to have their autonomy concept asserted in practice. Chairman Andras Agoston and Deputy Chairman Janos Vekas justified this by saying that the forthcoming recognition of the self-determination of the Serbian Krajinas has to be utilized and the issue of the autonomy of Hungarians also has to be raised in Serbia.

This was the goal of Vekas's trip to the United States and Canada and Agoston's to Zagreb, they told the press at the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Border [HTMH] on 2 December. Vekas returned from his trip, during which he was able to meet U.S. Congress and State Department representatives, in an optimistic mood. Vekas said that his negotiating partners had not considered the situation of Vojvodina Hungarians to be a secondary issue in the past, either, but they promised to pay even more attention to it in the future.

Agoston discussed the issue of autonomy with Geert Ahrens, the Deputy of Peace Mediator Lord Owen, in Zagreb and, according to his announcement, essential differences do not exist between the self-determination promised to the Serbs in Croatia and the VMDK's concept. The VMDK will review and update its autonomy plan again and, after it is approved by the VMDK's congress, it is planning to start extensive diplomatic activity.

According to Agoston, "the issue of the autonomy of Vojvodina Hungarians will also have to be opened in Hungary" because a "dual attitude can be seen towards it here, too." Agoston complained that, although in principle the Hungarian Government supports the autonomy, in practice it hinders its implementation. He was hinting at the Vojvodina section of the Illyes Foundation's board of trustees, which had been set up without the VMDK's participation.

Titular State Secretary Laszlo Labody, leader of the HTMH, attributed the VMDK's accusations that the HTMH does not represent the government program's goals to misunderstandings and an unsatisfactory flow of information. He stated that commitment to the autonomy efforts of the Hungarians living beyond the border is completely unequivocal. As to the local section of the board of trustees, he said that only the Illyes Foundation can approve the members of the body that awards financial support. This has not yet been done and they will try to institutionally ensure the VMDK's participation in the board of trustees.

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